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ABSTRACT 
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) experience subpar performance in some of their 
foreign subsidiaries. Despite the clear importance to practitioners, there are surprisingly few 
comprehensive studies on the appropriate responses to be taken when such a situation occurs. 
Studies addressing the subpar performance phenomenon have been fragmented across research 
domains, causing there to be a lack of theory-driven studies within an international context to 
provide insights. Thus, the research questions guiding this thesis are: When a foreign subsidiary 
experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what determines which specific type of response is 
chosen (if any at all)? Which type of response (if any) is most conducive to increasing recovery 
and survival prospects? What factors determine the timing of a response and what role does the 
timing of responses play in the effectiveness of the chosen response in increasing recovery and 
survival prospects? 
Drawing from a resource orchestration framework and related constructs, hypotheses are 
developed to differentiate between processes of “Identifying”, “Responding”, and 
“Synchronizing” when subpar performance occurs in foreign subsidiaries. Sequence analysis, 
multinomial logit regression, gap time competing-risk event history analysis, OLS regression, 
and estimations of curvilinear effects in logit regressions are performed to test a series of 
hypotheses on a sample of 17,982 observations, representing 5,669 subsidiaries in 94 countries. 
Our findings suggest that the subpar performance phenomenon is quite prevalent, with 
hundreds of subsidiaries in the sample experiencing as much as 10 or more years of consecutive 
subpar performance. Surprisingly, the most frequent sequences are those in which subsidiaries 
appear to not respond to subpar performance, at least according to the responses measured 
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herein. Regarding “Identifying”, we find that determinants at the country-level, MNE-level, and 
the subsidiary-level help predict whether a response is administered and if so, which one. 
Generally, if responses occur (“Responding”), they result in superior results over non-responses - 
if the focus is on the long-term survival prospects of the subsidiary. In the short-term, responses 
may be followed by adjustment periods which may prolong the subpar performance period. 
Moreover, increases in headquarter commitment appear to have a more beneficial effect than 
decreases in commitment. Regarding the “Synchronizing” dimension, we find that the existence 
of communication channels appear to improve the timeliness of a response. Moreover, the 
relationship between the time-to-first-response and the probability of recovery (versus exit) is 
curvilinear (inverted U-shape), such that recovery is most likely when the response occurs at a 
medium amount of time (3 to 6 years) after the onset of the subpar performance sequence. This 
curvilinear relationship is amplified for deceases in commitment, suggesting that the 
effectiveness of such responses is more sensitive to timing than increases in commitment. 
Regarding the replacement of general managers, we find that only early replacements enhance 
the likelihood of recovery. 
 The study is expected to advance understanding of the subpar performance phenomenon 
as well as appropriate responses by conceptually integrating the perspectives scattered across 
multiple research domains, thereby responding to calls from several literatures. The findings also 
provide some guidance to practitioners in MNEs who face the dilemma of how to appropriately 
respond to subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries. 
Keywords: Subpar performance, foreign subsidiaries, turnaround, organizational decline, 
resource orchestration   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
 Much of the international business literature has focused on growth (Whetten, 1980; 
Benito, 2005). As Tsui (2007) notes in her review of international management research, this 
focus has been a reflection of the broader context which, especially after World War II, has been 
characterized by an unprecedented increase in prosperity in many countries. Following the lead 
of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which expanded their boundaries across an increasingly 
larger number of countries, international business scholars emphasized growth-related topic 
areas such as understanding the global business environment, internationalization, entry mode 
decisions, international collaborations, and foreign direct investment. Indeed, these are the top 
five areas of research Werner (2002) identified in a review of 20 top management journals in the 
period between 1996 and 2000. Lu (2003) identified similar areas of focus in her review of 
international strategy research.  
As Whetten (1980) and Tsui (2007) note, this enthusiasm for growth-related research 
may particularly be a reflection of the fact that much international business research has 
originated from a North American research paradigm. This context is characterized by periods of 
particularly strong growth, widespread global expansion of MNEs originating from it, and a 
culture in which failure can be considered a taboo and reason for blame. As a result, the need and 
the openness for anything but growth-oriented research have been limited. 
This overarching bias towards growth, however, has increasingly been faced with a 
societal and organizational reality of decreasing rates of growth, progressively tighter profit 
margins, rising global wages, diminishing returns, and more dynamic competitive markets. How 
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high some societies and organizations can fall after years of growth was most painfully brought 
to light by the recent global financial crisis. This crisis lasted from 2007 until 2009 in the U.S. 
but much longer in other regions such as Europe, where it funnelled into a debt crisis. What this 
crisis and smaller ones before it revealed is that the global marketplace consists of multitudes of 
connections which can harm a whole system when a part of it falters. As a result, GDP per capita 
rates fell, as did exports of goods and services (as a percentage of GDP) for countries like China, 
Germany, and Japan. Unemployment rates increased in many countries as well (e.g. in Germany 
between 1990 to 2006 and in the US during the financial crisis). While aggregated indicators 
such as GDP per capita or export rates recovered for most countries some years after the 
financial crisis, the fate of selected countries and organizations may be much bleaker. In the U.S. 
alone, the total decline in the number of firms during the crisis amounted to 365,231 firms (about 
6 percent), throwing the economy back to levels from 2002 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  
However, organizational decline and survival prospects may not just be the result of 
financial crises or other external factors such as the uncertainty associated with conflict zones 
(Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013) or the results of overall industry decline (Filatotchev & Toms, 
2003). Internal factors such as ineffective management (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 
2007), an insufficient degree of fit with the organization’s external environment (Zajac, Kraatz, 
& Bresser, 2000) or conflict (Morrill, 1991) also play a role in causing organizational decline. In 
sum, organizational decline has become an increasingly apparent organizational reality which 
makes research in this area imperative.  
Since the mid-1970s, a growing group of scholars has turned their attention to studying 
the phenomenon of organizational declines and turnarounds. In their 1993 review of the 
turnaround literature, Pearce and Robbins note that “The identification of appropriate managerial 
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responses to financial decline has become increasingly important.” (p. 613). Two decades later, 
Trahms, Ndofor, and Sirmon (2013: 1278) second this, noting that “about half (49.8%) of firms 
in the S&P 500 index for the year 2010 had experienced more than 3 years of decline within the 
prior 5 years. […it is thus] likely to remain a highly relevant concern to managers worldwide”.  
Despite an increasingly interconnected global economy (exemplified by the worldwide 
rippling effects of the financial crisis) and the multitude of MNEs with vast networks of foreign 
subsidiaries, research on organizational decline has mostly been focused on corporate-level 
and/or business-level declines in a domestic context. These are characterized by declines that 
either affect the entire structure of the organization (e.g. Johnson, 1996) or its overarching 
business strategies (e.g. Barker & Duhaime, 1997). Anecdotes abound, however, of prominent 
examples of MNE investment decisions turning sour, such as U.S.-based Target Corp pulling out 
of the Canadian market after only two years with a US$2bn operating loss (Shaw, 2015) or 
Bombardier retrenching about 10 percent of its global workforce after disappointing performance 
(Marotte, 2016). Many ventures report subpar performance for several years in a row (much 
beyond Target’s two year) before any action is taken. The British retailer Tesco PLC sold its US-
subsidiary “Fresh & Easy” in 2013 after it had incurred five consecutive years of subpar 
performance, amounting to £1 billion in losses (Gordon, 2013). Wal-Mart Inc. in Germany 
sustained losses that amounted to US$1bn before pulling out of the market nine years later 
(Norton, 2006).  
These cases of corporate-level/business-level and especially subsidiary-level declines in 
an international context have been understudied by management researchers, leaving little 
guidance about how to turn such ailing subsidiaries around. The research that does exist remains 
fragmented, resulting in conflicting findings, and driven by phenomena rather than theory. 
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Indeed, based on their review of the literature, Trahms et al. (2013: 1297) conclude that “what 
we do not know […] far outweighs what is known about decline and turnaround”. What is 
notable as well is the fact that the exploration of the subpar performance phenomenon has been 
addressed in several literatures, often in parallel research domains, rather than in a coherent 
manner.  
The three literatures most closely related to the phenomenon are the organizational 
decline/turnaround literature, the international divestments literature, and the escalation of 
commitment literature. Most studies on the subpar performance phenomenon at the corporate-
level and business-level were conducted in the organizational decline/turnaround literature in 
the strategic management domain. Here, the subpar performance phenomenon is coined a 
turnaround situation (Pearce & Robbins, 1993: 634) and has focused mostly on domestic (within-
country) operations and efficiency-enhancing operational responses such as 
downsizing/retrenchment (cf. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Tangpong, Abebe & Li, 2015; Celly, 
2008). The level of analysis is usually the corporate-level or business-level organization within a 
domestic context.  
The international divestments literature within the international strategy domain has 
placed emphasis on de-internationalization (in the form of partial or full divestiture), for which 
subpar performance is but one cause (Benito & Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005; Mata & Portugal, 
2000; Turcan, 2013). This literature is still at a relatively nascent level of research and which 
response to select from the range of available actions when a subsidiary is performing poorly 
remains an underexplored topic. The level of analysis here is usually at the corporate-level or 
business-level in the international context. Similarly, real options logic has been applied to joint 
ventures to examine the occurrence of dissolutions (by acquisition or divestment) (Kogut, 1991). 
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The application of real options logic is generally restrained by rather specific parameters, causing 
the body of real options research that specifically applies to responses to subpar performance at 
foreign subsidiaries to also be at a rather nascent stage. 
The escalation of commitment literature in the behavioral decision-making domain draws 
specific attention on the individual decision-maker’s responses to subpar performance (Staw, 
1976; Shapira, 1997; Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara & Miles, 2012). The research in this 
literature shares some commonalities with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The 
focus here is on the psychological processes and biases that are reflected in responses to subpar 
performance and the level of analysis is the respective decision-maker.  
The fact that the phenomenon of subpar performance has been examined from a number 
of different perspectives has led to several concerns. First, there are conflicting findings within 
and across domains. For instance, some literatures recommend divestiture over continuance in 
light of subpar performance (e.g. turnaround theory, real options logic if parameters apply), 
while others warn of premature abandonment (Drummond, 2014). Similarly, some literatures 
view increased commitment to a declining venture as a detrimental approach (e.g. escalation of 
commitment, prospect theory), while others view it as a potentially important factor of long-term 
stability (Lane & Beamish, 1990).  
Second, there are gaps in the comprehensiveness of the analysis, e.g. a heavy focus on 
retrenchment/downsizing responses has caused non-divestment responses to be examined 
significantly less often. This brings about a relative emphasis on operational responses (those 
that are geared towards short-term performance improvements) and a relative de-emphasis of 
strategic responses (those that are geared towards improving the market positioning and strategic 
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health of the entity, with improvements in performance following thereafter). Strategic responses 
in the context of the present study are differentiated from strategic responses in literatures such 
as resource dependency theory (e.g. Oliver, 1991). In the latter, responses are directly geared 
towards one or more competitors, thereby enacting a competitive strategy. In the former, the 
competitive position is important as well but plays a less direct role. Instead, the goal of strategic 
responses in the context of this thesis can be understood as actions oriented towards putting the 
organization in a better position than the current one. From that improved position, it can then 
pursue its competitive strategy in the longer run. Complete divestiture or retrenchment is thus not 
the only action available to parent firms when the subsidiary experiences unsatisfactory 
performance for multiple periods. Specifically, a foreign parent in a joint venture may instead 
assume a higher amount of control of the subsidiary and acquire more equity in the venture, 
without turning it into a wholly-owned subsidiary altogether. The parent firm may also decide to 
send more expatriates or withdraw expatriates as a means to adjust commitment and control. We 
are not aware of any study which has examined responses such as these (and more) in 
comparison to each other, in an international context, and over time. Given the stakes that are 
involved for managers once a subsidiary generates subpar performance, the phenomenon 
warrants closer examination.  
Third, most of the studies have used samples from US-based (or otherwise within-
country samples) (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Wan, 2003; Benito, 2005). Thus, the complexities arising 
from headquarters-subsidiary relationships and the international context have been somewhat 
neglected. In an international context, not only may the types of responses differ from domestic 
contexts (e.g. deploying more expatriates) but also determinants may be important that are not 
relevant in a domestic context. Specifically, the concept of distance between a headquarters and 
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its foreign subsidiary has been shown to be a key construct in international business strategies 
(Berry, Guillén & Zhou, 2010) which may affect how fast a response is administered given 
subpar performance. Also, the response may depend on the role of the foreign subsidiary in the 
wider MNE network, such as being a regional headquarters. Thus, several mechanisms to turn 
around ailing domestic corporations may not be immediately transferable to the international 
context and in fact, the latter may be influenced by a wider set of variables that need to be 
considered. 
Finally, the mushrooming number of studies on subpar performance in different domains 
has led to a lack of theory-development - across but also within domains (e.g. Trahms et al., 
2013; Sleesman et al., 2012). We are not aware of any theory of decline/turnaround explicitly 
focused on subsidiaries in foreign locations. While some aspects of existing frameworks could be 
relevant for the international context as well, it remains to be tested and a larger number of 
determinants and responses need to be considered. 
In sum, while many studies have addressed the question of what to do in response to 
subpar performance, there is rather little integration across domains, causing there to be several 
gaps. As a result, multiple calls exist that highlight the importance of moving towards a 
theoretical integration, shifting focus from identifying more determinants to other key 
mechanisms, and turning towards other levels of analysis such as the subsidiary-level. The 
objective of this thesis is thus to respond to these calls by adding new insights by focusing on 
subpar performing foreign subsidiaries and turnaround strategies employed as a remedy for such 
a situation. This objective will be elaborated further in the next section. 
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1.2 Objective 
Given the motivation of the thesis, the following overarching research questions will be 
explored: When a foreign subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what 
determines which specific type of response is chosen (if any at all)? Which type of response (if 
any) is most conducive to increasing recovery and survival prospects? What factors determine 
the timing of a response and what role does the timing of responses play in the effectiveness of 
the chosen response in increasing recovery and survival prospects?
1
 
Trahms et al. (2013: 1297) note that achieving turnaround in situations of subpar 
performance is a “complex process” which requires investigation much beyond the current state 
of research. This thesis approaches the task of generating a deeper understanding of responses to 
subpar performance at foreign subsidiaries in three steps. First, the current state of knowledge 
about responses to subpar performance is reviewed in order to clearly locate the current gap 
regarding subsidiary-level turnarounds. This also leads to a revisiting of the definition of subpar 
performance sequences which will be understood as annual consecutive occurrences of poor 
performance (using several performance measures) which ends with either a recovery to pre-
decline levels, exit, or the end of the observation period. Second, a theoretical framework 
grounded in a resource orchestration framework (Trahms et al., 2013) is developed to guide the 
analysis of key mechanisms within the phenomenon of subpar performance at foreign 
subsidiaries. The key parts of the framework differentiate between “Identifying” (whether/what), 
“Responding” (how effective), and “Synchronizing” (when) mechanisms. Third, given the focus 
on subpar performing foreign subsidiaries, additional responses to subpar performance and 
influencing factors that were not usually considered in conventional corporate-level or business-
                                                          
1
 The terms “responses”, “actions”, and “moves” are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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level studies, are now assessed in more depth. For instance, factors such as GDP growth, the 
assigned role of a regional headquarters, MNE-level performance, and similar aspects are found 
to have an important influence. Finally, the research questions are assessed using multinomial 
logit regressions, gap time competing-risk event history analyses, and estimations of curvilinear 
effects, thereby moving towards the simultaneous consideration of more than just one type of 
response (conventionally divestment (“yes”/”no”) or retrenchment (“yes”/”no”)) and an explicit 
inclusion of the time concept. 
With this premise, this study aims to contribute to the literature on subpar performance in 
foreign subsidiaries in the following ways. First, by examining the phenomenon using a near-
population dataset of Japanese foreign direct investment, this study offers an overarching three-
dimensional framework of subpar performance responses and their effectiveness at the level of 
foreign subsidiaries. The framework combines antecedents of responses (“Identifying”) with 
their outcomes (“Responding”) and their relationship with time (“Synchronizing”). Grounded in 
the resource orchestration perspective, this framework offers a theoretical premise, rather than 
being purely phenomenon-driven. The objective and intended contribution is thus to offer a 
starting point from which future studies of subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries can be 
explored. 
Second, studies on the subpar performance phenomenon have had different emphases 
regarding appropriate responses. For instance, while the literatures on de-internationalization and 
turnaround have focused on retracting commitment, the literatures on escalation of commitment 
and prospect theory emphasized the effects of increasing commitment, and the literatures on 
organizational inertia and commitment theory have focused on non-action. This study takes a 
more encompassing stance by comparing all of these options to each other. As such, we partially 
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apply the corporate-level/business-level decline and turnaround literature but, more importantly, 
expand it to an international context. 
Third, viewing the subpar performance phenomenon in a holistic perspective responds to 
several calls in the literature. For instance, in the escalation of commitment literature, most 
studies have focused on the individual/psychological level, with studies conducted in laboratory 
or classroom settings (Shapira, 1997; a few exceptions exist: cf. Barton, Duchon & Dunegan, 
1989). Sleesman et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis reveals that the majority of studies focused on 
project-related determinants and psychological determinants, while social determinants and 
structural determinants were largely neglected (Shapira, 1997; a few exceptions exist: cf. Hsieh, 
Tsai & Chen, 2015). As Staw (1997: 206) puts it: "Perhaps because it is easier to study people 
than organizations, the field has concentrated on escalation as a product of individual decision 
making rather than organizational action". Furthermore, Sleesman et al. (2012) demonstrate that 
the plethora of determinants identified in the literature reflects a multi-determinism which allows 
for multiple theories (see also: Brockner, 1992). However, rather than identifying even more 
determinants of escalation, the field is in dire need of an integration of relationships and 
neighboring concepts into coherent theoretical models (Sleesman et al., 2012; Staw, 1997). This 
notion is reflected in the other literatures as well (e.g. Trahms et al., 2013). In this thesis, we 
explore both the determinants and antecedents of responses to subpar performance, thus aiming 
to generate a more holistic perspective on the phenomenon. 
The domain of the intended contribution among existing literatures on the phenomenon 
of subpar performance, different predominant levels of analysis, and the focus on decreases, 
continuance, or increases in costs and assets is depicted in Figure 1.1. 
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Key findings that arise from this thesis are that (i) hundreds of subsidiaries experience 10 or 
more consecutive years of subpar performance; (ii) the most frequent sequences are those during 
which no particular discernible response occurs; (iii) determinants across the country-level, 
MNE-level, and subsidiary-level predict whether and which type of response is chosen, (iv) 
performing any action is preferable over performing no action, especially when it comes to 
improving the survival prospects of the subsidiary. Due to a period of adjustment following a 
response, the short-term effect may be that the number of consecutive years of subpar 
performance may increase; (iv) increases in commitment tend to have a more favorable outcome 
than decreases in commitment, especially with regards to survival prospects; (vi) some 
determinants that imply a higher communication channel frequency help reduce the time to first 
response; (vii) the relationship between the timing of the first response and the probability of 
recovery (versus exit) is curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) such that very early and very late first 
responses dampen recovery prospects. This relationship is amplified when the response in 
question is a decrease in headquarter commitment (as opposed to an increase in headquarter 
commitment), suggesting that there is a time-sensitivity aspect to decreases in commitments; and 
(ix) the effectiveness of a general manager (GM) replacement may depend on the timing of this 
response. If the GM is replaced within two years of the decline, recovery prospects are enhanced. 
After this time, GM replacement may be less effective than not replacing the GM.  
The findings are also intended to hold value for practitioners. The analysis of antecedents 
of responses and the effectiveness of responses, especially considering the impact of time is 
hoped to offer some guidance in the all-too-familiar dilemma: “Do they persist and risk 
becoming caught up in a spiral of escalating commitment, or ‘apply the brakes’ when they may 
be within an ace of success?” (Drummond, 2014: 430).  
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Figure 1.1. The Positioning of the Contribution among Relevant Literatures.  
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13 
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
The subsequent chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literatures across three research domains, focusing on the definition and operationalization of 
subpar performance sequences, responses to subpar performance, and their effectiveness. This 
leads to a clear definition of subpar performance sequences and an identification of the research 
gap. Chapter 3 offers a theoretical framework based on a resource orchestration perspective 
which allows for an integration of the lenses reviewed in Chapter 2, by reviewing the resource-
based view, dynamic capabilities, resource orchestration, and associated theoretical constructs. 
Hypotheses are developed in Chapter 4 which builds on the theoretical foundation from Chapter 
3. Chapter 5 reviews the sample and research design. Chapter 6 summarizes the results from the 
sequence analysis, multinomial logit regression, gap time competing-risk event history analysis, 
and the estimation of (in part curvilinear) time effects. The findings are discussed, implications 
are reviewed, and future research directions are laid out in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In this chapter, the literatures addressing the subpar performance phenomenon are 
reviewed and discussed critically. Before we go into more detail regarding existing findings in 
the literatures on responses to subpar performance, however, it is worthwhile to clearly define 
two key concepts in this thesis: subpar performance and responses.  
 
2.1 Defining the Subpar Performance Phenomenon and Response Sequences  
2.1.1 Review of Definitions 
The subpar performance phenomenon has been examined from the perspective of several 
different research domains. This has led to a smorgasbord of definitions of what constitutes a 
situation of subpar performance that requires some response. However, even within domains, 
there is a limited degree of consensus on the definition of the phenomenon. Table 2.1 offers an 
overview of the key studies across three research domains, including their definition and 
operationalization of subpar performance, samples, and key findings. Pearce & Robbins (1993: 
634), for instance, coined the phenomenon turnaround situations, defined as “[t]he period of 
time the troubled firm should be engaged in turnaround efforts”. Staw and Ross (1989: 216) have 
described the phenomenon as an escalation situation, thereby terming "situations in which losses 
have resulted from an original course of action, but where there is the possibility of turning the 
situation around by investing further time, money, or effort”. Even others have referred to the 
subpar performance phenomenon as the occurrence of financial distress (e.g. Bruton, Oviatt & 
White, 1994), substandard performance (Bolton, 1993), organizational decline (e.g. Bruton et 
al., 2003; Trahms et al., 2013; McKinley, Latham & Braun, 2014), or even failure (e.g. Boyne & 
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Meier, 2009). Some of these definitions were categorized further, such as in the case of 
organizational decline in terms of its severity: survival threatening (e.g. Barker & Duhaime, 
1997; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Tangpong et al., 2015) and not necessarily survival threatening 
(e.g. McKinley et al., 2014; Trahms et al., 2013; Bruton et al., 2003). Similarly, Chen & 
Hambrick (2012: 230) note that “Some have stipulated that declining performance, regardless of 
absolute level, constitutes a turnaround situation (e.g., Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976), whereas 
others have argued that performance needs to be below some absolute threshold (e.g. Barker and 
Mone, 1994; Hambrick and Schecter 1983).” A further categorization of the definition of 
organizational decline can be made in terms of the reason for it: erosion of resources (e.g. 
Francis & Desai, 2005; Trahms et al., 2013), misfit within the niche (e.g. Lamberg & Pajunen, 
2005), or environmental factors besides internal ones (e.g. Gowen & Tallon, 2002).  
Similarly, the operationalisations of the subpar performance phenomenon have differed, 
from objective measures such as Barker and Duhaime’s (1997) four financially-focused criteria 
of decline (used also by e.g. Tangpong et al., 2015) to more perceptual measures such as survey 
items (e.g. Gowen & Tallon, 2002; Jas & Skelcher, 2005; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Lamberg & 
Pajunen, 2005). Moreover, the perspectives contrast on the lengths of time that is required for the 
minimum threshold for constituting a subpar performance phenomenon, ranging from 
instantaneous loss situations (e.g. Chen & Hambrick, 2012) to 2 years (e.g. Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Barker & Mone, 1994; McKinley et al., 2014) to 3 or 
more years (e.g. Barker & Duhaime, 1997). 
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Table 2.1. Definitions and Operationalizations of the Subpar Performance Phenomenon.  
Domain/ 
Literature 
Authors 
(publication 
year) 
Definition of the subpar 
performance 
phenomenon 
Operationalization of the 
subpar performance 
phenomenon Sample Key finding(s) 
International 
strategy 
     
International 
divestment 
Song (2014) 
“subsidiaries’ internal 
problems including low 
performance” (p. 50) 
“return on asset” (p. 55) 
“1,560 foreign 
manufacturing 
subsidiaries of 101 
Korean MNCs in 31 
host countries” (p. 53) 
from the Korean stock 
exchange; (1990-2008); 
subsidiary-level 
Using a multinational flexibility 
perspective, the authors find that some 
subsidiaries are not divested despite 
rising host-country labor costs. Intra-
firm product shifts, greater cross-country 
labor cost differentials and more country 
options decrease the risk of divestment, 
while poorly performing, smaller, stand-
alone subsidiaries in riskier countries are 
more likely to be divested.  
International 
divestment 
Berry 
(2013) 
“poor performance is a 
signal that firms need to 
make changes to their 
subsidiary operation 
because the existing 
approach has not proven 
successful (Hoskisson and 
Turk 1990)” (p. 247) 
“measure that the BEA has calculated 
for each foreign affiliate. This 
measure (which the BEA terms 
“profit-type return”) is based on 
reported net income, but it is gross of 
foreign income taxes, excludes 
capital gains and losses and income 
from equity investments, and reflects 
certain other adjustments needed to 
convert profits from a financial 
accounting basis to an economic 
accounting basis.” (p. 251) 
12,430 manufacturing 
subsidiaries from the 
BEA benchmark and 
annual surveys of U.S. 
direct investment 
abroad; (1989-2004); 
subsidiary-level 
This paper assesses interactions between 
firm-level and environment-level factors 
and their effect on divestment; 
surprisingly, only 1/3 of the divested 
subsidiaries were performing poorly; 
growth opportunities and the fact that 
poorly performing ventures may be hard 
to sell is preventing them to be divested; 
there are significant differences across 
the divestment decisions of firms for 
their related and unrelated foreign 
operations. If the country growth rate is 
high, divestments are less likely. 
International 
divestment 
Benito 
(2005) 
“poor performers, but 
Weston (1989) points out 
that operations might be 
divested for other reasons 
than poor performance per 
se” (p. 238) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article); subsidiary-
level 
Divestments have been considered in at 
least three literatures (industrial 
organization approach, financial studies, 
and corporate strategy perspectives). The 
author develops a framework that builds 
on international business strategies and 
suggests that subsidiaries in 
transnational MNEs are most likely to be 
divested, followed by those in 
multinational/international and global 
MNEs.  
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International 
divestment 
Mata & 
Portugal 
(2000) 
“exit [may be associated] 
with the failure of the 
foreign subsidiary. 
However, exit may be due 
to reasons other than 
failure.” 
not measured in this study: 
“Measuring the performance of 
subsidiaries of foreign companies is 
tricky, not least because pf the 
problems associated with transfer 
pricing.” (p. 561) and identify this as 
room for future studies 
1033 foreign firms in 
Portugal from the 
Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment survey 
(1983-1989); 
subsidiary-level 
The determinants of closure and 
divestiture differ from each other: 
ownership configuration and 
organizational structure predict 
divestments, while the entry mode 
predicts closure. Only human 
endowments predict both outcomes, such 
that higher human endowments decrease 
the likelihood for both divestiture and 
closure. 
International 
divestment 
Benito & 
Welch 
(1997) 
“severe problems may have 
emerged in managing the 
company’s foreign 
subsidiaries at the same 
time as the external 
environment of these 
subsidiaries has become 
less favorable” (p. 19) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article); subsidiary-
level 
The authors review three fields 
(economics, strategic management, 
international management) to assess how 
the de-internationalization phenomenon 
was addressed in them; then they 
propose a conceptual framework that 
relates “commitment to international 
operations” to partial/full withdrawal. 
Strategic 
Management 
     
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Tangpong, 
Abebe & Li 
(2015) 
“survival-threatening 
performance decline (Lim 
et al., 2013; Morrow et al., 
2004; O’Neill, 1986).” (p. 
647) 
“firms that meet the following criteria 
[from Barker & Duhaime (1997)] 
were considered turnaround: (1) 
return on investment (ROI) above the 
risk-free rate of return for two 
consecutive years before decline; (2) 
during decline, ROI below both the 
risk-free rate of return and industry-
average ROI for at least three 
consecutive years, and a Z-score 
below 3 for at least one year 
(indicating bankruptcy risk; Altman, 
1983); (3) during recovery, ROI 
above the risk-free rate of return and 
industry-average ROI for at least 
three consecutive years; and (4) 
performance fluctuation allowed for 
up to three years between the decline 
and recovery periods.” (p. 655) 
48 matched pairs of 
firms from Compustat 
North American 
Database (1993-2008); 
corporate-level/ 
business-level 
Early retrenchment (divestments and 
geographic market exits, not layoffs) 
improves turnaround success, when 
compared to late retrenchment. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
McKinley, 
Latham & 
Braun 
(2014) 
“successive, year-after-year 
decrease in an 
organization’s resource base 
that lasts for at least two 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article); corporate-
level/business-level 
Organizations can respond to decline 
through rigidity or innovation. Whether 
this leads to turnaround or a downward 
spiral depends on the flexibility of the 
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years” (p. 90) innovation, the nature of power, 
controllability of causes, and the degree 
of permanence of the causes. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Lim, Celly, 
Morse & 
Rowe 
(2013) 
post-retrenchment 
performance (performance 
is the dependent variable, 
not a sample selection 
variable) 
“industry adjusted return on sales 
(ROS) (i.e., firm ROS minus industry 
average ROS at the three-digit SIC 
code level). […] We measured 
performance three years after a 
retrenchment event to account for a 
potential recovery period.” (pp. 47-
48) 
2,406 large non-
diversified Japanese 
firms from NEEDS 
tapes (1991-2000); 
corporate-level/ 
business-level 
Firms commonly choose between cost 
retrenchment and asset retrenchment. If a 
firm’s core rent creation mechanism is 
Schumpetarian (exploration), cost 
retrenchment can be detrimental - 
especially in a Schumpetarian industry. 
If a firm’s core rent creation mechanism 
is Richardian (exploitation), asset 
retrenchment can have a negative impact 
in less asset-intensive industries and a 
positive impact in more asset-intensive 
industries.  
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Schmitt & 
Raisch 
(2013) 
“an existence-threatening 
decline situation (Hofer, 
1980; Lohrke et al., 2012).” 
(p. 1216) 
Identification of turnaround cases by 
turnaround consultants; the sample 
was also characterized by the 
following: ”Prior research suggests 
that turnaround initiatives should be 
selected by following a four-year 
period comprising two years of 
positive return on investment (ROI) 
and two years of an average pre-tax 
ROI below 10 per cent (Barker and 
Mone, 1994). While these selection 
criteria were reflected in our sample, 
we also ensured that the firms had 
experienced negative return on assets 
(ROA), as well as an absolute and a 
relative-to-industry decline over two 
years.” (p. 1227) 
107 out-of-court 
turnaround initiatives 
(27 Austrian, 64 
German, and 16 Swiss) 
from a questionnaire 
sent to 12 Austrian, 14 
German, and 7 Swiss 
consulting firms; 
(2003-2004); corporate-
level/business-level 
Retrenchment and recovery are 
contradictory and complementary at the 
same time. Successful turnarounds are 
achieved by combining efficiency-
enhancing initiatives with innovation-
stimulating ones. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Trahms, 
Ndofor & 
Sirmon 
(2013) 
“Organizational decline 
occurs when a firm’s 
performance or resource 
base deteriorates 
over a sustained period of 
time (Bruton, Oviatt, & 
White, 1994; Weitzel & 
Jonsson, 1989).” (p. 1278) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article) 
The authors review the 
decline/turnaround literature since 
Pearce & Robbins's review in 1993 
(whose model they expand); the 
literature is still fragmented, conflicting, 
and much more needs to be studied; 
assuming the lenses of resource 
orchestration, strategic leadership, and 
stakeholder issues may help. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Chen & 
Hambrick 
(2012) 
Turnaround situations: 
“established firms that once 
performed satisfactorily, 
“those that had operating returns on 
equity (ROE, before  extraordinary  
items)  greater  than  their  cost  of 
223 organizations in 
turnaround situations 
from the Standard and 
CEO replacements during decline have 
commonly been regarded as a necessity. 
This study suggests that CEO 
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specifically in terms of 
profitability, but no longer 
do.” (p. 225) 
equity  (COE)  for  at  least  two  
consecutive  years  in  our sample 
period, immediately followed by a 
year of operating  losses  (again,  
before  extraordinary  items).” (p. 
230) 
Poor’s 1500 index; 
(1990-2003); corporate-
level/business-level 
replacement as such does not have an 
effect on subsequent performance. 
Instead, only if a better fitting CEO 
replaces a less well fitting one is 
subsequent performance improved. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Boyne & 
Meier 
(2009) 
“period of organizational 
failure (Pearce and Robbins, 
1993).” (p. 835) 
“performing in the lowest quartile on 
their primary assessment criterion in 
1995.” (p. 845) 
140 Texas school 
districts (1995-2002); 
corporate-
level/business-level 
(public sector) 
Recovery from decline is not only 
determined by retrenchment and 
repositioning but also changes in the task 
environment (munificence and 
complexity) and human resources 
(internal succession being more 
beneficial than external succession). 
Retrenchment contributes to decline 
while repositioning appears to support 
turnaround success. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Francis & 
Desai 
(2005) 
“decline as a result of 
erosion of productive 
resources” (p. 1204) 
“Two consecutive years of return on 
investment (ROI) above the risk-free 
rate of return. […] At least three 
consecutive years of ROI below the 
risk-free rate during the decline. […] 
At least one year within the three 
years of decline with a negative net 
income.” (p. 1209-1210) 
97 firms from Standard 
& Poor’s Compustat 
database; (1980-1997); 
corporate-
level/business-level 
Managerially controllable factors (such 
as managing slack resources, increasing 
productivity, and cost/asset 
retrenchment) are more effective for 
turnaround success than environmental 
factors (such as munificence). Regarding 
the nature of decline, the severity of it is 
more impactful than its suddenness. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Jas & 
Skelcher 
(2005) 
“poor performance” (p. 
196) 
Categorization of councils into a 
“‘poor’ category and […] ‘weak’ 
category having a very low capacity 
to improve [thereby] identified by 
central government as ‘poorly 
performing’” (p. 198) 
Interviews with ~20 
staff members from 5 
English local 
authorities (councils) 
and a broader sample of 
15 councils drawn from 
the Comprehensive 
Performance 
Assessment  results (3 
years); corporate-
level/business-level 
(public sector).  
“The […] typical performance of public 
organizations over time is cyclical. 
Where cognition and leadership 
capability are absent, organizations fail 
to self-initiate turnaround. In this 
situation authoritative external 
intervention is necessary. The strategies 
applied are principally concerned with 
building a leadership capability that 
engages senior politicians and managers 
in order to overcome inertia and 
collective action problems. The theory is 
presented in the form of seven 
propositions” (p. 195) 
Folktale theory 
Lamberg & 
Pajunen 
(2005) 
Organizational decline: 
“deterioration in an 
organization’s adaptation to 
its microniche and the 
associated reduction in 
resources within the 
Case study of the Finnish company 
Enso-Gutzeit: “several problems as 
regards profitability and 
organizational performance […and] 
multiple problems in decision-
making and organizational 
Enso-Gutzeit (Finnish 
paper and pulp 
company); mainly 
(1945-1990) 
The authors use an organizational 
storytelling technique to illustrate how 
Enso-Gutzeit went through seven stages 
during the decline: “interregnum, 
institutionalization, complication, 
counteraction/ reaction, external catalyst, 
20 
 
organization (Cameron et 
al., 1987, 1988; McKinley, 
1993; Mentzer & Near, 
1992; Whetten, 1980).” (p. 
549) 
performance” (p. 954) open battle, and harmonization” (p. 969) 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Kow (2004) 
“organizations that, for a 
variety of reasons, are not 
demonstrating performance 
that is acceptable to 
stockholders, analysts, 
vendors and employees” (p. 
229) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article) 
The author identifies six key elements of 
a successful turnaround strategy: “(1) an 
appropriate strategic vision; (2) an 
organizational structure; (3) a set of 
business processes; (4) a human resource 
architecture that will support the vision; 
(5) technological innovation that will 
nourish the organization as well as 
enhances the product ranges; and (6) an 
organizational culture that will accept 
and commit to the effort.” (p. 229) 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Morrow, 
Johnson & 
Busenitz 
(2004) 
“declining financial 
performance” (p. 189) 
“(1) The firm had to experience at 
least three years of declining 
performance (ROI) preceded by two 
years of successive increases in firm 
performance, and (2) the firm had to 
engage in some form of cost or asset 
retrenchment. [The] firm [also] had to 
announce the use of retrenchment 
techniques such as cost cutting, plant 
closings, asset sales, employee 
layoffs etc. in order to be sure 
decreases in costs and assets were 
due to retrenchment.” (p. 197) 
412 single-business 
manufacturing firms 
from Compustat tapes; 
(1980-1995); business-
level 
The effects of cost and asset 
retrenchment depend on whether the 
business is situated in a growth industry 
(asset retrenchment has a positive effect) 
or a declining industry (cost 
retrenchment has a positive effect: asset 
retrenchment has a negative effect). 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Bruton, 
Ahlstrom & 
Wan (2003) 
“pattern of performance 
decline (Schendel, Patton, 
and Riggs, 1976)” (p. 522) 
“all sample firms suffered a decline 
in ROI for 3 consecutive years, with 
those ROIs being below the risk-free 
rate of return, and with an accounting 
loss in the last year of the 3-year 
decline cycle.” (p. 527) 
90 overseas Chinese 
firms in decline (44 
from Hong Kong, 31 
from Singapore, and 15 
from Taiwan); from the 
Pacific-Basin Capital 
Markets databases and 
annual reports; 
interviews with 19 
leading turnaround 
practitioners and 5 
firms undergoing a 
turnaround (1979-1998) 
Turnaround is usually a US-based 
concept and cannot be assumed to apply 
to other contexts; some parts may be 
applicable though, which supports 
Robbins & Pearce (1992); reducing sales 
is beneficial to prune to the core business 
but other actions may not be as 
productive. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
Gowen  & 
Tallon 
“declining internal or 
environmental business 
Survey; “The six antecedents to 
turnaround items were: (1) decreasing 
65 surveys from 
American electronics 
“significant differences [between 
American and US subsidiaries of 
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turnaround (2002) situation (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997; DeWitt, 
1998; McKinley, 1993; 
Pearce & Robbins, 1994; 
Shook, 1998).”  (p. 226) 
product line profitability; (2) 
decreasing account profitability; (3) 
fluctuating foreign currency rates; (4) 
increasing financial expenses; (5) 
increasing production/operations 
costs; and (6) increasing 
unproductive assets.” (p. 234) 
firms and 65 surveys 
from Japanese 
electronics firms’ 
subsidiaries in the US; 
(cross-sectional); 
corporate/business- and 
subsidiary-level 
Japanese electronics firms] exist among 
levels of strategy implementation in 
assessing the need for a turnaround 
strategy, the actions taken to reverse an 
adverse situation, and the relative 
success of the actions. In addition to 
greater capacity utilization, low 
turnaround plans are generally enacted 
by redesigning the product or process, 
but successful high turnaround plans are 
implemented most often by gain sharing 
or profit sharing, as well as by 
eliminating unprofitable products. 
American firms achieve greater return on 
investment, operating profit margin, and 
cash flow, but lower sales growth and 
less unit labor cost improvement than 
Japanese corporations.” (p. 225) 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Barker & 
Duhaime 
(1997) 
“survival-threatening 
performance decline over a 
period of years” (p. 18) 
All four criteria must be fulfilled: “At 
least three (3) consecutive years of 
return on invested capital (net 
income/total investment) below the 
risk-free rate of return. […] An 
Altman’s (1968, 1983) bankruptcy 
prediction Z-score of less than 3.00 
for at least 1 year during this 
downturn. […] A performance 
recovery characterized by at least 3 
years of return on invested capital 
above the risk-free rate of return, 
continuing to and including the latest 
fiscal year (FY 1988) before the 
Chief Executives of the sample firms 
were surveyed in late 1989 and early 
1990. [...] Up to 3 years of fluctuating 
performance above and below the 
risk-free rate of return was allowed 
between downturn and upturn.” (p. 
21-22) 
120 successful 
turnaround 
manufacturing firms 
from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat (1974-
1988); corporate-
level/business-level 
The authors address the discrepancy 
between early turnaround scholars and 
large sample studies. They provide 
support for the contingency approach 
developed by early turnaround scholars 
by suggesting that firm-based causes of 
decline are best met with strategic 
turnaround actions. Large-sample studies 
may have been in contradiction to this 
approach because they did not account 
for the cause of the decline and may 
have been subject to a sample selection 
bias. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Daily & 
Dalton 
(1995) 
“5-year period prior to 
corporate bankruptcy” (p. 
393) 
“5-year period prior to corporate 
bankruptcy” (p. 393) 
Sample 1: 57 bankrupt 
firms and 57 matched 
control firms (1973-
1982); Sample 2: 50 
bankrupt and 50 
matched control firms 
Although the CEO and director turnover 
rates may be higher in failing firms, the 
changes are often not in the direction 
that would be recommended (e.g. more 
independent boards, separation of CEO 
and chairperson positions).  
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from Predicast’s F&S 
Index of Companies; 
corporate-
level/business-level 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Lindsley, 
Brass, & 
Thomas 
(1995) 
Efficacy-performance 
spirals: “a pattern of 
consecutive increases (or 
decreases) in both perceived 
efficacy and performance 
over a minimum of three 
task attempts” (p. 650) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article) 
The authors build a conceptual 
foundation for explaining why some 
firms would experience minor 
fluctuations in performance (self-
correcting cycles), while others continue 
to decline until their performance 
becomes survival threatening (downward 
spirals). Spirals can interact with all 
levels in an organization (individuals, 
groups, and the entire organization). 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Bruton, 
Oviatt & 
White 
(1994) 
“distressed [,,.] poorly 
performing firm” (p. 973) 
“Selected firms suffered 
simultaneous declines in net income 
and ROI.” (p. 976) 
51 distressed and 46 
nondistressed 
acquisitions from 
Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat database; 
(1979-1987) 
“In 51 acquisitions of financially 
distressed firms, related business 
combinations in which the acquirers had 
prior acquisition experience performed 
best. However, business relatedness and 
acquisition experience 
had no effect on performance in a 
control group of 46 acquisitions of firms 
that were not distressed. The results 
imply that tacit knowledge about the 
acquisition process” (p. 972) 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Barker & 
Mone 
(1994) 
“steep performance decline 
during which a firm’s 
financial performance is 
extremely poor” (p. 395). 
“minimum of at least two successive 
years of performance decline during 
1976-85, measured by reductions in 
ROI. This decline had to follow at 
least 2 years of successive increases 
in positive ROI. Within each firm's 
period of decline, the year of sharpest 
performance decline (SPD) was 
identified by selecting the year with 
the largest absolute ROI decrease. 
If more than one period of decline 
occurred, the first period was used in 
the analyses.” (p. 398) 
32 U.S. textile mill 
companies with data 
from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat database; 
(1976-1985); corporate-
level/business-level 
The authors criticize Robbins & Pearce’s 
(1992) findings by suggesting that 
retrenchment can be a result of decline, 
rather than a cause of turnaround 
performance. They replicate the 1992 
study and the dominant role of 
retrenchment in turnaround success may 
need to be viewed more carefully.  
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Pearce & 
Robbins 
(1994) 
none (response to Barker & 
Mone, 1994) 
none (response to Barker & Mone, 
1994) 
none (response to 
Barker & Mone, 1994) 
The authors criticise that the replication 
of their study by Barker and Mone 
(1994) was not sufficient and that the 
original findings still hold.  
Organizational 
decline/ 
Pearce & 
Robbins 
Turnaround situation: “The 
period of time the troubled 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article) 
Previous research can be summarized as 
having four implications regarding 
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turnaround (1993) firm should be engaged in 
turnaround efforts.” (p. 634) 
causes, severity, recovery strategies, and 
multistage perspectives. This led to the 
authors condensing them into one model 
and suggesting aspects to keep in mind 
for future research on turnaround. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Robbins & 
Pearce 
(1992) 
Turnaround situation: 
“Firms experience 
turnaround situations 
when performance criteria 
are sufficiently depressed to 
warrant turnaround efforts” 
(p. 307) 
“To have experienced a turnaround 
situation the firm had to satisfy each 
of the following qualifications: two 
successive years of increasing ROI 
and ROS followed by: (1) absolute, 
simultaneous declines in ROI and 
ROS for a minimum of 2 years, and 
(2) a rate of decline in ROI and ROS 
greater than the industry average over 
this 2-year period.” (p. 295) 
32 U.S. textile mill 
companies with data 
from the company’s 
annual reports; (1976-
1985); corporate-
level/business-level 
Cost retrenchment (mostly inventory and 
interest expenses) occurred in many 
cases and appeared to achieve a higher 
level of subsequent ROI than other 
actions. In severe cases, asset 
retrenchment was necessary as well. 
Both together achieved the highest level 
of turnaround success. Retrenchment 
occurred less often if the cause of the 
decline was suspected to be due to 
external factors. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Weitzel & 
Jonsson 
(1989) 
“Organizations enter the 
state of decline when they 
fail to anticipate, recognize, 
avoid, neutralize, or adapt 
to external or internal 
pressures that threaten the 
organization’s long-term 
survival” (p. 94) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article) 
Decline in organizations may occur in 
several stages: blinded, inaction, faulty 
action, crisis, and dissolution. Recovery 
from the decline may occur at each stage 
(except for the dissolution stage) if an 
appropriate response is administered. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Thietart 
(1988) 
“I used two main criteria to 
identify the businesses 
performing poorly: (1) low 
profitability and (2) 
declining market share.” (p. 
36) 
“I considered a business to be 
performing poorly if (1) the ROI for 
the first two years under study was 
less than half the group's average 
ROI; and (2) if the real sales growth 
for the first two years under study 
was lower than the real market 
growth, meaning that the business 
was losing market share” (p. 36) 
217 businesses from the 
PIMS (Profit Impact of 
Market Strategy) 
database; corporate-
level/business-level 
The effectiveness of strategies depends 
on whether the firm is pursuing a growth 
or profitability objective. Also, the 
competitive characteristics of the 
industry and the strategic posture of the 
business impose contingency effects. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Hofer 
(1980) 
Turnaround situations 
involve “declines in 
organizational profitability, 
with those involving 
declines in sales or market 
share not far behind. […]”  
Assessment of current operating 
health (financial condition, market 
position, technological stance, 
production capabilities) and current 
strategic health (product/market 
matrix, technological and production 
capabilities, financial capabilities)  
12 turnaround 
situations in 10 
companies; (1951-
1978); corporate-
level/business-level 
The author offers guidelines to assess 
operating and strategic health and tests 
this on a case-based sample of 12 
turnaround situations. He finds that 
many firms that did not achieve 
turnaround performed an operating 
response when a strategic response 
would have been more fitting. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Whetten 
(1980) 
“decline-as-stagnation and 
decline-as cutback” (p. 582) 
none (conceptual article), but notes 
that in “the past, decline has been 
operationalized as decrease in the 
none (conceptual 
article) 
Organizational decline is an 
understudied subject in organizational 
science, probably due to the bias towards 
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number of staff, profitability, budget, 
or demand for products or services” 
(p. 583) 
studying growth. Studying decline is 
important, however, especially since 
more firms are starting to have to cut 
back. The author proposes an agenda for 
addressing decline.  
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Schendel & 
Patton 
(1976) 
“The performance pattern 
of interest has two distinct 
parts: one, an initial, decline 
phase of sub-GNP growth 
in income; and two, a 
second, upturn phase of 
greater-than-GNP income 
growth. Our interest is in 
firms that experience the 
second phase matched 
against similar firms in 
similar circumstances that 
do not recover and do not 
enjoy the second phase” (p. 
236) 
“average percent change in net 
income, normalized to reflect growth 
in gross national product (GNP)” (p. 
236) 
36 matched pairs of 
firms from Standard & 
Poor's Compustat 
dataset (1952-1971); 
corporate-
level/business-level 
Through a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, this exploratory 
study reveals that there are differences 
between those firms that turn around and 
those that do not in terms  of increases in 
sales, market share, types and 
effectiveness of investments, execution 
and/or timing of strategy, type of growth 
strategy, culture, and uncontrollable 
environmental aspects. 
Organizational 
decline/ 
turnaround 
Schendel, 
Patton, & 
Riggs 
(1979) 
Turnaround situation: 
“decline and recovery in 
performance. Because profit 
is one of the main 
objectives of business firms, 
performance is measured in 
terms of net income 
earned.” (p. 3) 
“Downturn Phase: Four years of 
uninterrupted decline in net income 
as normalized by Gross National 
Product (GNP) growth. Upturn 
Phase: Four years of increase in net 
income with allowance for a two year 
deviation between the downturn and 
upturn phase. Again, net income was 
normalized by GNP growth.” (p. 3) 
54 domestic 
manufacturing firms 
from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat database; 
(1952-71); domestic 
corporate level/ 
business-level 
Downturn phases seem to occur due to 
efficiency declines while upturn phases 
are often triggered by strategic changes. 
Turnarounds appear to be attributable to 
management action, rather than 
uncontrollable external events. 
Significant responses are required to 
break inertia and affect a turnaround.   
Behavioral 
decision-
making 
     
Escalation of 
commitment 
Hsieh, Tsai 
& Chen 
(2015) 
“scenarios in which a firm 
had been operating at a loss 
ever since its initial entry 
into a location” (p. 45) 
“scenarios in which a firm had been 
operating at a loss ever since its 
initial entry into a location” (p. 45) 
1,595 actions taken by 
51 Taiwanese IT 
companies in China, 
(1998-2011); 
subsidiary-level 
Firms engage in more escalating 
behavior when they receive specific cues 
(e.g. large competitors having a high 
volume of strategic action, small 
competitors having been operating 
profitably) or less escalating behavior if 
they receive other specific cues (e.g. 
larger competitor having been operating 
at a loss in the same location) from the 
environment. 
Escalation of 
commitment 
Sleesman, 
Conlon, 
“One of the most robust and 
costly decision errors 
none (meta-analysis) 
meta-analysis of 166 
articles on escalation of 
There has been 35 years of research in 
the escalation of commitment literature - 
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McNamara 
& Miles 
(2012) 
addressed in the 
organizational sciences has 
been the proclivity for 
decision makers to maintain 
commitment to losing 
courses of action, even in 
the face of quite negative 
news” (p. 541). 
commitment however, most of it has focused on 
psychological and project related 
determinants; much fewer have focused 
on the organizational level, 
social/structural determinants, 
longitudinal studies, and field settings 
(non-lab). The authors develop 16 
hypotheses from existing studies and 
develop 4 more (including moderation 
effects) to refine/qualify the knowledge 
and advice about existing relationships. 
 
Organizational 
risk-taking 
 
Audia & 
Greve 
(2006) 
 
performance below a 
specific aspiration level 
“return on equity (ROE), return on 
assets (ROA), and return on sales 
(ROS). […] Performance measures 
are evaluated against aspiration 
levels, which [were calculated] by 
taking an exponentially weighted 
average of past values on the 
performance variable” (p. 87) 
 
11 shipbuilders from 
the Tokyo and Osaka 
Stock exchanges; 
(1974-1995); corporate-
level/business-level 
The findings show that when 
performance fell below the aspiration 
level, risk-taking behavior (regarding 
factory expansion) was reduced in small 
firms, which are contrary to the 
predictions of prospect theory. However, 
in larger firms, risk-taking behavior was 
either not affected or increased. 
Escalation of 
commitment 
Staw & 
Ross (1989) 
Escalation situation: 
“situations in which losses 
have resulted from an 
original course of action, 
but where there is the 
possibility of turning the 
situation around by 
investing further time, 
money, or effort.” (p. 216) 
none (conceptual article) 
none (conceptual 
article) 
The authors propose a three-stage model 
of the escalation process. Determinants 
of escalation (project, psychological, 
social, and organizational) have different 
degrees of influence at different stages of 
the model. 
Escalation of 
commitment 
Staw (1976) 
“negative consequences” (p. 
27) of decisions and 
behavior 
In a case-based experiment: “subjects 
in the negative consequences 
condition received financial data 
which showed a deepening decline in 
the profitability of the chosen 
division but an improvement in the 
unchosen division.” (p. 32) 
240 business 
undergraduates from 
the University of 
Illinois; individual-
level 
This study is the first to show that "the 
primary effect of responsibility and 
consequences was that individuals 
invested a substantially greater amount 
of resources when they were personally 
responsible for negative consequences." 
(p. 39). 
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Given that there is a wide array of definitions and operationalisations of the subpar 
performance phenomenon in the extant literature, a clear demarcation of the concept is needed. 
The following sections narrow the concept down to its specific use in the context of this thesis. 
 
2.1.2 Scope of the Subpar Performance Definition 
For the purpose of this thesis, the subpar performance phenomenon is understood in the 
spirit of Robbins and Pearce (1992: 307), who offered the following definition: “Firms 
experience turnaround situations when performance criteria are sufficiently depressed to warrant 
turnaround efforts”. This definition encompasses all subpar performance situations that require a 
response, not just those that are directional (organizational decline) or potentially terminal 
(failure, survival-threatening). Moreover, we take a softer approach than Chen and Hambrick 
(2012: 230) who included only “genuinely troubled firms rather than simply stagnant or slowly 
deteriorating firms” in their sample. Since those stagnant or slowly deteriorating firms generally 
also require a managerial response in a typically global, competitive, and growth-oriented 
environment, they are included into the sample of this thesis.  
 
2.1.3 Operationalizations of Subpar Performance in the Extant Literature 
As Trahms et al. (2013: 1302) note, “[t]here are currently no set standards for measuring 
decline or turnaround.” Since the level of analysis in this study is the foreign subsidiary, some 
measures that are commonly used to assess corporate-level or business-level decline are not 
available or are not easily comparable due to transfer pricing. Moreover, past research has 
highlighted the multidimensionality of the performance construct (Combs, Crook & Shook, 
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2005), suggesting that ideally, research should “use at least two of the three measures (market, 
accounting, and subjective)” of performance (Rowe & Morrow, 1999: 69). In order to build a 
foundation for devising a clear definition of the subpar performance sequence phenomenon, 
different ways of measuring performance have been used. This thesis incorporates two types of 
measures: accounting measures (change in subsidiary-level sales, change in employee 
productivity) and a perceptual measure of financial performance (gain vs. break-even vs. loss). 
The focus, however, is on sales as will be elaborated in Chapter 5.  
Various studies have suggested that subjective measures of firm financial performance 
are an important component of the overarching performance construct (Rowe & Morrow, 1999). 
Anderson (1990) suggests that the use of subjective measures can be useful when subsidiaries are 
compared that have very different purposes and thus different performance indicators. The 
perceptual measure of financial performance used as a robustness check in this thesis is based on 
an assessment of the subsidiary’s performance by managers. Thus, any performance perception 
is likely to encompass not only a valuation of the financial performance of the subsidiary but also 
other, less tangible performance criteria such as effectiveness of processes, quality of 
collaboration (in the case of joint ventures), or prospects of the venture.  
We argue that excluding market-based measures of firm financial performance does not 
jeopardize the soundness of the subsidiary-level measurement of performance for two reasons: 1) 
Rowe and Morrow (1999) found that market measures showed the lowest loadings with the 
higher-order firm financial performance construct, suggesting that the accounting dimension and 
subjective dimension are stronger indicators of firm financial performance, and 2) market-based 
measures of firm performance are generally not available for the subsidiary-level. Thus, we aim 
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to build on existing literature by focusing on the most useful measure of performance in this 
context (sales) but test our hypotheses using alternative operationalizations, too.   
 
2.1.4 Minimum Length of the Subpar Performance Phenomenon 
With regards to the minimum length of the subpar performance phenomenon, this thesis 
emphasizes the sequential nature of the phenomenon (e.g. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Lamberg & 
Pajunen, 2005). While a single occurrence of a subpar performance period may happen by 
chance and be an isolated occurrence, a multi-year occurrence is indicative of a more structurally 
embedded concern that requires a strategic response. Therefore, the minimum length of the 
subpar performance phenomenon is defined in this study to be two years. This approach has been 
used in comparable studies, such as Tangpong et al. (2015).  
 
2.1.5 Defining the Unit of Analysis: Response Sequences  
The patterns of subpar performance as described above are the context in which strategic 
action (or non-action) is observed. The observations are made for each period of the subpar 
performance phenomenon and all the observations together form a sequence with a length of at 
least two years. Brzinsky-Fay, Kohler, and Luniak (2006: 435) define a sequence “as an ordered 
list of elements”. Figure 2.1 offers a schematic illustration of two response sequences.  
In Figure 2.1, Subsidiary A experiences a subpar performance sequence that lasts seven 
years. Per definition, the first two years are not included in the analysis time and any responses 
are recorded thereafter. In the case of Subsidiary A, the response sequence consists of three 
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strategic actions taken and two years of no action being taken (=five elements), until recovery to 
pre-decline levels is attained. In comparison, Subsidiary B’s subpar performance sequence lasts 
for six years and encompasses four response elements: one workforce reduction response in Year 
3 and no responses thereafter. The response sequence ends with the exit of the subsidiary. This 
perspective on the unit of analysis being response sequences is somewhat similar to Tangpong et 
al. (2015) and Hsieh et al.’s (2015: 58) construction of firm histories which includes events 
(actions), spells, and gap times. In contrast to the latter, however, the subpar performance and the 
associated response sequence do not necessarily have to start with the firm’s initial entry but may 
occur at any point during the subsidiary’s observed life span.  
In sum, response sequences are defined in this study as an ordered list of strategic 
responses (or non-responses) against the background of subpar performance criteria which have 
occurred over at least two consecutive years. These do not necessarily start from the firm’s 
foundation and are not necessarily increasing in severity or posing an immediate threat to 
survival. The sequence typically ends with either recovery to pre-decline levels of the subpar 
performance measure or the exit of the foreign subsidiary
2
. 
Having thus generated a definition of the subpar performance phenomenon employed in 
this thesis, we now turn towards a broader review of the literature.  
 
                                                          
2
 Note that there are also cases of right censoring, whereby some sequences will end because no further observations 
are available (before any of the two events have occurred).  
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Figure 2.1. Illustration of Response Sequences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure is adapted from Figure 2 in Tangpong et al. (2015).
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2.2 Overview of the Literature on Subpar Performance, Responses, and Turnarounds 
In general, research in the field of business and strategy has been heavily skewed towards 
studying successful firms and identifying factors that lead to the further enhancement of various 
measures of performance such as profitability, financial performance, or degree of 
internationalization (Ghemawat, 1991; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 2009). Scholars have 
discussed several reasons for this observation, from the inconvenience of obtaining suitable 
(longitudinal) data to the undesirability of addressing negative subjects such as poor performance 
and failure (Turcan, 2013). Thus, the fixation on growth and expansion resulted in much less 
scholarly attention on the phenomenon of poorly performing businesses, contracting industries, 
and organizational decline (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).  
Nonetheless, some literature streams have emerged that share the common denominator 
of focusing on experiences of subpar performance. One notable aspect of the subpar performance 
phenomenon is that it has been examined at multiple levels of analysis: the individual (manager) 
level, the domestic (single-country) firm level, and the international firm level. While the first 
level of analysis is generally examined in the domain of behavioral decision-making, the latter 
two levels are typically associated with strategic management and international strategy 
respectively. Studies have mushroomed in each of these domains but not to the point at which a 
unified theory of turnarounds has emerged (Pearce & Robbins, 1993: 614; Trahms et al., 2013) - 
neither within nor across domains. 
In the following sections, the studies in each domain are surveyed in depth. The literature 
review was conducted by first exploring major reviews and meta-analysis, followed by 
considering the journal articles contained in each of them. References to relevant articles within 
each article were drawn from as well. Moreover, searches in several databases (ProQuest, 
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ABI/INFORM, Google Scholar), using key words such as subpar performance, poor 
performance, organizational decline, organizational distress, and turnaround were conducted to 
add any other relevant article
3
.  
In general, there is some degree of overlap between domains but only in certain areas. 
Given the focus of this thesis’ research questions, which aim at understanding responses to 
subpar performance at the foreign subsidiary level, the literature review will begin with an 
assessment of relevant studies in the international strategy domain, then expand to the strategic 
management domain more generally, and conclude with an evaluation of the behavioral 
decision-making domain.  
 
2.2.1 International Firm-Level Studies of Responses to Subpar Performance (International 
Strategy Domain) 
Research in the international strategic (ISM) management domain has grown 
considerably over the past decades (for reviews, see Lu, 2003; Bruton, Lohrke & Lu, 2004). 
Bruton et al. (2004: 422) define the main question to be answered in ISM as ‘‘to what extent do 
various environmental and organizational factors impact an MNE’s ability to outperform its 
competitors over time?’’ Poor performance at the subsidiary-level is an important phenomenon 
to be investigated in this realm since it can affect the MNE’s overall competitive position. In the 
ISM stream, poor performance is understood to be “a signal that firms need to make changes to 
their subsidiary operation because the existing approach has not proven successful (Hoskisson 
                                                          
3
 Given the vastness of the organizational decline/turnaround and escalation of commitment literatures in particular 
(both have a body of research of about 40 years), we focused on including the articles that are most informative to 
this thesis. 
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and Turk 1990)” (Berry, 2013: 247), assuming that the subsidiary has grown beyond its initial 
years during which performance may often and expectedly be subpar.  
Notably little research has hitherto been conducted in this area. Lu (2003) identified 393 
articles in the ISM realm, out of which only four fell into the subcategory of 
turnarounds/declines. Most of these examine the concept of de-internationalization (other terms 
include divestment, divestiture, retrenchment, and downsizing) (Benito & Welch, 1997; Mata & 
Portugal, 2000; Benito, 2005) which has evolved into a slowly growing field of investigation (cf. 
also Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Harrigan, 1981; Calof & Beamish, 1995; Benito, 2005, Turcan, 
2013). Indeed, most divestment studies were conducted in other fields like the industrial 
organization approach, financial studies, and corporate strategy perspectives (Benito, 2005). Real 
options logic also extends into this domain. Cuypers and Martin (2010: 49) define real options as 
"strategies of organizations, since the capabilities and assets of an organization can be seen as a 
bundle of options for future strategic choices. These options are called "real options" and can be 
defined as contingent investment commitments in an asset or capability, rather than in a financial 
contract, which secure decision.” The key notion of this lens is that making an investment 
(financial or otherwise) contains a certain element of flexibility such that it opens the door to 
future possibilities (Adner & Levinthal, 2004). Such flexibility can be a competitive advantage, 
as Kogut and Kulatika (1994) illustrate in their study of MNE decision-making regarding global 
manufacturing and production shifting in light of environmental uncertainty such as exchange 
rate fluctuations. Signals from the environment can suggest that the venture’s value has risen or 
fallen. A signal of increased value tends to lead to a subsequent acquisition, while a signal of 
decreased value will only lead to dissolution if further investment would be required and 
operating costs are at a substantive level (Kogut, 1991: 20). Since Kogut’s (1991) study on joint 
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ventures, real options logic has become an important lens in both strategic management and ISM, 
as mirrored by Eden’s (2009: 357) comment that real options logic constitutes an "important lens 
for understanding MNE strategic decision-making”. 
Note that the literature on internationalization, on the other hand, does not predominantly 
fit into the scope of this literature review since even though there are conceptualizations of 
changes in commitment to a foreign venture (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 2009), these do not 
take negative performance signals as the starting point of the investigation. However, the 
retracting of commitment as suggested in that stream is very closely mirrored by the de-
internationalization literature.  
Since Lu’s (2003) review, more studies on de-internationalization have emerged and have 
refined the relationship between poor performance and international divestments (c.f. Berry, 
2013; Turcan, 2013; Celly, 2008). For instance, Benito (2005) argues that subsidiaries in a 
transnational MNE may be more prone to failure due to the inherent complexity of the strategy. 
He thus offers a theoretical framework which suggests that foreign subsidiaries which are part of 
a transnational MNE are most likely to be divested, followed by those in a multinational MNE, 
international MNE, and subsidiaries in a global MNE having the lowest likelihood of being 
divested. Berry (2013: 258) found that the negative relationship between performance and 
divestments only holds for subsidiaries in countries with “low growth, policy stability, and 
exchange rate stability” and may differ for related and unrelated subsidiaries. Moreover, Celly 
(2008) examined both the antecedents and the consequences of downsizing in an international 
sample of Japanese subsidiaries, thus offering a more comprehensive assessment of the 
phenomenon compared to previous studies. 
35 
 
However, despite its promising trajectory, this line of research falls short of a 
comprehensive analysis of response sequences to subpar performance for two reasons. First, as 
scholars in this realm have repeatedly asserted (e.g. Weston, 1989; Mata & Portugal, 2000; 
Benito, 2005), divestments of foreign operations may occur in response to subpar performance - 
but not necessarily so. An alternative reason for divestments may be a strategic reorientation of 
the parent firm and the decision that the subsidiary does not fit into the corporate portfolio any 
longer (Mata & Portugal, 2000: 561; Benito, 2005: 245). Indeed, as Hamilton & Chow (1993: 
484) suggest, the reasons for divestment are manifold, ranging from a refocusing on core 
activities, meeting corporate liquidity requirements, to shifting resources into units with greater 
opportunities and many others (their study lists 30 different motives). Similarly, Berry (2013: 
246) noted that in their sample of US-based multinational enterprises, “only about one-third of 
the divested foreign operations […] were poorly performing”.  
Second, the literature on de-internationalization/divestitures has typically focused on 
complete withdrawal from the respective foreign location. For instance, Mata and Portugal 
(2000: 554) consider foreign firm divestiture as the case “where the firm continues to operate, 
but no longer with foreign capital participation.” Hamilton and Chow (1993: 480) found in their 
sample of New Zealand companies that 78 percent of divestments occurred in the form of 
complete sell-offs. Few exceptions of investigations into partial divestments exist, such as 
Celly’s (2008: 190) finding that there is a negative linear relationship between the degree of 
downsizing and subsidiary performance.  
Third, alternative lenses such as the real options lens are rather restrictive in their 
applicability. Specific parameters must be present in order for real options logic to be an 
appropriate lens - such as the level of uncertainty and irreversibility of an investment, as well as 
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the degree of flexibility in the target market choice and technical agenda (Adner & Levinthal, 
2004). As such, the real options lens may mostly apply to decisions of a rather binary nature 
(dissolution versus continuance, moving of operations versus not moving operations) given 
certain signals from the environment, rather than finer-grained differentiations between a larger 
number of different responses to subpar performance. 
Thus, while the de-internationalization and divestment literature in the ISM domain has 
generated valuable insights, to our knowledge no comprehensive assessment exists that focuses 
specifically on responses to subpar performance at the foreign subsidiary level per se. The 
stream on de-internationalization has focused on predicting the likelihood of divestments, for 
which poor performance is but one predictor (Berry, 2013). However, moving poor performance 
into the centre of attention opens the inquiry up for the exploration of new avenues in terms of 
appropriate responses, not solely in the direction of a decrease in commitment. Such a somewhat 
broader investigation of responses to the subpar performance phenomenon can be found in the 
turnover/organizational decline literature in the strategic management domain though, which is 
where this review turns to next. 
 
2.2.2 Single-Country Firm-Level Studies of Responses to Subpar Performance (Strategic 
Management Domain) 
The strategic management domain has been described as dealing “with the major 
intended and emergent initiatives taken by general managers on behalf of owners, involving 
utilization of resources, to enhance the performance of firms in their external environments.” 
(Nag, Hambrick & Chen, 2007; italicization removed). Thus, a key difference to international 
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strategy research is a much lower emphasis on issues related to the operation of multinational 
enterprises, foreign subsidiaries, and their interactions with a global environment. 
The largest literature within the strategic management domain which concerns itself with 
responses to subpar performance is that of turnaround/organizational decline (for a review, see 
Trahms et al., 2013). This literature emerged from the seminal work by Schendel and Hofer and 
Hedberg and Starbuck in the 1970s (see Barker & Duhaime, 1997, for a review) and investigates 
the “[e]fforts of a financially troubled firm to pursue a return-to-growth strategy” (Pearce & 
Robbins, 1993: 634).  
Barker and Duhaime (1997: 14) discuss two distinct streams within the literature which 
emerged in the late 1970s that have shaped the literature to date. The first stream examines 
performance declines in terms of “a strategic decision problem to be solved by a turnaround 
strategy”. Any responses undertaken in this regard aim to address the core problems of the firm 
which are either operational (subpar efficiency) or strategic (weak competitive position) in nature 
(cf. also Trahms et al.’s review, 2013). The second stream views performance declines as 
indications of firm-level stagnation, caused by a misfit between the organization’s strategy, 
structure, ideology and the constantly changing environment. These approaches are based on 
contingency models, whereby the appropriate strategic response depends on the cause of the 
performance decline, with weak strategic positioning being the primary cause and inertia being a 
strong force against implementing strategic change. As pointed out by Barker and Duhaime 
(1997), however, some large sample studies have failed to confirm the validity of strategic 
change for turnaround success.  
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Several theoretical frameworks were offered, such as Weitzel and Jonsson’s (1989) stage 
model, whereby organizational decline occurs in five stages of blindness, inaction, faulty action, 
crisis, and dissolution. Appropriate responses at any of these stages (except the dissolution stage) 
can turn the organization around (see Figure 2.2).  
Another framework was offered by Pearce and Robbins (1993) who conceptualized 
organizational decline as a sequential process of a turnaround situation and turnaround 
responses. Their focus lies on retrenchment activities that could take the form of cost reductions 
or asset reductions, depending on the severity of the decline, see Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.2 Five-Stage Model Of Organizational Decline (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989: 102). 
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Figure 2.3. Turnaround Process Model (Pearce & Robbins, 1993: 624; Recreated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A more recent categorization of studies in the literature was provided by Trahms et al. 
(2013) who built on Pearce and Robbins’ (1993) two-stage model of decline and turnaround. 
Trahms et al. (2013) divide the investigation of the phenomemon into internal and external 
causes of decline, response factors (managerial cognition, strategic leadership, stakeholder 
management), strategic and operational firm actions, and several types of outcomes (in terms of 
their severity). The resulting framework is depicted in Figure 2.4 
Despite these advances, Trahms et al. (2013) note that there is much more to be 
investigated about the subpar performance phenomenon. For instance, while there are a number 
of studies focusing on the causes of decline and the predictions of response factors, there are 
much fewer studies on the outcomes of such turnaround actions. In fact, Trahms et al. (2013)  
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Figure 2.4. Turnaround Process Model (Trahms et al., 2013: 1288). 
 
only list one such study (Moulton & Thomas, 1993), although others exist (e.g. Markides, 1992; 
Morrow, Johnson & Busenitz, 2004). 
Further, similar to the de-internationalization literature in the ISM domain, most studies 
have focused on actions of retrenchment which Pearce and Robbins (1993: 634) refer to as 
“reductions of costs (advertising, R&D, direct labor, and materials) and assets (receivables, cash, 
plant and equipment).” Cost retrenchment is generally deemed a stronger response and the 
choice depends on the severity of the decline (Pearce & Robbins, 1993) or the degree of growth 
in the competitive environment (Morrow et al., 2004). However, although several studies have 
identified a list of possible strategic responses (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Tangpong et al., 2015), 
those that are not geared towards a decrease in commitment have received much less attention. 
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Moreover, a coherent conceptualization of strategic responses has yet to emerge. Pearce 
and Robbins (1993) remarked that no unifying theory of business level turnaround exists and to 
date, many gaps exist in the literature. Trahms et al. (2013: 1278) advocate for the increased 
utilization of three theoretical lenses (resource orchestration, strategic leadership, and 
stakeholder theory) to apply within the literature, “thereby assuaging a key criticism of 
turnaround research: that this stream is largely phenomenon driven.” A symptom of this lack of 
theory-driven approaches may also be the observation that findings with regards to the 
effectiveness of responses have been fragmented and somewhat inconsistent, which Trahms et al. 
(2013) attribute to operationalization issues as well as the notion that the response might have 
been in reaction to the depth rather than the cause of the decline. 
In addition, the turnaround literature has largely focused on domestic (single-country) 
samples. For instance, Barker and Duhaime (1997) used a sample of 120 US-based 
manufacturing firms. Jas and Skelcher (2005) chose a sample of 15 English local authorities. 
Boyne and Meier (2009) relied on a sample of school districts in Texas. Bruton et al. (2003) is 
one of the few exceptions where turnaround theory was considered in an international context, 
with consideration to cultural implications (East Asian firms). However, taking the international 
context into account brings about new contingency aspects. For instance, the distance 
(geographic, cultural, or otherwise; cf. Berry et al., 2010) to the subsidiary is likely going to 
affect the level of strategic response inertia on the side of the foreign parent firm: the farther 
away a subsidiary is, the less headquarters attention it might enjoy (Hansen & Løvås, 2004; 
Monteiro, Arvidsson & Birkinshaw, 2007). Further, deciding on a strategic action may not be as 
straightforward if more stakeholders are involved. For instance, in a joint venture, selling off 
equity shares in a retrenchment effort may simply not be feasible due to contractual constraints 
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or desirable due to the resulting loss in reputation and participation in future market growth. In a 
similar vein, retrenchment may not always be the most appropriate strategic response if several 
stakeholders are involved. If the decline in performance is due to conditions internal to the 
subsidiary (cf. the literature relating conflict within international joint ventures to performance, 
e.g. Fey & Beamish, 2000), an increase in equity by one parent firm for the purpose of assuming 
greater control may actually be the more appropriate response. In fact, Barker and Duhaime’s 
(1997: 25) list of strategic responses to subpar performance suggests that 50 percent of the firms 
in their sample responded that “Contracting, expanding or simultaneously contracting and 
expanding the scope of the corporation’s foreign operations” is an action that has been taken 
before. However, this category focuses on the unit (foreign operations) itself, not on the direction 
of the response. Thus, much is yet to be explored in the turnaround literature within strategic 
management that illuminates the specificities of subpar performance periods in foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Related to the above, most empirical analyses of the subpar performance phenomenon 
within the turnaround/organizational decline literature have focused on the core business unit, 
much more so than on other parts of the business’ network (Celly, 2008). Multinational 
enterprises with their often vast network of subsidiaries have largely been ignored by turnaround 
researchers.  
The next section reviews the subpar performance phenomenon in the behavioral decision-
making domain, where it is mostly contained in the escalation of commitment literature. 
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2.2.3 Individual-Level Studies of Responses to Subpar Performance (Behavioral Decision-
Making Domain) 
 Observing responses to subpar performance signals at the individual level of analysis has 
been a subject of research within the behavioral decision-making domain for several decades 
(Sleesman et al., 2012). The largest stream is within the escalation of commitment literature 
(Shapira, 1997), with the Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, and Administrative Science Quarterly publishing the largest output of 
studies on the subject. 
 The foundation for the literature was laid by Staw (1976) who conducted a case study 
containing repeated investment decisions using a sample of 240 undergraduate students. The 
rather surprising observation was that individuals often invest more into a losing venture, even if 
this is deemed economically irrational - and especially if they felt personally responsible for the 
initial investment decision. Staw (1997: 192) later defined situations which are prone to such 
potentially detrimental behavior as those “where losses have been suffered, where there is an 
opportunity to persist or withdraw, and where the consequences of these actions are uncertain”, 
thus falling into the definition of subpar performance. 
 Since then, several studies have ventured to identify the boundaries of the phenomenon 
and explore other predictors of escalating behavior. Indeed, soon a classification scheme 
emerged which categorized the identified independent variables into project determinants, 
psychological determinants, social determinants, organizational determinants, and contextual 
effects (Staw & Ross, 1989; Staw 1997). Sleesman et al. (2012) applied the same classification 
scheme to conduct a meta-analysis and found that the vast majority of determinants within these 
categories prove to be significant predictors of escalating behavior.  
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For instance, one important factor which is generally presumed to enhance the likelihood 
of escalating behavior is that of sunk costs. Northcraft and Wolf (1984) were among the first to 
address the question of whether more resources should be invested into a project which has 
generated negative feedback by focusing particularly on sunk costs. Sunk costs in this regard 
accrue when “a decision has been made and resources irretrievably expanded following from that 
decision. […] Sunk costs are the negative cash flows experienced in anticipation of future 
compensating cash flows […,thereby going beyond] a single decision or time period” (p. 226). 
While the objectively rational decision is to decide on “resource commitments […] only by 
comparing future revenues to future costs” (p. 233-234), studies in the escalation of commitment 
literature have found that individuals often deviate from this prescription. Instead of de-investing 
in light of subpar performance, they are worried that their initial resource commitments may be 
perceived as wasteful and subsequently invest more to justify their decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985). Later studies have refined the understanding of the sunk costs effect e.g. in terms of the 
amount of sunk costs (Heng, Tan & Wei, 2003), or the degree of ambiguity surrounding the 
negative feedback information (Garland, Sandefur & Rogers, 1990).  
Staw and Ross (1987: 70) remark with an emphasis on the Anglo-Saxon context that “we 
associate persistence—‘staying the course,’ ‘sticking to your guns,’ and ‘weathering the 
storm’—with strong leadership.” Thus, to explain the difference between rationally expected and 
actually observed responses to subpar performance, a variety of theoretical lenses were utilized: 
self-justification (e.g. Staw, 1976; Brockner, 1992), prospect theory (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), decision dilemma theory (e.g. Brockner, 1992), goal substitution effect (e.g. Conlon & 
Garland, 1993; Sleesman et al., 2012), self-presentation theory (Jones & Pittman, 1982; 
Sleesman et al., 2012)  and agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
45 
 
Sleesman et al., 2012). More recent empirical advancements have placed a bigger emphasis on 
emotions such as regret (e.g. Ku, 2008; Wong & Kwong, 2007) and the factors that facilitate de-
commitment (e.g. Heath, 1995; Moser, Wolff & Kraft, 2013).  
All of these studies have in common the perception that the additional commitment to a 
venture that is performing below expectations is an irrational bias that is to be avoided. However, 
despite decades of research and many useful insights, several important questions are unresolved. 
First, as Drummond (2014: 430) noted, although “[e]scalation of commitment is thought to be a 
ubiquitous and costly mistake [, …] sometimes organizations should ‘press on the accelerator’ 
and stay the course despite adversity.” This suggests that the cognitive bias may unfold in either 
direction: leaving the venture too late (while committing too much to it) or too early (while 
committing too little to it). The result is the need for more research to resolve the managerial 
dilemma: “Do they persist and risk becoming caught up in a spiral of escalating commitment, or 
‘apply the brakes’ when they may be within an ace of success?” (Drummond, 2014: 430).  
Second, most studies have focused on psychological and project determinants of 
escalating behavior while neglecting structural factors (Staw & Ross, 1989; Sleesman et al., 
2012; few exceptions exist, e.g. Hsieh et al., 2015; Barton et al., 1989). In particular, “[l]ittle to 
no research to date has examined factors such as whether and how escalation is a consequence of 
overall organizational performance […]. This scarcity may in part be due to the difficulty of 
studying such factors." (Sleesman et al., 2012: 545). Indeed, most existing studies have been 
conducted in laboratory settings or with convenience samples from classroom experiments. 
Third, although theoretical models such as a temporal model of escalation (Staw & Ross, 
1989; Staw 1997) and an aggregate model of escalation (Staw, 1997) have been proposed, little 
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overall theoretical integration has occurred in this area. As Sleesman et al. (2012: 558) note: 
there is a “need to de-emphasize efforts to continue identifying determinant ‘effects’ and instead 
give attention to integrating and exploring more deeply the core theories driving escalation.”.  
Some of these shortcomings can be overcome by shifting scholarly attention towards 
“linking micro research on psychological biases with macro research on firm behavior” (Hsieh et 
al., 2015: 53) in an effort to create multi-level explanations for the subpar performance 
phenomenon. Moreover, rather than identifying more predictors of escalating behavior, the 
impact of the chosen response should be further investigated, in order to allow for a juxtaposition 
of available choices, a better grasp of the dilemma described by Drummond (2014), and an 
integration of perspectives for the purpose of developing theoretical advancement. 
 
2.3 Overall Assessment of the Literatures across Domains 
 As the review of the literatures and domains addressing the subpar performance 
phenomenon and appropriate responses to it reveals, each domain has its own lens. Like in the 
famous Indian fable of the six blind men drawing different conclusions about the same object (an 
elephant) from their subjective angles, the literature domains exploring the subpar performance 
phenomenon have emphasized different aspects to the detriment of others, and drawn different 
(sometimes divergent) inferences. For instance, while the de-internationalization and 
turnover/organizational decline literatures emphasize actual divestment decisions in light of 
subpar performance, the escalation of commitment literature focuses on a normative perspective 
on divestment decisions. Furthermore, each domain focuses on a rather specific level of analysis 
and by neglecting the others, several responses (such as increasing control in a JV by investing 
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more equity; sending or withdrawing expatriates) are not taken into consideration. A multilevel 
analysis of the phenomenon would be desirable.  
 At the same time, these domains do have some commonalities. Specifically, the focus on 
phenomena-driven studies while neglecting theory-building has been a rather constant concern. 
Moreover, the emphasis appeared to have been placed more on identifying the determinants of 
escalating behavior or the choice of strategic response, rather than the outcomes of it. Finally, 
only a few studies exist which specifically focus on the longitudinal, sequence-based nature of 
the phenomenon itself, the responses, and its outcomes (a few exceptions exist, e.g. Tangpong et 
al., 2015).  
 In sum, although taken together there are a rather substantive number of studies on the 
subpar performance phenomenon, it is not obvious how they fit together. It appears, however, 
that the domains may inform each other, such that the international strategy domain might 
benefit from an inclusion of a broader variety of responses and outcomes, while the strategic 
management and behavioral decision-making domains may gain from the broadening of the 
context. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the areas of relative emphasis and neglect per 
domain.  
Chapter 3 will offer a conceptual framework which aims at addressing some of the 
shortcomings of the existing and fragmented body of studies that address the subpar performance 
phenomenon.  
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Table 2.2. Comparison of Emphases in the Examination of the Subpar Performance 
Phenomenon across Domains. 
Domain Relatively emphasized Relatively neglected 
International Strategy 
De-internationalization 
Complete retracting from 
foreign operations 
Other responses to subpar 
performance 
Responses to subpar performance 
per se 
Degrees of divestments and other 
responses 
Strategic Management 
Causes of decline 
Predictions of response actions 
Phenomena-driven 
Retrenchment 
Single-country context 
Corporate or business level 
Outcomes of response actions 
Theory-building 
Other responses to subpar 
performance 
International context 
Subsidiary level 
Behavioral Decision-
Making 
Avoidance of undue persistence 
Psychological/project 
determinants 
Laboratory studies, convenience 
samples 
Prediction of determinants 
Avoidance of premature 
abandonment 
organizational/contextual 
determinants 
Real (non-experimental) samples 
Theory-building, integration of 
theory 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 As the preceding review of the literatures addressing the subpar performance 
phenomenon reveals, multiple perspectives have emerged at three different levels of analysis. A 
consensus across domains is, however, that the exploration of the phenomenon has been rather 
phenomenon-driven to this point (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013, Sleesman et al., 
2012), while underemphasizing theoretical perspectives to explain the observed incidences. 
Therefore, in an effort to advance the understanding of the occurrence of and responses to subpar 
performance in foreign subsidiaries, a theoretical framework will be developed.  
 
3.1 Towards a Resource Orchestration Framework of Responses to Subpar Performance in 
Foreign Subsidiaries 
 Resources play a central role during organizational decline and turnaround. Managers 
must conserve resources to ensure survival, jettison resources that are not critical for value 
creation, and invest the remaining resources in ways that facilitate turnaround (Sirmon, Hitt, 
Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011). Thus, a theoretical lens that considers resources a key element to 
describe decline and turnaround is imperative. 
 The resource-based view (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) describes resources as 
“all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. 
controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991: 101). In this lens, firms are conceptualized as 
bundles of resources, thereby emphasizing the internal organization of firms to attain an 
advantage relative to its competitors (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
A particular resource contributes to the firm’s sustained competitive advantage if it possesses the 
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characteristics of value, rarity, inimitability, and non-substitutability. A competitive advantage 
occurs when a firm is able to “create more economic value than the marginal (breakeven) 
competitor in its product market” (Peteraf & Barney (2003: 314). Since its introduction, the RBV 
has also contributed to the IB literature, where it has been applied to topic areas such as MNE 
management, market entries, strategic alliances, international entrepreneurship, and emerging 
markets (Peng, 2001).  
 Although the RBV has received considerable empirical support, it has not remained 
without criticism. Several scholars have noted that the RBV is too static in nature, both with 
reference to the external environment and the processes internal to the firm. First, Priem and 
Butler (2001) criticize the RBV for not having reached the stage of a theory of competitive 
advantage yet, due to a need for more formalization, an integration with an environmental 
demand model, and a closer consideration of the exogeneity of the value concept (i.e. resource 
value is defined by the customer, thus outside of the RBV - an aspect refined in Priem, Butler, 
and Li, 2013). Second, as Priem and Butler (2001) further note, the RBV requires the 
incorporation of the temporal component into its conceptual makeup, in order to strengthen its 
aspiration of reaching the status of a theory. This was mirrored by other scholars, who also 
suggest that the RBV “misses the strategic role of time” and breaks down under conditions of 
high environmental dynamism (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1118). Second, it focuses on the 
mere possession of resources which is a necessary but insufficient condition for explaining a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Newbert, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Rather, resources 
will unfold their value-creating potential only when put to proper use through the application and 
leverage of organizational capabilities (Mahoney & Pandain, 1992: 365; Peteraf, 1993). While 
Barney (1991) initially conceptualized resources as an umbrella term for assets and capabilities, 
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later refinements clarified that capabilities are a firm’s capacity to deploy resources for a desired 
purpose. “They are information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and 
are developed over time” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993: 35; italicizations removed). This criticism 
has been mirrored in the IB literature, where Peng (2001: 821) notes that “future RBV work 
needs to pay more attention to process- and implementation-related issues.” 
 Such criticisms have led to a bifurcation of the literature, moving away from Barney’s 
(1991) original heterogeneity approach towards a dynamic capabilities approach and an 
organizing approach (Newbert, 2007: 140). The dynamic capabilities approach has gained much 
traction among scholars, devised to describe “situations […that can be understood as dynamic in 
the sense that] there is rapid change in technology and market forces” (Teece et al., 1997: 512), 
Teece et al. initially (1997: 516) defined dynamic capabilities “as the firm's ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments.” Since then, studies have emerged that suggest that the concept of dynamic 
capabilities also applies to moderately changing environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) or 
even relatively stable environments (Zahra, Sapienza & Davidson, 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
(Barreto, 2010). Based on this, a revised definition of dynamic capabilities was offered, wherein 
they describe “the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to 
sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
resource base.” (Barreto, 2010: 271).  
 What emerged from this development is the suggestion of an ‘orchestrating’ function of 
dynamic capabilities: the notion that dynamic capabilities work as a tool that helps managers 
transform the firm’s existing resource base towards an improvement of the firm’s competitive 
advantage prospects (Teece, 2007). Specifically, Teece (2007) notes that dynamic capabilities 
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may take the form of sensing, seizing, and managing threats and/or transforming (see Figure 4 in 
Teece, 2007). Together with their micro-foundations (embedded in organizational and 
managerial processes of coordination/integration, learning, and reconfiguring) and the overlaying 
dynamic capabilities, they make what “might be thought of as asset ‘orchestration’ processes." 
(Teece, 2007: 1341). This notion was developed further by Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, 
Singh, Teece, & Winter, (2007) who describe asset orchestration as a type of dynamic 
managerial capability, consisting of two interrelated action categories. First, search/selection 
encompasses the design of the “business model, select configurations of co-specialized assets, 
select investments (e.g. R&D, M&A) […and] select organization, governance, and incentive 
structures”. Second, configuration/deployment means to “orchestrate and coordinate co-
specialized assets [and] nurture change and innovation processes” (Helfat et al., 2007: 28).  
 The other stream of the literature that the RBV has bifurcated into could be termed the 
organizing approach. An influential contribution in this realm is Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland’s 
(2007) resource management framework. In an attempt to hone in even closer on the “black box” 
of how resources are put to use, the authors offer a perspective on three processes (with three 
sub-processes each) by which resources can be managed within firms to create value for 
customers and owners. These processes are: 1) structuring (acquiring, accumulating, divesting), 
bundling (stabilizing, enriching, pioneering), and leveraging (mobilizing, coordinating, 
deploying). While structuring “refers to the management of the firm’s resource portfolio”, 
bundling “refers to the combining of firm resources to construct or alter capabilities”, and 
leveraging “refers to the application of a firm’s capabilities to create value for customers and 
wealth for owners” (Sirmon et al., 2007: 277).  
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 Realizing the similarity both in objective and structure between the asset orchestration 
and resource management frameworks, Sirmon et al. (2011) ventured to integrate them into one 
resource orchestration framework. By way of clarifying how this new framework connects to its 
intellectual roots, Sirmon et al. (2011: 1394) note: “resource management draws on [the 
resource-based theory] RBT and has been explicitly linked with RBT’s primary logic, while 
asset orchestration draws from the dynamic capabilities concept. However, dynamic capabilities 
have been linked to RBT (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), thereby providing an indirect linkage 
between asset orchestration and resource management.” Resource orchestration thus offers an 
integration of aspects from the RBV with those from the dynamic capabilities perspective. Figure 
3.1 illustrates how asset orchestration and resource management fit together to form the resource 
orchestration framework.  
 
Figure 3.1. The General Resource Orchestration Framework (Figure 1 in Sirmon et al., 2011). 
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 Sirmon et al. (2011) further elaborate that resource orchestration can be explored in three 
dimensions: breadth (scope of the firm), depth (levels within the firm), and life cycles (i.e. time). 
While the breadth dimension of resource orchestration encompasses corporate strategy (product 
diversification, international diversification), business strategy (differentiation vs. cost 
leadership), and competitive dynamics (strong vs. modest competitive rivalry), the depth 
dimension of resource orientation considers different configurations on the continuum of top-
down and bottom-up strategies, and the life cycle dimension of resource orchestration covers the 
start-up stage, growth stage, mature stage, and decline stage of a firm.  
The resource orchestration framework has been applied to topic areas such as 
commitment-based HR systems (Chadwick, Super, & Kwon, 2015) and family firms (Chirico, 
Sirmon, Sciascia, & Mazzola, 2011), but no study has used the framework on the phenomenon of 
subpar performing organizations and/or subsidiaries yet. This is not because applicability is 
limited. In fact, Sirmon et al. (2011) describe in broad strokes what a study of organizational 
decline using a resource orchestration framework might look like. Trahms et al. (2013: 1299) 
also note the potential the resource orchestration framework might hold as “a theoretical lens 
through which numerous unresolved issues in turnaround research can be examined”. Indeed, 
they note that “it is surprising that so little turnaround research has examined how the 
management of a firm’s resources during decline […] and their leveraging in new competitive 
actions influence performance turnaround.” Moreover, the resource orchestration lens places a 
strong emphasis on the construct of time, offering itself as applicable to research questions such 
as: “Does the timing of retrenchment and strategic actions affect the success of turnaround 
attempts?” (Trahms et al., 2013: 1298).  
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 In this thesis, we apply the resource orchestration framework to the phenomenon of 
subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries by combining models of turnaround as reviewed in 
Chapter 2 (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013) with the 
resource orchestration framework offered by Sirmon et al. (2011). This approach leads us to 
introduce three central and overarching orchestration processes: Identifying, Responding, and 
Synchronizing. 
 The orchestration process of Identifying (of the appropriate response to subpar 
performance by the MNE headquarters) connects the likely causes of decline to the responses 
taken as a result of suspected causal attributions. This aspect is closely linked to the 
search/selection part of the resource orchestration framework. Moreover, Pearce and Robbins 
(1993) note that organizational decline may have causes that are due to internal factors (e.g. 
inefficiencies within the organization, unsuited strategic orientation) and causes that may be due 
to external factors (e.g. industry decline). In the context of foreign subsidiaries within MNEs, the 
cause for decline may also be found within the MNE itself, whereby e.g. an MNE that declines 
overall may not be able to provide sufficient firm-specific advantages and other resources to the 
foreign subsidiary anymore. In such a scenario, the MNE would have lost its inherent 
competitive advantage by using the flexibility available through its international production 
network (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). This is closely linked to Sirmon et al.’s (2011: 1394) 
assertion that the notion of fit with the environment is a foundational aspect of the resource 
orchestration lens. Decline at both the MNE-level and the subsidiary level could indicate a 
misfit. Once the likely cause of the decline has been identified, a choice is made for the type of 
response that is best suited to mitigate the situation and regain environmental fit. As we will 
argue in more detail in the next chapter, Identifying also implies that a specific situation needs to 
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receive headquarter attention before it can be addressed with a response. Note that attention can 
thereby be structured by institutional logics, which are “supraorganizational patterns, both 
symbolic and material, that order reality and provide meaning to actions and structure conflicts” 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 803). Thus, decision-makers will focus their attention on issues that 
are consistent with a predominant institutional logic. Moreover, some determinants may impede 
the process of Identifying and will be assessed in the analysis. 
 This leads to the orchestration process of Responding, whereby the effectiveness of the 
chosen response in terms of the rate of recovery and the rate of exit is assessed. Responding 
hereby corresponds most closely to structuring, leveraging (especially mobilizing), and 
deploying in the resource orchestration framework. While Pearce and Robbins (1993) focused on 
retrenchment as the main way to respond to declines, other studies such as Barker and Duhaime 
(1997) and Trahms et al. (2013) recognize a larger number of responses in their model. Since 
MNEs can respond in more ways than through cost retrenchment or asset retrenchment, the 
model in this thesis also encompasses a larger number of strategic and operational responses to 
subpar performance at the respective foreign subsidiary. 
 As has been highlighted before, the notion of time plays an integral role in the resource 
orchestration framework, leading us to conceptualize an orchestration process of Synchronizing 
resources in light of subpar performance at foreign subsidiaries. Responses to subpar 
performance are typically time-critical (Hofer, 1980) and can make the difference between a 
turnaround and bankruptcy. The timing of a response is thus a key concept that needs to be 
assessed specifically and not just as a latent variable. In the resource orchestration framework as 
presented by Sirmon et al. (2011), the aspect of time is perhaps best captured by the notion of 
coordinating. In conventional turnaround models (e.g. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 
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2013), time is mostly inherent in the cause-response-outcome process model. What has mostly 
been overlooked, however, is the time it takes to respond to an adverse situation. This is 
particularly salient in the context of an MNE-subsidiary relationship, where the response to a 
subpar performing foreign subsidiary may be delayed by several factors (e.g. cultural and 
geographic distance or conditions at the home country) and expedited by others (e.g. existence of 
a regional headquarters). As we will argue in the next chapter, some factors enhance the 
frequency in communication channels, thereby allowing for more headquarters attention to be 
drawn to the respective subsidiary. Tangpong et al. (2015: 647) provide a first stance at assessing 
the impact of the timing of responses, finding that earlier divestments and geographic market exit 
contribute to successful turnarounds (while early layoffs do not). However, the factors that 
determine the timing of a response in the first place have been relatively neglected (Tangpong et 
al., 2015: 673) but are especially important in international contexts where spatial and temporal 
barriers play an important role. Several internal mechanisms are at play in order to synchronize 
action to express a first response. Since the first response is likely to be the most impactful, it 
warrants further examination. Thus, the resource orchestration framework can help shed light on 
factors that may determine how resources are synchronized throughout the MNE network and 
the impact this aspect of time-to-respond has on selected outcomes. 
 In sum, there are several advantages to assessing the phenomenon of subpar performance 
at the subsidiary level through a resource orchestration lens. First, it allows for an overarching 
theoretical perspective on how an MNE can address the challenge of turning around an ailing 
foreign subsidiary. This encompasses an assessment of a variety of causes, a longer list of 
responses than suggested in most retrenchment-focused studies, and a selection of different 
outcomes. Second, it presents a way of thinking about connections between the MNE-
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headquarters’ level of analysis and the foreign subsidiary’s level of analysis. Since conventional 
studies of turnaround have mostly focused on corporate-level or business-level decline and 
turnarounds, a new theoretical lens that connects the two levels promises to offer valuable 
insights. Third and perhaps most importantly, it offers a time-focused perspective on turnarounds 
in foreign subsidiaries. As Trahms et al. (2013: 1299) note, “[a]lthough each action is important, 
it is in synchronizing or orchestrating the leadership’s resources management actions that value 
is added in positive firm outcomes.” Thus, it is not one type of resource (e.g. equity) or action 
which is important but the combination and timing of resources. This alleviates a key concern 
expressed towards the RBV (where the resource orchestration perspective has some of its roots), 
such that tautology is reduced when there is a clear time differential between the determinants 
(e.g. identified causes, deployed resources) and the outcomes (e.g. chosen responses, 
recovery/exit) (Peng, 2001).  
In sum, the resource orchestration lens is particularly suited to attempt the creation of a 
unifying framework of responses to subpar performance, as many scholars have repeatedly 
called for (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013, Sleesman et al., 2012). Such a 
framework that applies to the context of an ailing subsidiary within an MNE network is 
presented in Figure 3.2. Please note that in the interest of better readability, the framework in 
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Figure 3.2. A Resource Orchestration Framework of Responding to Subpar Performance in Foreign Subsidiaries. 
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Figure 3.2 contains only the connections between broad categories. In Chapter 4, each dimension 
of the framework (“Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”) will be analyzed in depth 
and three separate models for each dimension will be offered, each with an inherent set of 
hypotheses. 
Within this overarching resource orchestration framework, several other theoretical 
concepts can be embedded to inform the hypotheses. These will be presented next.  
 
3.2 The Attention-Based View 
 Within the resource orchestration framework presented in Figure 3.2, especially in the 
“Identifying” dimension, lays the notion of attention. Attention is a key yet mostly implicit 
construct underlying many studies on responses to subpar performance, particularly the ones in 
the international business realm. Broadly defined as taking notice of something and acting upon 
it (Oxford Dictionaries, N/A), attention can be understood as a resource that is scarce and critical 
to organizational success (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
Although attention has been studied in many different ways, Ocasio (1997) was the first to 
explicitly combine attention with strategy, leading to an attention-based view (ABV) of the firm 
(for an extension, see Ocasio, 2011). Within this view, attention is understood to be a 
multifaceted concept which can be defined “to encompass the noticing, encoding, interpreting, 
and focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers on both (a) issues; [i.e.] 
problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers: the available repertoire of action 
alternatives” (Ocasio, 1997: 189). The ABV is thus designed to provide an explanatory 
framework for understanding whether and how firms respond to changing internal and external 
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contexts, as well as the contingencies that may underlie these occurrences. As such, the key 
dependent variable within the ABV is that of organizational moves which Ocasio (1997: 201) 
defines as “the myriad of actions undertaken by the firm and its decision-makers in response to 
or in anticipation of change in its external and internal environment.” He differentiates the 
organizational moves concept from that of decisions by emphasizing that moves imply that the 
action is not only planned but also performed. The concept of organizational moves is thus very 
similar to the concept of responses to subpar performance as it is used in this thesis. The 
theoretical framework developed by Ocasio (1997: 192) is replicated in Figure 3.3. 
The ABV is different from related theories within the cognition realm in that it “focuses 
on the structural determinants that lead to strategic action” (Ocasio, 2011: 1292) and acts as a 
meta-theory which provides a background for detailing mechanisms. Individual-level cognition 
studies, in contrast, focus more on directly observing attention patterns as they unfold within a 
specific person. As a result of this difference, the ABV can be expanded across different levels of 
analysis, rather than being tied to the individual-level. Moreover, the ABV emphasizes less the 
performance implications of an action and more the determinants that lead to the confronting of 
an issue with an action or the ignoring of it through non-action (Ocasio, 1997: 194) in the first 
place.  
Very few studies within the organizational turnaround literature have made the concept of 
attention explicit. One example is D’Aveni and MacMillan’s (1990) study of crises of demand 
decline in a matched sample of 57 bankrupt firms and 57 turnaround firms. The results suggest 
that those firms that did not survive the crisis practically ignored the external (output) 
environment and focused their attention on the internal (input) environment, supporting the 
threat-rigidity perspective (McKinley, 1993). Another example is Musteen, Liang, and Barker’s 
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Figure 3.3. A Model of Predicting Organizational Moves through an Attention-based View 
(Ocasio, 1997: 192; Recreated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The Figure was recreated to exclude references to specific hypotheses, for the purpose of better readability. 
 (2011) study using a sample of 110 MBA and Executive MBA students in a case-study setting. 
The objective of that research was to explore the individual-level determinants of decision-
makers’ attention/perception of organizational decline severity and its impact on the extent of 
retrenchment activity. More mature decision-makers with a background in throughput functions 
(Accounting & Finance, Production, Production/ Operation), and an external locus of control 
perceived the decline to be stronger, leading to more pronounced retrenchment decisions.  
 The interest in exploring the role attention plays in an MNE headquarters’ resource 
allocation process has grown though (Campbell, 1989; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ambos & 
Birkinshaw, 2010). Headquarter attention is a rare and valuable resource; a notion which 
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is to initiate action under certain contingencies (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). Most 
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process of attention structures and decision-making (what Ocasio (2011) calls attentional 
perspective). However, combinations of top-down and bottom-up processes of attention (what 
Ocasio (2011) terms attentional engagement) have also found consideration. For instance, 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) suggest that the weight (strategic or operational importance) and 
the voice (initiatives) a subsidiary possesses within an MNE can influence the amount of 
headquarter attention it receives. 
 We are aware of no studies which focus specifically on the role of attention in a 
headquarter-subsidiary relationship when the foreign subsidiary’s performance is at subpar 
levels. What the discussion of the literature has revealed so far is that the chances for a 
successful turnaround increase when a response is offered. Responses require that top-
management attention is allocated in a way that allows for the initiation of such a response in the 
first place. The turnaround literature has recognized the implications of this relationship between 
attention and response for situations of organizational decline. In the international business 
context, the allocation of top-management attention is even more salient, where the “distinctive 
features of MNEs are high levels of geographical and cultural diversity coupled with complex 
portfolios of businesses, functions, and markets.” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 577). The 
spatial, temporal, and cultural barriers put an even higher strain on the information processing 
and attention allocation capabilities of the organization than in smaller and or purely domestic 
firms. As a result, attention (and by implication, action) is often unevenly spread across 
subsidiaries and may thus help explain differences between subpar performing subsidiaries with 
regards to whether they experience a response from their headquarters and if so, which one. 
Thus, a stronger focus on attention may be a useful extension of the existing studies on 
headquarters-subsidiary relationships in situations of subpar performance. 
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3.3 Inertia, Hysteresis, and Time Compression Diseconomies 
 While the attention-based view aims to predict organizational moves, it can also offer an 
explanation for why firms do not respond to internal or external changes. The concept of inertial 
forces has received most traction within the strategic management literature. Organizational 
inertia theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) offers a dominant and detailed perspective in this 
regard. Organizational inertia theory suggests that organizations frequently act in pursuit of 
reliability and accountability which, however, are only attainable if the organization moves 
toward a stable and reproducible structure. By standardizing patterns of activity, the organization 
is able to exhibit a relatively consistent structure over time. Unfortunately, such an approach also 
leads to more rigid structures, more complexity, less efficiency, and ultimately organizational 
inertia, which manifests itself as an aversion to change (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991).  
 Core capabilities (those that are not necessarily dynamic yet still relevant to the firm’s 
competitive advantage) can exert some inertial forces. Ghemawat (2002: 69) notes that such core 
capabilities are path dependent, subject to time lags, and embedded in organizations. This also 
applies to dynamic capabilities, as Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1113) remark, particularly when 
the environment is not characterized by very rapid change. In such a context, dynamic 
capabilities resemble routines which “are complicated, predictable, analytic processes that rely 
extensively on existing knowledge, linear execution and slow evolution over time. As managers 
continue to gain experience with these routines, they groove the processes more deeply such that 
they become easily sustained and even inertial.” This means that some companies experience 
inertial forces which may affect the firm’s ability to sense changes in the environment and 
translate this into appropriate responses. The outcome of a lack of dynamic capabilities is that the 
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firm may continue to make competitive returns in the short run - but will fail to remain viable in 
the longer run (Teece, 2007: 1342).  
 In the turnaround/organizational decline literature, a lack of managerial action has been 
explained within the “threat-rigidity camp”. As Ketchen and Palmer (1999: 683) note, “poor 
performers are expected to rely on previous actions to reverse their poor outcomes.” This 
reaction was explained by the impact that threat (as signaled by poor performance) may have on 
managerial decision-making: a behavior of retreat during which information processing, 
centralization of control, and conservation of resources are most dominant (Staw, Sandelands & 
Dutton, 1981). As a result, adaptation to the changes in the internal or external environment may 
be inhibited - a notion McKinley (1993: 3) describes as “’necessity is the mother of rigidity’ 
school” which stands in contrast to the “’necessity is the mother of invention” school. The latter 
draws from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1976) and describes how managers become 
more risk-seeking in light of negative signals, which in the best scenario provides a catalyst for 
adaptation and innovation (McKinley, 1993).  
 Related to these notions is the concept of hysteresis which generally describes a situation 
in which the effect lags behind a change in the cause of the effect. In the (international) strategic 
management literature, causes of hysteresis have been identified which include high switching 
costs and uncertainty (e.g. Belderbos & Zou, 2009). For instance, if the signals from a foreign 
subsidiary switch from being positive to being negative, a response may be delayed because of 
partial irreversibility of the initial decision (e.g. related to equity investments) or uncertainty 
about the appropriate path of action (e.g. commit more or less?). As a result, even though 
capabilities to sense and seize may exist, the ability to act upon what has been sensed may be 
delayed.  
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 While the hysteresis effect can impede a timely reconfiguration of resources that are in 
need of transformation, the construct of time compression diseconomies (TCD) presents an 
alternative perspective. First introduced by Dierickx and Cool (1989), TCDs suggest that ceteris 
paribus, a faster pace of change leads to more adverse outcomes as the organization faces a 
trade-off between time and costs (Jiang, Beamish & Makino, 2014: 116). For instance, as Celly 
(2008) observes, Vermeulen & Barkema (2002) argue for the effect of TCDs on the relationship 
between international expansion and performance: the faster the rate of internationalization, the 
lower the positive effect on performance becomes. The diseconomy of this time compression 
arises from costs associated with incomplete search, imperfect decision-making, and little 
available time and attention devoted to the screening of, reaction to, and integration of 
information regarding subsidiaries (Jiang et al., 2014: 115). Similarly, Jiang et al. (2014: 119) 
use the concept of TCDs to connect RBV with the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
2009), showing that “speed of expansion has a direct and negative effect” on subsidiary survival, 
while “[f]or subsidiary profitability, no main effect was found and the negative influence on 
subsidiary performance was significant only when combined with timing of entry.” These 
findings are relevant for this thesis in at least three ways. First, the concept of TCDs is closely 
connected to the dynamic capabilities/resource orchestration perspective, since it introduces the 
element of time to the notion that “[r]esource and capability development cannot be rushed” 
(Jiang et al., 2014: 114). As such, the concept is closely related to what Tan and Mahoney (2005: 
114) term dynamic adjustment costs, defined there as “the inability of a firm to adjust its 
managerial resources to the desired level in a timely way to match adaptively to a change in the 
market”. Second, TCDs appear to play an important role at the foreign subsidiary-level and, 
although Jiang et al. (2014: 115) view them as “the limit to firm growth discussed by Penrose 
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(1959)”, they may equally apply to other types of adjustments, such as de-internationalization. 
Third, Jiang et al. (2014) show that the timeliness of actions may have different effects for 
shorter-term outcomes (performance), compared to longer-term outcomes (survival) - a 
differentiation that is important and also made in this thesis. 
Taken together, the discussion around inertia, hysteresis, and TCDs suggests that a 
balance needs to be struck between change that is too slow and too fast and/or often (Chung & 
Beamish, 2010).  
 
3.4 The Patterns and Outcomes of Organizational Change 
 Somewhat related to the constructs of hysteresis and time compression diseconomies is 
that of organizational change per se. In the conceptual system of dynamic capabilities, 
organizational change relates to managing threats and/or transforming which is expressed in its 
micro-foundation pertaining to “[c]ontinuous alignment and realignment of specific tangible and 
intangible assets” (Teece, 2007: 1340). In the broader organizational change literature, two 
competing models have been proposed. First, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and Romanelli and 
Tushman (1994) introduced the conceptualization of change as the punctuation of equilibria. As 
such, long periods of stability are interrupted by rather short periods of rapid change. The periods 
of stability tend to be longer than those of change due to the aforementioned self-reinforcing 
pressures towards reliability and reproducibility which can lead to inertia. In contrast, the 
relatively shorter periods of rapid change allow for a combined effort (an orchestration of 
resources) from many parts of the organization which can enable change to be implemented 
more easily than if the change stretched out over longer periods of time.  
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 An alternative perspective on change processes stems from the evolutionary perspective, 
in which business units are conceptualized as changing slowly over time (Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Cyert & March, 1963), as each subunit goes about its related but relatively independent 
operations. Over time, in incremental steps, and without a concerted effort, the corporation as a 
whole becomes transformed.  
 When change is implemented, there can be short-term and long-term repercussions 
arising from it. As Celly (2008: 46) remarks, “while some changes can ultimately be positive for 
some individuals, change tends to be disturbing and disruptive for employees, at least until it has 
fully normalized.” Fedor, Caldwell and Herold (2006: 21), for instance, observe in a sample of 
32 organizations from a number of industries, that change (good or bad) entails adjustments that 
need to be made by the workforce. This adjustment may take time and have an impact on the 
level of commitment the employee offers to the organization. Specifically, their study revealed 
that “Even “good” change is not always good for certain employees if they need to do most of 
the adjusting. […] if the change was seen as being unfavorable for the work unit, changes in 
organizational commitment were largely neutral to negative.” Therefore, while “good” change 
may be beneficial to a subsidiary’s performance and the workforce’s satisfaction in the long-run, 
the effects may be quite the opposite in the short-run. 
 Commitment in the sense it is mentioned above is an individual-level construct but it can 
also occur at the organizational level. This is relevant to the concepts reviewed next. 
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3.5 Organizational-Level Commitment to Foreign Subsidiaries 
 Although the construct of organizational commitment has typically been understood as an 
employees’ commitment to an organization, this study uses the concept to mean commitment of 
the headquartering organization to its subsidiaries. As such, it denotes an organizational-level 
relationship which can be defined in terms of Morgan and Hunt’s (1994: 23) notion of 
relationship commitment, with “an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with 
another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it”. Lenses such as 
commitment-trust theory (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), social exchange theory (Isidor, Schwens, 
Hornung & Kabst, 2014; Das & Teng, 2002), or cyclical processes in inter-organizational 
relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) view continued commitment as a necessary ingredient 
for subsidiary longevity. In the dynamic capabilities perspective, Teece (2007: 1235) notes that 
“commitment of (financial) resources to investment opportunities can lead to enterprise growth 
and profitability.” and resource orchestration efforts encompass such resource commitments or 
changes thereof. 
 However, not all perspectives in the literature agree that high and/or increasing 
commitment is a beneficial approach. For instance, Ghemawat (1991: 15) describes 
“commitment [as] the tendency of strategies to persist over time”. Depending on the context, 
such persistence or non-response may be more promising than changes in the level of 
commitment, since the continuation of a proven strategy over a longer period of time may reduce 
the degree of strategic “flip-flops” (Ghemawat, 1991: 15) and enhance the stability and 
predictability within the organization. Contrary to this view, several streams of the literature 
warn about refraining from strategic responses. In the turnaround literature, Pearce and Robbins 
(1993: 615) note that “that patience and perseverance by the firm are rarely sufficient to produce 
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profitable performance for the firm”. In the escalation of commitment literature, Staw and Ross 
(1989) and Staw (1997: 204) note that: “there is […] a very loose coupling between 
organizational goals and action (March & Olsen, 1976). […] organizations are often slow to 
respond. Thus, even when the need for change is recognized, it may not occur”. These two 
perspectives are somewhat opposing because while the first recommends continuation of past 
action paths, the second advises against it. 
 Similarly, there seems to be no consensus over which direction the commitment change 
should take, if the decision towards a change is made. For instance, Lane and Beamish (1990: 
99) cite an executive from their sample as stating “Commitment is probably the single most 
critical factor for successful entry into foreign markets” and note that commitment is especially 
important once hurdles such as subpar performance are encountered. This may hint at the notion 
that commitment is especially vital in times of distress and an increase in commitment may be 
beneficial.  
This stands in contrast to the escalation of commitment literature (Staw, 1976; Sleesman, 
et al., 2012) which suggests that persistence to a path of action is not only adhered to but indeed 
commitment is raised to a higher level when performance is low. Since this may be due to 
economically irrational behavior (as described in Chapter 2), such escalation of commitment 
(Barton et al., 1989) is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Thus, within this lens, commitment is 
seen more sceptically and as potentially dangerous.  
While the escalation of commitment literature specifically focuses on the risk of investing 
more into a losing venture, other streams emphasize downsizing as the most rational option (also 
in comparison to persisting). One stream in which this is an important aspect is the real options 
perspective. Kogut (1991) was the first to connect real options logic to foreign subsidiaries (joint 
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ventures (JV) in particular) and argued that JVs represent initial investments with a subsequent 
flexibility to contract, maintain, or expand the investment once more has been learned about the 
venture’s development over time. Adner and Levinthal (2004) proposed a two-stage model in 
which the initial investment is revised based on whether subsequently favorable or unfavorable 
news were received. Following the logic, subpar performance would constitute unfavorable 
news, causing the investor to withdraw the option and retract their investment if certain 
conditions are met. Indeed, as noted before, real options logic can only be applied when strict 
parameters are present. For instance, the logic is not applicable when a decision point could 
result in a smorgasbord of different decisions. The failure of an option investment must be 
clearly identifiable, in order to initiate timely abandonment. As Adner and Levinthal (2004: 77) 
suggest, for instance, if the target market of a subsidiary is flexible, failure may be difficult to 
determine, since “if a new product fails to win acceptance in a given target market, it may still be 
successful in other possible target markets”. Thus, real options logic as a special case of path-
dependent investments applies to rather specific decision situations. 
Further, while some literatures make relatively straightforward recommendations and/or 
predictions, there are indications of a more differentiated perspective. For instance, even though 
most studies in the de-internationalization literature describe decreases in commitment, Benito 
and Welch (1997) suggest that international divestments become more unlikely the longer the 
subsidiary has been in existence. Similarly, a new stream of literature has recently emerged in 
the behavioral decision-making domain, where Drummond (2014) suggests that premature 
abandonment of a venture may also be detrimental, thereby tempering the warnings regarding 
“abandoning too late” issues by most studies in the escalation of commitment study. 
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 In sum, the recommendations and predictions arising out of studies that focus on 
organizational-level commitment have not been equivocal. Thus, the constructs and their relative 
importance within a comprehensive perspective will be weighed carefully when developing the 
hypotheses. In the following section, the arguments bought forward by this diversity of 
theoretical lenses will be incorporated into the development of specific hypotheses. The resource 
orchestration perspective will thereby be used as an overarching framework which allows for a 
comprehensive consideration of the subpar performance phenomenon of foreign subsidiaries.  
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Following the overarching resource orchestration framework developed in Chapter 3, the 
sets of hypotheses in this chapter are organized around “Identifying”, “Responding”, and 
“Synchronizing” processes when responding to subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries. Each 
set of hypotheses is preceded by a more detailed excerpt of the resource orchestration framework 
offered in Figure 3.2. 
 
4.1 Hypotheses Regarding “Identifying” 
When a foreign subsidiary is performing poorly for at least two years, action is usually 
required to facilitate turnaround (Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976). While some factors that 
influence the choice of a response to poor performance level have been identified for corporate-
level or business-level turnarounds, much deeper understanding of the phenomenon is warranted. 
On the one hand, the main focus within the turnaround literature has been on corporate-level and 
business-level turnarounds. This focus has led to a relative neglecting of responses that go 
beyond asset or cost retrenchment, exits, or strategic reorientations, as well as determinants that 
encompass more than a domestic market. An international business perspective can add insights 
regarding alternative responses in this regard. On the other hand, within the international 
business perspective, predicting whether and how MNE headquarters respond to subpar 
performing foreign subsidiary and what factors may determine the choice has been a relatively 
neglected area of research. Perhaps the largest related stream of research is that of international 
divestments (Benito, 2005; Berry, 2013), wherein determinants of divestitures are explored. 
However, as Berry (2013) notes, not all divestitures necessarily result from poor subsidiary-level 
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performance. Moreover, the option of not responding to subpar performance is vastly under-
researched within both the turnaround literature and the international divestitures literature. 
  Nonetheless, there are some studies in the organizational turnaround literature that aimed 
to predict the factors that may impact whether and how an organization responds to subpar 
performance. For instance, Hofer (1980) noted that unfortunate positions in a declining industry 
phase or in a market with little fit can (and, in all likelihood, should) lead to strategic actions. 
When, however, slack is high and short-term performance improvement is the goal, a response 
aimed at improving operations is likely going to be more beneficial (Hofer, 1980; Love & 
Nohria, 2005). A few studies within the international business domain have also emphasized 
determinants of responses, specifically international divestments. For example, Mata and 
Portugal (2004) find that foreign firms that enter a market with an acquisition, new firms with a 
larger human capital endowment, joint ventures, and minority holdings are more likely to be 
divested. Benito (2005) notes that overdiversification can also predict divestments. These studies 
have in common that subpar performance at the subsidiary-level is but another predictor of a 
response (divestment), while it is the key contextual variable in this thesis. Thus, all subsidiaries 
in the study are already performing poorly, causing subsequent responses likely to have been 
made in reaction to the undesirable situation.  
 Consequently, the first set of hypotheses aims to fill this gap by addressing the first 
research question raised in Chapter 1: When a foreign subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar 
performance, what determines which specific type of response is chosen (if any at all)? An 
attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997, 2011) is employed since it provides a framework designed 
to predict the occurrence and type of an organizational move (a concept very similar to that of 
responses) given specific contingencies. The framework also offers a useful perspective on 
75 
 
headquarter-subsidiary relationships (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ambos & Birkinshaw, 
2010). An emphasis was laid on examining those factors which may prevent or facilitate a 
response in the first place, before examining how each type of response is influenced by 
idiosyncratic sets of determinants.  
 
4.1.1 Hypotheses 1a-1c (No Response) 
 The causes for a non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary can be 
manifold and span all levels of analysis. In this part of the analysis, we assume an ABV 
perspective and suggest that geographic distance, MNE-level poor performance, and the number 
of expatriates at the ailing subsidiary are factors that may influence whether a response is 
administered. The choice of these variables is based on their representativeness regarding 
influences at different levels of analysis (following the notion that subpar performance can span 
multiple levels of analysis) and their importance in the extant literature. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
hypothesized relationships.  
The ABV suggests that the meta-concept of attention can help explain why some firms 
would respond to issues while others do not. Attention, while ultimately an individual-level 
process, is “situated in the context of the firm’s activities and procedures, and these situational 
contexts, and the decision-makers, issues, and answers they are linked to, are distributed 
throughout the firm (March & Olsen, 1976).” (Ocasio, 1997: 189). This dispersion of attention 
structures can manifest in differences with respect to how much attention is allocated to each unit 
across spatial, temporal, and procedural dimensions (see Mechanism 3 in Ocasio, 1997). In 
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MNEs, these dimensions are especially salient, since the headquarters must allocate its attention 
across different country borders, time zones, language barriers, and cultural differences. 
Figure 4.1. Model With Hypotheses For Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 1 - Predicting No 
Response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The underlined variables are the ones in focus for the respective set of hypotheses. 
 An important factor that may thus affect whether or not a subsidiary will experience a 
response to its subpar performance is its geographic distance to the headquarters. A foreign 
subsidiary that is further away from its headquarters is likely going to be less connected to the 
processes and key decision-makers at the headquarters (Helliwell, 2002). Greater geographic 
distance can also come with greater travel time and higher travel costs, which in turn may affect 
the number of visits executives pay to the foreign subsidiary (Boeh & Beamish, 2012). Similarly, 
Dunning (1998) suggests that geographic distance can incur spatial transaction costs which can 
result from the friction of coordinating a dispersed network of subsidiaries, managing country 
differences, or alleviating information asymmetries. Geographic distance may also result in 
language barriers that can lead to misunderstandings, conflict, and parallel communication 
Strategic responses 
increases in commitment 
decreases in commitment 
Operational responses 
increases in commitment 
decreases in commitment 
Combination responses 
increases in commitment 
decreases in commitment 
mixed change in commitment 
No response 
increases in commitment 
Environment-level factors 
GDP growth 
Geographic distance 
 
MNE-level factors 
Poor performance 
Subsidiary-level factors 
Regional headquarters 
R&D role 
Joint venture/WOS 
Subsidiary age 
Number of employees 
Number of expatriates 
H1a (+) 
H1b (+) 
H1c (-) 
77 
 
channels (Harzing & Pudelko, 2014). All these challenges can raise temporal transaction costs, 
since greater geographic distance can result in delays due to longer travel times, translations, and 
time zone differentials.  
 Taken together, greater geographic distance can make it more likely that an MNE is 
paying less attention to the distant foreign subsidiary. Moreover, even if the headquarters does 
receive signals about the subsidiary’s subpar performance, it may be more difficult to process 
this information and interpret it accordingly when geographic distance is greater. For instance, 
the causes for subpar performance in a geographically proximate subsidiary may be more 
intuitively understood than the causes for subpar performance in a geographically distant 
subsidiary, where many headquarter-based heuristics may not be applicable.  
Moreover, insights from the literature on networks suggest that a diverse network may 
increase the degree of novelty of information received through the network. However, this 
diversity may come with an overall reduction in information flow. Thus, if an MNE has built a 
widespread network of foreign subsidiaries, it may be able to obtain novel information from such 
far-flung subsidiaries (e.g. about local preferences and innovations). The trade-off in this setting 
is, however, that the headquarters may receive less information from those foreign subsidiaries, 
increasing the risk of a non-response when subpar performance occurs. In sum, the following 
hypothesis is offered:  
Hypothesis 1a: A non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to 
occur with higher geographic distance between the headquarters and that foreign subsidiary.  
 A similar attention-based argument can be made for the situation in which the loss 
situation is not restricted to the foreign subsidiary but concerns the MNE as a whole. It is 
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possible that the foreign subsidiary is ailing precisely as a result of the corporate-level or 
business-level decline. In a situation of decline for the entire organization, attention may be 
focused on salvaging the domestic market first, before rescuing a particular foreign subsidiary. 
The problem in the headquarters’ own backyard needs to be resolved before it can direct its 
attention elsewhere. Further, even if the headquarters did note the subpar performance situation 
at the foreign subsidiary, it may not be able to prioritize resources to be allocated to the foreign 
location. Such resources include top management time, leading to a higher level of inertia 
regarding the headquarters’-subsidiary relationship. In sum, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 1b: A non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to 
occur when the MNE as a whole is experiencing profit losses.  
 During situations with high levels of uncertainty, such as subpar performance, an MNE 
headquarters has several options through which it can exercise control, channel support, and 
receive information in order to enhance its ability to pay attention to a subsidiary-level situation. 
One such way is the practice of temporarily deploying parent-country nationals as expatriates to 
those foreign locations for purposes of knowledge transfer, organizational development, or 
coordination and control (Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Takeuchi, Shay, & Li, 2008). Japanese 
MNEs regularly deploy expatriates to their foreign locations for these purposes (Gong, 2003; 
Peterson, Napier & Shim, 1996). Expatriates can thereby play a two-directional role: first, they 
can direct subsidiary-level attention to measures required by the headquarters. Choi and Beamish 
(2004) also note that control mechanisms act as a conduit for firm-specific advantages and 
expatriates could be such a control mechanism. Second, they can report back to the headquarters 
regarding the subsidiary-level situation. Thus, expatriates can play an active role in directing 
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headquarter attention channels - with the result that a higher number of expatriates at a subpar 
performing subsidiary is expected to decrease the probability of not receiving a headquarter 
response.  
Moreover, Riaz, Rowe, and Beamish (2014) note the importance of expatriate 
deployment levels with regards to future growth. They find that a higher number of expatriates at 
the foreign subsidiary’s foundation and a slower decrease of this number over time lead to 
improved growth prospects. Riaz et al. (2014) suggest that expatriates can facilitate knowledge 
transfer, coordination and control. If their number is higher at founding, path dependency unfolds 
a positive effect, whereby subsequent capabilities development and growth is enabled. The 
second part of their argument suggests that when the decrease in the number of expatriates is 
slower in a subsidiary than in its counterparts, it incurs lower dynamic adjustments costs. These 
costs arise when new members replace the function of the expatriate and the organization needs 
to adjust to incorporate these individuals. During times of subpar performance, both a higher 
number of expatriates at foundation and over time may thus allow for more efficient 
communication and coordination. As a result, the following hypothesis is provided: 
Hypothesis 1c: A non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to 
occur when there are a fewer expatriates in the subsidiary.  
 
4.1.2 Hypotheses 2a-2c (Increases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment) 
 If a subsidiary does receive a response, the type of response may be affected by different 
predictors. In this section, the predictors of increases in commitment are assessed (see Figure 
4.2), based on an argument of environmental fit. 
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Figure 4.2. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 2 - Predicting Increases 
in Commitment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
When the foreign subsidiary is performing poorly while the overall market is growing, an 
indication of misalignment of fit with the external environment may be present. Various ways 
exist to effectuate realignment through increased strategic commitment. In this thesis, these 
include enhancing control through switching to a higher equity ownership mode, and deploying 
more expatriates. Within an MNE, strong reasons are likely to be necessary to justify a strategic 
response associated with a considerable amount of investment. Such a justification could be the 
market potential at the foreign subsidiary’s host country location. Berry (2013) identified market 
growth as a key factor that deterred MNEs from divesting their relatedly diversified subsidiaries. 
Here, this argument is extended to the effect that increases in strategic commitment is 
hypothesized to be the response that MNE headquarters choose in light of an ailing subsidiary in 
a promising market. This leads to the following hypothesis:   
Strategic responses 
increases in commitment 
decreases in commitment 
Operational responses 
increases in commitment 
decreases in commitment 
Combination responses 
increases in commitment 
decreases in commitment 
mixed change in commitment 
No response 
increases in commitment 
Environment-level factors 
GDP growth 
Geographic distance 
 
MNE-level factors 
Poor performance 
Subsidiary-level factors 
Regional headquarters 
R&D role 
Joint venture/WOS 
Subsidiary age 
Number of employees 
Number of expatriates 
H2a (+) 
H2b (+) 
H2c (+) 
81 
 
Hypothesis 2a: An increase in strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth rates. 
The arguments for an increase in operational commitment to the subpar performing 
subsidiary are similar to those for an increase in strategic commitment. Operational measures 
such as increasing the workforce or investing in equity without effecting a mode change can 
enhance the fit with the environment, e.g. by increasing customer-orientation through a larger 
sales team. However, the probability of an increase in operational commitment is expected to be 
stronger than the probability of an increase in strategic commitment. The risk associated with 
investing more resources into an ailing subsidiary in a promising host country is smaller for the 
operational commitment and thus more probable. The resulting hypothesis is:   
Hypothesis 2b: An increase in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth rates. 
 Finally, when GDP growth rates are particularly high, the abovementioned arguments are 
expected to converge to a combination of increases in commitment through both strategic and 
operational measures. Thus, the following hypothesis is offered: 
Hypothesis 2c: An increase in both strategic and operational commitment is more likely to occur 
when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth 
rates. 
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4.1.3 Hypotheses 3a-3f (Decreases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment) 
 Much of the organizational decline and turnaround literature has emphasized the 
importance of retrenching, following a “necessity is the mother of rigidity” school (McKinley, 
1993). In this set of hypotheses, the conventional efficiency arguments are investigated along 
with IB-context specific aspects. Figure 4.3 illustrates the set of hypotheses. 
 In the context of MNE headquarters attention, the strategic role of the subsidiary plays an 
important part in the decision to respond to subpar performance. Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008: 
577) suggest that subsidiaries with sufficient “weight”, i.e. central “structural positions that 
subsidiary units occupy within a corporate system” receive more headquarter attention. For 
instance, if the ailing foreign subsidiary serves as a regional headquarters, it has an important 
strategic role that connects it to other subsidiaries in the region. Lasserre (1996: 31) lists five key 
tasks performed by the regional headquarters. They 1) scout the region for opportunities, 2) offer 
Figure 4.3. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 3 - Predicting 
Decreases in Commitment. 
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strategic guidance to units in the region, 3) demonstrate internal and external commitment to the 
region, 4) coordinate the units in the region and create synergies, and 5) pool resources across 
units in the region. Due to this “switchboard” function, the regional headquarters is thus very 
important as an information and attention channel for the headquarters - it has “weight”. A 
similar argument is made by Alfondi, Clegg, and McGaughey (2012) who identify 10 functions 
of regional headquarters
4
. They also note that in some countries, a full regional headquarters may 
not be feasible. MNE headquarters then assign a regional management mandate, which includes 
many of the functions of a regional headquarters but at a lower level of investment. As such, 
both regional headquarters and subsidiaries with a regional management mandate fulfill 
important roles. In comparison, the regional management mandate may be a more cost-efficient 
approach in smaller markets than regional headquarters but regional headquarters are the most 
effective way for an MNE headquarters to signal attention and commitment to a specific region. 
Thus, a divestment of a regional headquarter would not only indicate a retreat from that 
particular investment but from the region as a whole.  
 Moreover, Nell, Ambos, and Schlegelmilch (2011) discuss the concept of overlaps in the 
networks of MNE headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries (“embeddedness overlaps”). If a 
subsidiary has an important role in the MNE’s network that links it to many other subsidiaries, it 
possesses a certain degree of power which demands headquarter attention. By creating 
embeddedness overlaps, a MNE can tap into the information flows that are connected to that 
subsidiary, thereby acting to overcome the diversity-bandwidth trade-off described by Aral & 
Van Alstyne (2011).  
                                                          
4
 1) Strategic leadership, planning, and direction, 2) resource development, acquisition, and deployment, 3) seeking 
and exploiting new opportunities, 4) driving organisational adaptation, 5) attention and signalling, 6) monitoring, 
control, and governance, 7) resource and knowledge management, 8) representation and mediation, 9) coordination 
and harmonisation, 10) integration and facilitation of inter-unit linkages. 
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Thus, if such a powerful regional headquarter subsidiary is performing poorly, it is 
expected to be highly unlikely that it will experience any decrease in strategic or operational 
commitment. Instead, if a decrease in strategic and/or operational commitment occurs, it is 
expected to materialize only for those subsidiaries that do not fulfill a regional headquarters role. 
The following hypotheses results: 
Hypothesis 3a: A decrease in strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is not a regional headquarters. 
Hypothesis 3b: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is not a regional headquarters. 
 A similar argument as for regional headquarters can be made for subsidiaries which 
fulfill another specific purpose in the MNE network. As Feinberg and Gupta (2004) note, foreign 
subsidiaries being assigned a research and development (R&D) role have become an increasingly 
common phenomenon. Extant literature has noted the importance of subsidiaries with an R&D 
role with regards to the generation of learning within the MNE and the transfer of this new 
knowledge from the host country to the home country. As a result, such subsidiaries with an 
R&D function gain “weight” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) within the MNE network. Over 
time, a subsidiary which has been assigned an R&D role may thus evolve from a “starter” role 
(establishing a newly started laboratory) to an “innovator” (enhancing capabilities within the 
laboratory) to a “contributor” role (diffusing knowledge within the MNE network) (Asakawa, 
2001). Moreover, research projects within MNEs often represent important and capital-intensive 
investments into future product lines or process improvements within the organization. The time 
horizon of performance expectations may thus be significantly longer than it would be for 
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foreign subsidiaries with other purposes. With such an important node position within the 
MNE’s network, it is thus unlikely for subsidiaries fulfilling an R&D function to be divested, be 
it strategically or operationally. Thus, similar to regional headquarter subsidiaries, we propose 
the following:  
Hypothesis 3c: A decrease in strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary does not fulfill an R&D purpose. 
Hypothesis 3d: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary does not fulfill an R&D purpose. 
Decreases in operational commitment such as downsizing and retrenchment have 
arguably been the most dominant types of responses in the turnaround literature (Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992; Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce & Robbins, 1993, 1994). While there has been some 
criticism regarding the efficacy of retrenchment actions (Barker & Mone, 1994), much evidence 
seems to suggest that most firms retreat to downsizing by way of reducing slack when 
performance is poor. For instance, Love and Nohria (2005) find that downsizing by way of 
reducing slack is most beneficial when slack is high. While most studies in this regard have 
aimed to investigate the question of whether downsizing is an appropriate measure for the 
facilitation of turnaround, much fewer have empirically explored the factors that may determine 
whether downsizing is chosen as the response. Within the context of an MNE, two factors stand 
out as having explanatory potential in this regard: subsidiary age and size. Both age and size can 
come with path dependencies that build up slack over time. Building up slack can be a conscious 
decision, considering that it has been shown to contribute to firm performance and especially 
innovation, at least within certain ranges (for a review, see Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 
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2004). However, during poor performance, slack exerts a counterproductive effect, representing 
bound resources that are not used for the achievement of a turnaround until they are capitalized 
through downsizing. 
 These arguments fit into the “necessity is the mother of rigidity” (McKinley, 1993) 
stream of the organizational turnaround literature. Its main tenet is that turnaround can be 
achieved by cutting costly innovations and pursuing a strategy of risk avoidance by cutting costs 
and focusing only on the core of the business (McKinley et al., 2014). Following Love and 
Nohria (2005), it can be expected that firms choose to downsize by way of reducing slack only 
when slack is already high. This is likely to be the case in 1) older and 2) larger subsidiaries 
which are likely to have accumulated excess resources over time. 
 Moreover, age and size also affect the degree of attention the headquarters allocates 
towards the ailing subsidiary. If a subsidiary is older and larger, it is more likely that the 
executives at the MNE-level will have had contact with executives from that subsidiary. Thus, it 
is likely that larger and older subsidiaries will indeed experience a response to its subpar 
performance situation. Consequently, the following two hypotheses are developed:  
Hypothesis 3e: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is older. 
Hypothesis 3f: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is larger (in terms of the number of employees). 
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4.1.4 Hypothesis 4 (Combination Response) 
 Hofer (1980) pointed out the advantages of using responses to subpar performance that 
point in a clear direction. Combination responses that contain both strategic and operational 
increases and decreases in commitment can bring about heightened managerial complexity and 
confusion among employees. What may nonetheless affect the decision in favor of a combination 
response is depicted in Figure 4.4. 
 The degree of complexity of attention and control structures within MNEs versus purely 
domestic firms becomes apparent when considering that subsidiaries may be managed by more 
than just one parent firm from more than one country (i.e. in the case of an international joint 
venture). A stream of literature within the international business domain has 
Figure 4.4. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 4 - Predicting 
Combination Responses. 
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explored the effect that the number of parent firms in a subsidiary may have on outcomes. 
Regarding performance, for instance, the perspectives on how the number of parent firms matters 
have diverged. Beamish and Kachra (2004) juxtapose the TCE perspective (more parent firms 
lead to higher transaction costs and thus lower performance) with the RBV perspective (more 
parent firms lead to more diverse complementary resources and thus higher performance) and 
find that the number of parent firms is not significantly associated with performance. However, 
there appears to be consensus that having more than one parent firm in a foreign subsidiary does 
increase managerial complexity, especially when the parent firms originate from different home 
country locations. This in turn may affect how attention is allocated and whether the subpar 
performing subsidiary experiences a response.  
 Managerial complexity in a strategic alliance stems from multiple sources. Yan and Zeng 
(1999) offer a list of factors that add complexity (and potentially lead to instability) which 
includes disagreements regarding co-management, conflicts due to cross-cultural differences, 
issues related to control and ownership structures, clashes resulting from idiosyncratic 
characteristics of parents, and the navigation of external environments. Subsidiaries that are 
owned by more than just one parent firm are thus required to manage a higher degree of 
complexity and ambiguity.  
 This notion becomes especially salient when the subsidiary is performing poorly. In such 
a situation, many firms “will blame their local partner [or, more generally,] almost anyone or 
anything except themselves” (Lane & Beamish, 1990: 100). Naturally, this reaction is likely to 
lead to conflict among the parent firms of the subpar performing subsidiary. Even if the parent 
firms genuinely try to search for the true cause, it may be very difficult to identify a causal 
mechanism of subpar performance and this ambiguity may result in disagreements about the best 
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way to move forward. These disagreements are not necessarily detrimental - however, they are 
likely going to lead to more cases in which a subsidiary may experience a more diverse (perhaps 
even uncoordinated) response. For instance, the local partner may wish to increase the number of 
employees (operational increase) while the foreign partner may wish to decrease their equity 
position to a portfolio mode (strategic decrease). Thus, since different entities may initiate 
different responses which are at risk of not being well coordinated, combination responses are 
hypothesized to occur more often in joint ventures than in WOS: 
Hypothesis 4: A combination response is more likely to occur when the subpar performing 
subsidiary is a joint venture. 
 This concludes the hypothesis development section for the “identifying” dimension of the 
resource orchestration framework. The next set of hypotheses will be developed around the 
“responding” dimension.   
 
4.2 Hypotheses Regarding “Responding” 
This subsection assesses the second part (“Responding”) of the overarching resource 
orchestration framework (“Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”). In particular, the 
effects of chosen responses on outcome variables (recovery, exit, and continued subpar 
performance) are explored.  
This notion of the efficacy of responding is an important area of research at the 
intersection of the organizational turnaround literature (Trahms et al., 2013) and international 
divestiture literature (Benito & Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005). On the one hand, the turnaround 
literature has mainly focused on responses to poor performance at the corporate-level or 
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business-level within domestic markets, thereby neglecting scenarios in which MNE 
headquarters are called upon to respond to their poorly performing subsidiaries in foreign 
locations. The number and types of responses available in such a situation can be quite different 
from the number and types of responses available at the corporate-level or business-level of 
analysis in a domestic context. For instance, the adjustment of control (e.g. via expatriates or 
equity) are not commonly available in the latter scenario. Moreover, many studies in this stream 
of literature focused on samples of firms that successfully performed a turnaround (McKinley et 
al., 2014), leading to a limited picture of the efficacy of responses to subpar performance.  
On the other hand, the international divestiture literature has mostly been concerned with 
divestitures as the dependent variable, rather than as an independent variable like in the 
organizational turnaround literature. This leads to a slight shift in focus, whereby divestitures are 
found to occur in response to subpar performance - but also in response to other aspects such as 
corporate-level or business-level strategic reorientation (Berry, 2013; Benito, 2005). The 
appropriate response to subpar performance at the subsidiary-level as the defining criterion of the 
context has thus been underexplored. 
 The investigation of the efficacy of each response (i.e. the response being the 
independent variable) is thus important to investigate in terms of the chances for recovery versus 
the risk of exit. Thus, this study explores the following research question: Which type of response 
(if any) is most conducive to increasing recovery and survival prospects? 
 
 
 
91 
 
4.2.1 Hypotheses 5a-5b (No Response versus Any Response) 
 There appears to be consensus in the literature that a subpar performance sequence that 
lasts for more than two years requires an active response in order to facilitate turnaround. What 
this means with regards to the rate of recovery versus exit (as opposed to the mere likelihood of 
each outcome), has remained underexplored. Figure 4.5 illustrates the proposed relationships. 
 Drawing from the resource orchestration framework (especially its roots in the dynamic 
capabilities perspective), a response to subpar performance can be the result of an efficient 
process of sensing, seizing, and subsequently managing threats and/or transforming. The 
Figure 4.5. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 2: “Responding”: Part 1 - Predicting the 
Efficacy of No Response versus Any Response. 
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There are many conditions that may cause subsidiary-level subpar performance to remain 
unanswered. Ghemawat (1991) argues that the causes for refraining from any strategic response 
to a new situation may be related to lock-in, lock-out, lags, and inertia. Lock-in and lock-out are 
reflections of adverse path-dependency, where either leaving a particular path of action or 
embarking on a particular path of action is more costly than persisting with the current strategic 
path. Lags are based on the logic of hysteresis and time compression diseconomies, whereby 
accelerated responses to negative performance signals can be very unlikely and/or costly (this 
aspect will be explored in more depth in Chapter 7 (“synchronizing”)). Moreover, if a non-
response to subpar performance signals is due to organizational inertia (which can be caused by a 
structurally and psychologically embedded resistance to change), the effectiveness of sensing, 
seizing, and managing threats and/or transforming may also be dampened. As a result, no (or a 
significantly delayed) response occurs in reaction to the subpar performance situation. 
Moreover, the occurrence of a response may be related to the concept of dynamic 
capabilities itself. The basic notion of dynamic capabilities is that they are a contributing factor 
to the firm’s competitive advantage. As Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1111) note, the benefits of 
dynamic capabilities come from them being “valuable, somewhat rare, equifinal, substitutable, 
and fungible
5”. One source that leads to these benefits and ultimately the desired superior 
competitive positioning is the notion that dynamic capabilities such as resource orchestration are 
difficult and time-consuming to develop. Moreover, “[s]ometimes even the managers themselves 
do not know why their dynamic capabilities are successful.” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1114), 
suggesting a certain degree of causal ambiguity inherent in the process. This causes the 
                                                          
5
 Fungible refers to mutually interchangeable subjects that are identical (e.g. cash for cash), while substitutable 
subjects are subjects that can act in place of each other (e.g. cash for purchased good).  
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capability to be less imitable by competitors and therefore in turn allows for a superior 
competitive positioning. 
 On the flipside, the implication from this is also that not all companies possess such 
superior dynamic capabilities. This would become especially apparent in the international 
context, where sensing, seizing, and managing threats and/or transforming is especially made 
more difficult by geographic and cultural distance between the headquarters and the foreign 
subsidiaries. If an MNE is able to respond to a subpar performance situation at the subsidiary 
level rather quickly and decidedly, this may indicate the existence of a dynamic resource 
orchestration capability. On the other hand, if a response is non-apparent or considerably 
delayed, there may be processes, structures, and other factors hindering the MNE from 
responding effectively.  
Thus, if subpar performance is likely to be structurally embedded and a response hints at 
a dynamic capability which would constitute a competitive advantage, a response (as opposed to 
no response) may be necessary to help the subsidiary turn around. The occurrence of a response 
in general can have a different impact in the short-term and the longer-term. In the short-term, a 
response may bring about a certain degree of disruption, as described in Chapter 3: even change 
that is known to be ultimately beneficial to the business unit may cause demotivation, confusion, 
and dissatisfaction in the short-run, causing performance (subjective and/or objective) to remain 
negative for a longer period of time. Moreover, as Chung and Beamish (2010: 1000) note, 
“Time, attention, and energy spent on renegotiating [international equity joint venture (IEJV)] 
agreements divert partners from tasks that generate revenue and from activities that help the 
IEJV deal with competition (Inkpen and Beamish 1997, Yan 1998).” This is also in line with Tan 
and Mahoney’s (2005: 114) observation of dynamic adjustment costs, which arise when 
94 
 
responses to changes in the internal or external environment of the foreign subsidiary disrupt its 
ongoing operations. Thus, in the shorter run, a response may cause a delay in the recovery rate at 
the subsidiary level, compared to not responding at all (which may indicate the impact of 
contextual volatilities).  
In the longer run however, a response is likely going to lead to improvements in the 
efficacy of the subsidiary’s strategic orientation and/or efficiency in the subsidiary’s operations. 
This implies that this improvement in fit caused by a response (or responses) should generally 
lead to better survival prospects in the longer run. Moreover, the fact that a response is enacted 
implies that the subsidiary is considered worth saving (Hofer, 1980) which can lead to higher 
levels of motivation after the initial disruptive phase. Finally, the notion that the subsidiary has 
experienced a response may hint at the existence of dynamic resource orchestration capabilities 
(“Responding”) in the subsidiary, which will likely continue to be beneficial when applied 
sensibly to any future threats and opportunities as well. Thus, the subsidiary’s longer-term 
survival prospects are likely going to be improved when a response is triggered, compared to not 
responding at all.  
Thus, responding at all, though perhaps somewhat disruptive in the shorter term, may 
lead to improved survival prospects in the longer run. We thus propose that a response is 
generally preferable to not responding: 
Hypothesis 5a: Compared to not responding, any response to subsidiary-level subpar 
performance increases recovery prospects. 
Hypothesis 5b: Compared to not responding, any response to subsidiary-level subpar 
performance increases survival prospects. 
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4.2.2 Hypotheses 6a-6d (No Response versus Specific Types of Responses) 
Once it has been established that any response is better than no response, the next step is 
to unravel the aggregated response variable and assess the impact of each of the responses to 
subpar performance on recovery and exit. We categorize responses based on two dimensions: 1) 
strategic versus operational and 2) increase versus decrease in commitment. Figure 4.6 
summarizes how the two dimensions are proposed to interact, as will be described in more detail 
below. Rather than a similar figure as the preceding ones, except with many more lines since 
each hypothesis in the set should be represented, Figure 4.6 depicts the set of hypotheses in a 
more readable 2x2 matrix. 
Table 4.6. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 2: “Responding”: Part 2 - Predicting the 
Efficacy of Specific Types of Responses.  
 
 Increase in 
commitment 
Decrease in 
commitment 
Strategic  
response 
worsens rate of 
recovery 
improves survival 
prospects 
worsens rate of 
recovery 
worsens survival 
prospects 
Operational  
response 
improves rate of 
recovery 
improves survival 
prospects 
worsens rate of 
recovery 
worsens survival 
prospects 
 
First, as early turnaround scholars note (Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 1976; 
Hofer, 1980), firms can respond in a number of ways to subpar performance but the main 
differentiating criterion is whether the response is of a strategic or operational nature. While 
most scholars in the turnaround literature have followed these terms, other (very similar) ways to 
describe them exist as well. For instance, invention and rigidity (McKinley et al., 2014; Whetten, 
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1980) are related constructs in that the first addresses the initiatives of efficacy, while the latter 
addresses initiatives of efficiency. 
Although the differentiation between these two broad categories of responses can at times 
be blurry, the main aspect is that strategic responses are geared less towards short-term 
performance improvements and more towards longer term improvements of market positioning 
from which enhanced performance follows. Examples include the reorganization of control 
structures, investing in long-term innovation, and changing the market positioning, among 
others. Operational responses on the other hand are the opposite in the sense that they are aimed 
at bettering short-term performance. Examples include reducing the size of the workforce, 
eliminating any inefficiency in products, materials, equipment, and services, and streamlining 
operational processes, among others. Hence, the long-term perspective on performance is less of 
a consideration (Hofer, 1980: 20). Combinations of strategic and operational responses can also 
occur.  
Strategic and operational responses may have different degrees of impact on recovery and 
survival prospects. Since strategic responses are mostly geared towards improving long-term 
survival of the subsidiary through focusing on efficacy, their impact may be most visible in a 
lower rate of exit compared to operational responses. In the shorter run, strategic responses may 
come with higher managerial complexities, related to the formulation of the strategy itself, the 
adjustment of organizational structures and budgets, the modification of positions, and more. 
Operational responses on the other hand are mostly geared towards improving shorter-term 
performance of the subsidiary through focusing on efficiency. Thus, their impact is likely going 
to be more visible in a better rate of recovery compared to strategic responses. In the longer run, 
efficiency improvements may not be sufficient to optimize the subsidiary’s survival prospects. 
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Indeed, as Hofer (1980) notes, most corporations utilize an operational response, even though 
sometimes strategic responses would have helped them to remain in business in the longer run. 
Whether or not retrenchment action is actually an effective response to subpar performance (and 
not also a cause for further decline) has been a topic of debate (Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce & 
Robbins, 1994; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013). 
Second, apart from assessing the impact of the occurrence of a strategic or operational 
response, the direction of the response may also have an important impact on a subsidiary’s 
recovery and survival rates. In particular, the direction of response is understood here as either an 
increase or a decrease in investment. As such, this distinction is salient at the subsidiary-level of 
subpar performance because the direction of response can carry information about the MNE-
subsidiary relationship and the degree of commitment the MNE’s headquarters is willing to 
invest. A fitting definition of such a relational commitment is offered by Hebert (1994) who 
defines commitment in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship as the degree to which a parent 
feels bound to the stability and success of the JV. This concept of relational commitment is 
comparably less salient when addressing subpar performance at the corporate-level or business-
level (which was the level of analysis in most turnaround studies), leading to a situation in which 
the different types of relational commitment have been understudied.  
Moreover, much of the turnaround literature has emphasized the importance of 
downsizing and retrenching in times of subpar performance (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; 1994). 
Despite some criticisms of this heavy emphasis on retrenchment (Barker & Mone, 1994), it is 
still seen as the foundation of turnaround (Pearce & Robbins, 1994, Trahms et al, 2013). 
Generally, retrenchment is differentiated into cost retrenchment (e.g. laying off employees) and 
asset retrenchment (e.g. jettisoning an inefficient business unit). However, such an approach of 
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“tightening the belt” may have an additional layer in the context of the MNE-subsidiary 
relationship. The efficiency gains arising from retrenchment may at least partially be offset by 
the disruptive effects associated with perceived decrease in commitment from the MNE 
headquarters. This may be an important difference that can have an effect on the impact of 
retrenchment in the shorter run: instead of a “we’re all in this together” approach when the entire 
corporation is declining, employees in a foreign subsidiary that experiences a decrease in 
headquarter commitment when performance is subpar may experience a notion of “we’ve been 
abandoned”. Thus, the short-term effect of retrenchment in the foreign subsidiary may be not 
only a lower number of employees and tighter budgets but also disappointment, low morale, and 
a wave of additional talented employees leaving the subsidiary.  
When the MNE headquarters increases its investments to the foreign subsidiary during 
subpar performance, however, a strong signal is sent that it is committed to the foreign 
subsidiary. While this way of responding may still be somewhat disruptive in the shorter term, it 
is likely going to infuse the ailing subsidiary with new prospects and morale, and prevent a 
higher degree of “brain drain” from the subsidiary. Moreover, if increased commitment is 
expressed by deploying more expatriates to the foreign subsidiary, they can become a conduit for 
firm-specific advantages (Choi & Beamish, 2004), leading to a strengthening of the subsidiary’s 
resource and capability base. Thus, while retrenchment may be a very valuable approach in 
corporate-level or business-level turnarounds, the additional layer of an MNE’s relational 
commitment to a foreign subsidiary may cause increases in investment to be more effective at 
subsidiary-level turnarounds. The following hypotheses are offered: 
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Hypothesis 6a: Compared to not responding, increases in commitment affect the rate of recovery 
such that strategic increases worsen the rate of recovery while operational increases improve 
the rate of recovery. 
Hypothesis 6b: Compared to not responding, decreases in commitment affect the rate of recovery 
such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of recovery, however 
strategic decreases more so than operational decreases. 
Hypothesis 6c: Compared to not responding, increases in commitment improve survival 
prospects, such that both strategic and operational increases in commitment improve survival 
prospects, however strategic increases more so than operational increases. 
Hypothesis 6d: Compared to not responding, decreases in commitment affect the rate of recovery 
such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of recovery, however 
strategic decreases more so than operational decreases. 
  
  This concludes the section on the “responding” dimension of the resource orchestration 
framework. Next, hypotheses will be developed regarding the “synchronizing” dimension of the 
framework.  
 
 
4.3 Hypotheses Regarding “Synchronizing” 
The concept of time has always played an important role in organizational 
decline/turnaround studies, as process models such as by Pearce and Robbins (1993) and Weitzel 
and Jonsson (1989) suggest. However, rarely was the time concept modelled explicitly. One 
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exception is Tangpong et al. (2015: 669) who examined the earliness versus lateness of 
retrenchment responses (layoffs, divestments, geographic market exit). They found that “Early 
Retrenchment is positively related to Turnaround Success (p<0.05), but Late Retrenchment is 
negatively related to it (p<0.05)”. Two sets of analyses can be built on this study. First, 
Tangpong et al. (2015) examine the efficacy of the timing of responses but do not investigate the 
determinants of the time-to-response. They do, however, explicitly call for a deeper examination 
of such issues (p. 673). We will address this call in the first part of assessing the “Synchronizing” 
dimension in this study. Second, the efficacy of the timing of the response warrants a deeper 
analysis with regards to the shape of the relationship and the impact of selected moderating 
influences. Thus, the guiding research question in this regard is What factors determine the 
timing of a response and what role does the timing of responses play in the effectiveness of the 
chosen response in increasing recovery and survival prospects? 
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 7 (Determinants of the Timing of the First Response) 
 As noted in the analyses regarding the “Identifying” dimension, headquarter attention 
towards the foreign subsidiary’s subpar performance situation can help explain why some would 
receive a response while others would not. In this section, we refine these arguments by 
specifically assessing the time until the first response is administered. Since there seems to be 
some evidence that a timely response improves recovery and survival outcomes (Tangpong et al., 
2015), the mechanisms that determine the timeliness warrant closer investigation. Figure 4.6 
offers an overview of the proposed hypothesis.  
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Figure 4.6. Model with Hypothesis for Dimension 3: “Synchronizing”: Part 1 - Predicting the 
Timing of the First Response. 
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subsidiary can help overcome barriers due to cultural distance to the headquarters (Wilkinson, 
Peng, Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008). This can occur in both directions, such that the expatriates 
can facilitate the exchange of information from the headquarters to the subsidiary and vice versa. 
Communication frequency is thus enhanced. Third, if the GM is of Japanese origin, there are 
likely fewer language and cultural barriers between the subsidiary’s leadership (assuming they 
are Japanese) and the Japanese parent firm which can administer a response. Fewer barriers 
allow for an easier establishment of trust and thus, communication frequency may be enhanced.  
 When communication frequency is enhanced, adverse situations at the foreign subsidiary 
level can be better assessed and decisions can be made faster and with more confidence. Thus, 
we propose the following. 
Hypothesis 7: Compared to having no such communication enhancing mechanisms, subsidiaries 
that have mechanisms which facilitate more frequent communication with headquarters exhibit a 
shorter time to the first response. 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 8a-8b (Shape of the Relationship with Recovery versus Exit) 
 Building on the arguments from time compression diseconomies, we suspect that the 
effectiveness of the timing of the response may be curvilinear. We visualize the proposed 
relationship as a diagram, to aid interpretability (see Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7. Schematic Model for Dimension 3: “Synchronizing”: Part 2 - Shape of the 
Relationship between the Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus 
Exit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The main argument for differentiating between an early and a late response in Tangpong 
et al. (2015) is the notion that decline can lead to a vicious cycle of stress and disruption, causing 
further decline to occur (Tangpong et al., 2015; McKinley et al., 2014). If, however, the right 
response is initiated at the right time, a virtuous cycle may unfold whereby decline is halted and 
recovery sets in (Tangpong et al., 2015; McKinley et al., 2014; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).  
 On the other hand, the notion of time compression diseconomies suggests that too fast a 
response may not be conducive to improved recovery rates after all. Organizations may respond 
with a “knee-jerk” reaction (Hofer, 1980: 31) in order to exhibit fast action and avoid being 
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relationship between the timing of a response and the rate of recovery or exit is curvilinear rather 
than linear as Tangpong et al. (2015) suggests. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 8a: The effect of the time-to-first-response on the likelihood of recovery (as opposed 
to exit) takes an inverted U-shape, such that the likelihood of recovery is highest at medium 
levels of the time-to-first-response.  
Further, we suspect that the curvilinar relationship is affected by the type of first response 
that is provided. Specifically, we suspect that at the subsidiary level, increases in commitment 
will generally be more welcomed (i.e. less disruptive) than decreases in commitment. As such, 
increases in commitment are likely going to improve the likelihood of recovery. Furthermore, we 
propose that decreases in commitment are more sensitive to the curvilinear time-effect. If 
decreases in commitment are made very early on in the subpar performance sequence, the effect 
may be a perception of a “knee-jerk” response. If the perception is that the retrenchment was 
conducted merely as an end in itself, morale may sink and talent turnover may increase. If a 
disruptive response such as a decrease in commitment, however, is provided towards the medium 
range of the subpar performance sequence, the perception could be that at least due diligence was 
conducted to support the necessity of the downsizing action. Towards later stages of the subpar 
performance sequence, however, a decrease in commitment as the first response will likely add 
to the intense degree of psychological stress decision-makers are already under (Whetten, 1980; 
Tangpong et al., 2015). As a result, more faulty action may be conducted (Weitzel & Jonsson, 
1989) and the likelihood for a recovery may fall again. By way of expressing the moderation 
effect, we thus suggest that decreases in commitment exhibit a steeper inverted U-shape on the 
probability of recovery (as opposed to exit) than increases in commitment. (Haans, Pieters, & 
He, 2015). Figure 4.8 illustrates this proposition. 
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Figure 4.8. Schematic Model for Dimension 3: “Synchronizing”: Part 2 - Shape of the 
Relationship between the Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus 
Exit, with the Moderating Effect of Response Type. 
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necessary “precondition for almost all successful turnarounds” (Hofer, 1980: 25). The main 
rationale for this perspective is that the CEO and/or the members of the top management team 
are responsible for the subpar performance and those new perspectives and management skills 
are needed in order to turn the company around (Chen & Hambrick, 2012). The replacement of 
the CEO and/or top management team is thus hypothesized to be positively correlated with the 
rate of recovery and survival in a turnaround situation. These same arguments may also apply at 
the subsidiary-level, where the replacement of the general manager may infuse the subsidiary 
with new life and aid the subsidiary’s turnaround. 
Second, other researchers have argued that the replacement of the top managers in a 
company can lead to disruption and trauma (Haveman, 1993) which may indeed lead to worse 
performance following a leadership succession. The main rationale for this perspective is that 
CEO and/or top management team replacement in a subpar performance situation may be a form 
of ritual scapegoating (Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005), whereby boards act in what 
Hofer (1980: 31) calls a “’knee-jerk’ reaction” and Chen and Hambrick (2012: 225) call 
“ceremonial purging”, with the objective to respond to decline as fast as possible. This response 
for the sake of responding quickly and visibly may have adverse effects on talented managers in 
other ranks who may become wary of their future in the company (Chen & Hambrick, 2012). 
The replacement of the CEO and/or top management team is thus hypothesized to be negatively 
correlated with the rate of recovery and survival in a turnaround situation. These same arguments 
may also apply at the subsidiary-level, where the replacement of the GM could lead to 
disruptions that may eventually hamper the subsidiary’s recovery prospects.  
 Third, researchers have noted that little empirical evidence exists to support either 
perspective and the evidence that does exist has been mixed or even insignificant (Barker, 
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Patterson, & Mueller, 2001; Chen & Hambrick, 2012). For instance, Daily and Dalton (1995) 
find that while failing firms exhibited higher CEO and director turnover rates, the changes are 
often not in the direction recommended by key stakeholders (i.e. towards more independent 
boards, separation of CEO and chairperson positions). Further, Chen and Hambrick (2012) found 
that leader successions in subpar performing firms only leads to the desired effects if the new 
CEO creates a better fit with the conditions at hand (i.e. the severity of losses and industry 
performance severity). CEO replacement without attention to these parameters of fit, however, 
does not appear to have any effect on the companies’ recovery rates. The replacement of the 
CEO and/or top management team is thus hypothesized to be contingently correlated with the 
rate of recovery and survival in a turnaround situation. These same arguments may also apply at 
the subsidiary-level, where the efficacy of the GM replacement response may depend on 
contextual contingencies.  
We follow this contingency perspective, suggesting that a GM replacement per se does 
not improve performance. Rather, we aim to advance existing research by suggesting that the 
concept of time plays an important role, whereby only an early GM replacement will generate 
the desired beneficial outcomes. If the GM replacement occurs rather late, processes of decline 
may already have become embedded themselves and too much talent may have left the company 
already, leading to a downward spiral of decline. Thus, we hypothesize that the early 
replacement of the GM will likely be beneficial for the rates of recovery and survival.  
The rationale behind this is that a new leader at the foreign subsidiary will bring in new 
ideas and will not be as embedded in inertial structures as the outgoing GM. Moreover, political 
structures within the subsidiary will be broken by replacing the GM, thereby opening the doors 
for new processes. Perhaps most importantly, however, a GM replacement is unlikely to occur as 
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a reaction of public scapegoating since he or she generally has much less media coverage and 
visibility (compared to a corporate-level CEO) to make this an effective move. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed.  
Hypothesis 9: An earlier GM replacement during periods of subpar performance leads to better 
rates of recovery and improved rates of exit than a later GM replacement. 
This concludes the hypothesis development section. Next, the methodology with which 
these hypotheses will be tested will be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 5: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 From a philosophical standpoint, we aim to approach the phenomenon of subpar 
performance in foreign subsidiaries by making some assumptions about three central and 
hierarchical questions: 1) “What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there 
that can be known about it?” (the ontological question), 2) “What is the nature of the relationship 
between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (the epistemological 
question), and 3) “How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he  or 
she believes can be known?” (the methodological question) (Guba & Lincoln, 1998: 201). To the 
first question, we assume a post-positivist perspective in this thesis, whereby reality exists (i.e. 
the goal is to approach the truth) but can only be imperfectly captured by the bounded rationality 
of humans. Regarding the second question, we favor a perspective of objectivity and 
falsifiability, whereby findings can potentially be tested and replicated. This leads to the third 
question being focused on a quantitative approach with hypotheses and variables as the unit of 
analysis, rather than a qualitative approach emphasising human verbal and nonverbal actions 
(Rynes & Gephart, 2004).   
This is not to say, however, that an interpretivist (qualitative) methodology or in fact 
pragmatist (mixed methods) methodology would not lead to interesting and valuable outcomes as 
well. Indeed, as we note in Chapter 7, a qualitative study would likely help deepen the insights 
gained through the quantitative approach in this thesis by adding more context, offering a richer 
account of human behavior, differentiating the individual case from the general case, and 
emphasizing the process of discovery (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). The reason for our preference for 
a quantitative approach at this point is that we believe the research gap regarding the 
phenomenon of subpar performance at foreign subsidiaries requires a benchmarking of its 
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prevalence to provide a foundation from which future studies, including interpretivist and 
pragmatist studies, can be built.   
 
5.1 Data Sources 
 Hypotheses were tested using subsidiary-level information from the Kaigai Shinshutsu 
Kigyou Souran Kuni-Betsu dataset, issued annually by Toyo Keizai Inc. (Toyo Keizai, 2014), 
and MNE-level information from the Nikkei NEEDS tapes. This combined dataset results in a 
sample of Japanese overseas investments at near-population size, totaling 469,834 subsidiary-
year observations representing 49,616 subsidiaries in 160 countries. Collected through surveys at 
each subsidiary, the observation period spans the years 1990-2013, allowing for a longitudinal 
analysis and a reduced risk of capturing merely one-time effects.  
 Additional datasets were utilized to complement the main dataset with further 
information. Specifically, country-level data was derived from The World Bank Group database 
(2016), culture-level data was collected from the Cultural Dimensions dataset (Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) and from the geographic distance dataset by Berry et al. (2010).   
 
5.2 Operationalizing Subpar Performance Sequences 
 As the review of the literature on corporate-level/business-level decline and turnaround in 
Chapter 2 revealed, most studies used return on investment as the measure of subpar 
performance (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Tangpong, Abebe, & Li, 2015, Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; 
Francis & Desai, 2005; Bruton et al., 2003; Bruton et al., 1994, Robbins & Pearce, 1992), 
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followed by return on assets (Schmitt & Raisch, 2013), return on equity (Chen & Hambrick, 
2012), and return on sales (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). At the subsidiary-level, such measures are 
often not readily available and practices such as transfer pricing may distort the image of how 
much profit is actually generated at the foreign subsidiary.  
With this in mind, subpar performance sequences as described in Table 5.1 were derived 
using four different ways of operationalizing performance during both downturn and upturn 
phases. This conceptualization is in line with Schendel et al.’s (1976) differentiation between 
such phases during both of which performance has not yet recovered and actions may thus still 
be required in order to fully restore pre-decline levels.  
First, the downturn phase was identified by flagging each year in which sales were lower 
than in the year before. We also calculated a labor productivity measure by dividing sales by the 
number of employees in the subsidiary. Again, each year was flagged in which productivity was 
lower than in the year before. Further, the Toyo Keizai dataset contains information about 
perceptions of financial performance, containing three categories: gain, break-even, and loss. To 
ease the calculation of subpar performance sequences based on this measure, we combined the 
three categories into two. Two different ways of operationalizing this perceptual measure of 
subpar performance thus resulted; one differentiating between 1) surplus and 2) break-
even/deficit and the other differentiating between 1) surplus/break-even and 2) deficit. More 
specifically, the rationale behind this aggregation of this performance measure is to identify 
subsidiaries that are currently in a turnaround situation and therefore in need of a managerial 
response (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). As noted in Chapter 1, included are subsidiaries that are 
clearly in distress and experiencing directional (organizational decline) problems, potential 
termination (failure, survival-threatening), and those that are stagnant at a non-profitable level 
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over a number of consecutive years. These latter types of subsidiaries may equally require a 
response in order to continue to operate in a global, competitive, and growth-oriented 
environment. Moreover, subsidiaries may first experience a loss, then improve to the point of a 
break-even (not gain!), and then fall back into the loss situation. With a three-tiered 
categorization, these occurrences would not be considered a string of consecutive years of subpar 
performance and thus likely be dropped from the sample (or shorter pieces of the sequences 
would be considered under the loss and the break-even categorizations respectively). As such, 
this aggregated categorization (especially the first way to aggregate perceptual measures of 
financial performance) is related to Jas and Skelcher’s (2005: 198) differentiation into a “‘poor’ 
category and […a] ‘weak’ category [which is characterized as] having a very low capacity to 
improve’”.  
Second, the upturn phase was identified by flagging the number of years in which the 
respective subsidiary is recapturing sales again before it fully recovers to pre-decline levels, 
exits, or the observation period ends (right censoring). Some subsidiaries experienced several 
years of such upturn phases while others may undergo no such phase at all. The same approach 
was taken for the labor productivity measure of performance. For the perceptual measures of 
financial performance, such an approach was not necessary, since the end of the subpar 
performance categorization automatically indicated the arrival of either a recovery or exit event 
(or right censoring).  
 
 
 
113 
 
5.3 Pre-Analysis Sample Preparation 
 After the identification of subpar performance sequences, the sample was prepared in the 
following steps. First, as Mata and Portugal (2000: 555) note, large datasets like the Toyo Keizai 
dataset, while very valuable in terms of explanatory power, may contain a higher absolute 
number of coding errors than hand-picked small datasets. To alleviate this concern of coding 
errors as best as possible, we scrutinized all the variables in the analysis. A variable that required 
adjustment was subsidiary age. Subsidiary age was calculated by subtracting the year of 
foundation from each year of observation. Subsidiaries that had a negative age value were 
deleted since this suggested a coding/input error in the year of foundation variable. In total, 
however, only about 0.18 percent of the dataset were affected, leading us to be confident in 
deleting these subsidiaries without affecting any analysis outcomes.  
Second, since this study is only concerned with subsidiaries that are experiencing subpar 
performance sequences, the sample was cut to only include those sequences. Some subsidiaries 
may experience a number of such sequences, interrupted by periods of better performance or 
non-observance. Thus, there are likely going to be gaps (i.e. intervals) between the sequences of 
subpar performance, if the subsidiary experiences more than one such sequence. Following 
Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, and Marchenko (2008: 36), the observations during such gaps were 
omitted. The same was done with observations that occurred before the first subpar performance 
sequence (left censoring). Moreover, as will be described in section 5.8, the fact that subsidiaries 
may encounter more than one subpar performance sequence was accounted for by creating 
robust standard errors through clustering the analysis by each subsidiary.  
Third, Inkpen and Beamish (1998: 38) recommended excluding subsidiaries from the 
sample which contain fewer than 20 employees. This approach is a now common method to 
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ensure generalizability to substantive operations, not merely agencies or sales offices. Since the 
unit of analysis in this thesis is the subpar performance sequence, however, the application of 
this criterion was not as straightforward as merely deleting these respective observations. For 
instance, following the simple deletion method, a subsidiary that reported 40 employees at the 
beginning of the subpar performance sequence and then retrenched to 18 employees would have 
been included with an incomplete sequence. Similarly, a subsidiary which first reduced its 
workforce to fewer than 20 employees during the downturn phase and increased it again to more 
than 20 employees during the upturn phase would have been included into the sample with a 
holey sequence. Therefore, in an effort to include as many sequences with as much complete and 
continuous information as possible, we excluded only those sequences where the subsidiary 
reported fewer than 20 employees for the entire duration of the subpar performance sequence. 
Fourth, since the objective of this thesis is to assess responses to subpar performance 
when such subpar performance does not occur by chance or due to short-term fluctuations, we 
omitted the first two years of each sequence (unless otherwise specified). As described in 
Chapter 2, this approach is in line with several decline/turnaround scholars, such as Tangpong et 
al., (2015).  
These steps led to final pre-analysis sample sizes and characteristics as illustrated per 
performance measure in Table 5.1. As Table 5.1 shows, some subsidiaries may experience more 
than one subpar performance sequence, indicated by the higher number of sequences than 
subsidiaries. Moreover, given that labor productivity is a ratio of sales over the number of 
employees, it may seem surprising that the number of observations is higher than for the sales 
measure of performance. Upon closer inspection, however, the difference occurs when the level 
of sales does not change but the number of employees does, thereby leading to a higher  
115 
 
probability of being flagged as experiencing subpar performance compared to considering sales 
only.  
Table 5.1. Sample Sizes per Performance Measure. 
Performance  
measure 
Number of 
observa-
tions 
Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of  
sequences 
Max 
length 
Mean 
length 
S.D. 
length 
Number 
of 
countries 
Sales 17,982 5,669 7,406 18 4.41 1.84 94 
Labor productivity 21,860 6,307 8,744 22 4.45 1.85 87 
Perceptual 
measures of 
financial 
performance  
A: (0=surplus, 
1=break-even, deficit) 
B: (0=surplus/break-
even, 1=deficit) 
 
 
 
11,847 
 
4,633 
 
 
 
3,196 
 
1,553 
 
 
 
3,360 
 
1,592 
 
 
 
24 
 
14 
 
 
 
5.24 
 
4.75 
 
 
 
2.38 
 
1.95 
 
 
 
73 
 
56 
Note: Observations are subsidiary-year occurrences. Length refers to subpar performance sequences. 
In this thesis, the main operationalization of subpar performance sequences was based on 
the sales differentials measure of performance. It was selected for three reasons. First, as 
Weinzimmer, Nystrom, and Freeman (1998: 235) note, sales growth is the “most commonly 
identified measure of overall organizational performance (Hubbard & Bromiley, 1995)” and any 
decline in sales may thus indicate a decline in subsidiary growth. Moreover, sales may be a more 
fitting measure than increases in employees or assets since “a firm can realize growth in sales 
dollars without achieving any significant change in employees or assets” and thus, “sales data 
may be more appropriate in studies including organizations” from different industries 
(Weinzimmer et al., 1998: 252). Second, with a labor productivity measure, decreases in the 
sales-vs-employees ratio may occur due to the hiring of more employees, with there being a time 
lag until sales growth has caught up with the increased number of employees. Thus, a common 
approach to growth by investing in human resources may be flagged as an indication of decline. 
This can be especially salient in service subsidiaries which tend to be more labor-intensive. A 
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labor productivity measure may therefore be a more noisy measure of decline than using sales 
differentials as the measure of performance, especially when including both manufacturing and 
service subsidiaries into one sample (Weinzimmer et al., 1998: 252). Third, compared to 
perceptual measures of financial performance, focusing on sales differentials offers a larger 
sample size and reduces the risk of biases such as retrospective bias or social desirability bias. 
Nonetheless, the other types of performance will be used as robustness checks in Chapter 6. 
 
5.4 Response Variable  
 We identified several responses that could occur as a reaction to subpar performance at a 
foreign subsidiary. Besides assessing each type of response individually, we also noted that the 
number of observations per response category can become very small when control variables 
with missing values are added to the regressions. As a result, some categories would fall below 
the threshold of Roth and Morrison’s (1990) guideline for including at least 30-50 observations 
per category. We thus decided to combine the types of responses into categories that indicate the 
overarching type of response (strategic vs. operational vs. mixed) and the direction of the 
response (increase vs. decrease vs. mixed). Such clustering is not uncommon in organizational 
decline/turnaround studies (see Trahms et al., 2013; Hofer, 1980). Table 5.2 provides a list of 
each type of response and clustering approach. 
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5.5 Final Outcome Variable (Exit versus Recovery versus Right Censoring) 
 At each end of an observation year within the subpar performance sequence, several 
possible outcomes were recorded. First, the subsidiary could still be performing at subpar levels, 
a scenario which was indicated as “0”. Moreover, right-censored cases were also marked with 
a“0”, following Hsieh et al. (2015). Censoring is defined as a situation in which an “event occurs 
and the subject is not under observation” (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould & Marchenko, 2010, p. 29). 
Thus, no inferences can be made about any recovery or exit events occurring during this period 
of non-observation. In particular, since the observation span of the dataset reached from 1990 
until 2013, all observations in 2013 were tagged with a “0”, assuming that they continue (the 
alternative, assuming that all subsidiaries exit in 2013, is too strong an assumption). Second, the 
subsidiary could have recovered to the levels of performance before the subpar performance 
sequence which was tagged with a “1”. While the main analysis was conducted with subsidiary-
level sales as the measure of performance, robustness checks using subsidiary-level productivity 
and perceptual measures of financial performance (two different ways of operationalizing) were 
conducted and are reported in Chapter 6. Third, subsidiaries could exit the following year. The 
last year they were observed in the dataset was thus marked with a “2”. This follows similar 
studies of exit events, such as Mata and Portugal’s (2000) comparison between the determinants 
of divestitures and closures of foreign subsidiaries. Fourth, based on this approach to 
operationalizing possible outcomes, recovery and exit are not mutually exclusive events. A 
subsidiary that recovers in one year could exit in the next year, thereby causing that year to be 
tagged with both a “1” and a “2”. To account for such a situation, outcomes of such a scenario 
were tagged as “3”. However, the reasons for such an occurrence are unclear and thus the focus 
in the analysis was placed upon outcomes “1” (recovery) and “2” (exit).  
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Table 5.2. Response Variable. 
Type of response Categorization 
Total frequency of 
response 
occurrence 
Frequency of 
response 
occurrence as a 
first response 
No response No response 6,726 1,841 
Increase equity to WOS (>80 
percent) 
Increase in strategic 
commitment (and 
combinations thereof) 
48 32 
Increase equity from even position 
(> 50 percent) 
Increase equity from portfolio 
position (> 10 percent) 
Increase in the number of 
expatriates 
Decrease equity from WOS (<80 
percent) 
Decrease in strategic 
commitment (and 
combinations thereof) 
205 116 
Decrease equity from even 
position (< 50 percent) 
Decrease equity to portfolio 
position (< 10 percent) 
Decrease in the number of 
expatriates 
Increase in equity (not resulting in 
a mode change) 
Increase in operational 
commitment (and 
combinations thereof) 
2,838 1,450 
Increase in the number of 
employees 
Increase in equity (not resulting in 
a mode change) 
Decrease in operational 
commitment (and 
combinations thereof) 
2,633 1,265 
Increase in the number of 
employees 
Combinations of the above 
occurring in the same year 
Increase in strategic and 
operational commitment 
(and combinations 
thereof) 
1,387 695 
Combinations of the above 
occurring in the same year 
Decrease in strategic and 
operational commitment 
(and combinations 
thereof) 
1,566 739 
Combinations of the above 
occurring in the same year 
Combination response 
(increase and decrease in 
strategic and operational 
commitment) 
2,579 1,268 
 Total 17,982 7,406 
 
  
119 
 
5.6 Independent Variables 
5.6.1 Independent Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Identifying” 
At the country-level, two independent variables were used. GDP growth was derived 
from The World Bank annual data (1990-2013) per country. Geographic distance is a measure 
derived from online supplementary material from Berry et al., (2010) and coded as the distance 
between Japan and each host country. At the MNE-level, one independent variable was 
identified. A situation of negative profits at the MNE-level was indicated as a binary variable, 
whereby “0” indicated positive (or break-even) profits and “1” indicated negative profits (i.e. 
losses). At the subsidiary-level, five independent variables were used. A special strategic role of 
the subsidiary was coded as 1) “1” for the subsidiary having a regional headquarters function (or 
“0” otherwise). The R&D role of a subsidiary was derived from a purpose of investment variable 
in the Toyo Keizai dataset and marked as “1” when the subsidiary fulfilled such a role and “0” if 
other purposes of investment were predominant. Ownership modes were indicated as “0” for 
joint ventures and “1” for wholly-owned subsidiaries and lagged by one year. Subsidiary age 
was derived by subtracting the foundation year from each year of observation. The number of 
employees was included to measure the size of the subsidiary. Finally, a variable indicating the 
number of expatriates was included. 
 
5.6.2 Independent Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Responding” 
 Based on the response variable, subsequent configurations of responses to subsidiary-
level subpar performance were devised. Specifically, all strategic responses, all operational 
responses, and all combinations thereof were combined, respectively, based on Table 5.2. 
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5.6.3 Independent Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Synchronizing” 
For the first set of analyses regarding synchronizing, four independent variables were 
employed to indicate a communication-channel enhancing mechanism. A special strategic role of 
the subsidiary was coded as 1) “1” for the subsidiary having a regional headquarters function (or 
“0” otherwise). The R&D role of a subsidiary was derived from a purpose of investment variable 
in the Toyo Keizai dataset and marked as “1” when the subsidiary fulfilled such a role and “0” if 
other purposes of investment were predominant. The number of expatriates was included directly 
as it was provided by the Toyo Keizai dataset. The nationality of the GM was derived by 
transforming the Toyo Keizai dataset (which contains some variables with Japanese characters as 
strings) into Unicode, to make it readable in Stata. Then, we created a variable that indicated a 
“1” when the name of the subsidiary representative was given in Chinese characters and a “0” 
otherwise. We confirmed this approach with a Japanese-speaking expert
6
 on the dataset and 
Japanese MNEs more generally, who noted that Japanese names are often spelled in Chinese 
characters. He also noted that the GMs with names written in Chinese characters outside of 
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea are likely going to be Japanese, while this may not be so 
obvious within these selected countries. Following this logic, we added a robustness check to 
Model 2a in Table 6.14, excluding these four countries (plus Singapore which has similar 
characteristics) from the analysis. We also conducted a random search of such names and 
confirmed that these individuals were indeed in leadership positions at the subsidiary.  
In the second set of analyses, the timing of the first response variable becomes the 
independent variable. This continuous variable was derived by marking the occurrence of the 
first response to subpar performance and the year in which it occurred. In our sample, the first 
                                                          
6
 Email correspondence with Professor Shige Makino available upon request. 
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response occurred between the first and eighth year of a subpar performance. Those subsidiaries 
that did not respond at all were not included in this part of the analysis. In order to capture the 
proposed curvilinear effect of the time-to-first-response variable, we created the squared term of 
it. Further information on the methodological approach can be found in section 5.8.4. Finally, we 
created a GM replacement variable which assumed a value of “0” when the name of the GM was 
the same as in the year before and a value of “1” if the name was different. 
 
5.7 Control Variables 
Several control variables were employed to reduce the omitted variable bias as best as 
possible (Antonakis et al., 2010). Since the causes of subpar performance may stem from the 
external and/or internal environment (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988), control variables were 
included which reflect both aspects. The control variables are reviewed below per each 
dimension regarding “Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”.  
 
5.7.1 Control Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Identifying” 
Control variables were also included at three different levels of analysis. At the country-
level, the host country’s market size was captured by including an annual population measure. 
Cultural distance scores were calculated from Hofstede et al. (2010) most established cultural 
value dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, masculinity-femininity, and 
individualism-collectivism) using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) composite score equation. At the 
level of the MNE, network size was determined by a cumulative count of the subsidiaries for the 
dominant Japanese parent firm. Benito & Welch (1997: 18) suggest that as the MNE network 
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size increases, the commitment to each individual subsidiary may decrease, potentially leading to 
a higher probability of divestments. At the subsidiary-level, industry similarity was included 
since studies have found that over-diversified MNEs are more likely to divest their unrelated 
subsidiaries (Benito, 2005). In order to assess the relatedness between the Japanese headquarters 
and its foreign subsidiary, a dummy variable was derived which assumes a value of “0” when the 
two operate in different sectors and a value of “1” when they operate in the same industry and 
“0” if it did not.  
 
5.7.2 Control Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Responding” 
 To account for environmental aspects (Berry, 2013), an annual population measure and 
average GDP growth were included as control variables. Further, the geographic distance (Berry 
et al, 2010) and cultural distance between the MNE headquarters and the foreign location could 
affect the efficacy of the chosen response and the likelihood of being divested (Benito, 2005). 
Cultural distance was derived from cultural values scores (Hofstede et al., 2010) and converted 
into composite distance measures using Kogut & Singh’s (1988) operationalization. At the MNE, 
level, network size was determined by a cumulative count of the subsidiaries for the dominant 
Japanese parent firm and a binary variable indicating whether the MNE was performing poorly 
(“1”) or not (“0”) was included. To assess the strategic importance the subsidiary may hold for 
the MNE headquarters, a measure of industry similarity was included. Subsidiaries that are in a 
different sector than the headquarters may be at a higher risk of being divested (Benito, 2005). 
Further, MNE headquarters may be hesitant to divest larger subsidiaries, so a subsidiary size 
measure was added by way of including the number of employees (Barker & Duhaime, 1997). 
The number of expatriates was also included to account for the notion that the rate of recovery 
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may be improved by the presence of expatriates. There may also be a difference in managerial 
complexity and likelihood of exit or recovery between joint ventures and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, so these different configurations were controlled for. Following Dhanaraj and 
Beamish (2004), joint ventures were defined as subsidiaries in which at least two parent firms 
each own at least 20 percent equity and wholly-owned subsidiaries as those in which one parent 
firm owns 80 percent or more of the equity. Finally, subsidiaries that function as regional 
headquarters may be less likely to be divested and thus, a dummy variable flagging such 
subsidiaries was included.  
 
5.7.3 Control Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Synchronizing” 
 For the first set of analyses, we included several control variables which were described 
above. In order to avoid redundancies, these variables will be mentioned here but not 
reintroduced at length. We included population size, GDP growth, geographic and cultural 
distance at the environmental level. Network size, MNE profit situation, and industry similarity 
were included at the MNE-level. At the subsidiary level, we included the ownership mode, and 
the number of subsidiary employees. 
 For the second set of analyses, we included population size, GDP growth, geographic 
and cultural distance as well as regional headquarters, industry similarity, and subsidiary age, 
number of employees, and the number of expatriates.  
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5.8 Methodological Approach 
 The overarching preparation of the dataset for the regression analyses (especially those 
described in sections 5.8.2, 5.8.3, and 5.8.4 involved four further steps. First, all variables which 
were time-variant were lagged by one year to allow for better causal inference between a 
predictor and an outcome variable such as a response. This also ensured that the ownership mode 
was not measured in the same year that a response in form of an ownership mode change 
occurred. Second, continuous independent variables were mean-centered to avoid any concerns 
of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). Third, all continuous variables were subjected to 
Stata’s “ladder” command which tests whether the respective variable requires a transformation 
to achieve a more normal distribution. No such transformation was required. Finally, since some 
subsidiaries exhibited more than one subpar performance sequence and the observations were 
thus not independent of each other, we clustered by the unique subsidiary identifier to create 
robust standard errors. 
 
5.8.1 Sequence Analysis 
In order to gain more insights into the nature of the subpar performance sequences in this 
thesis, sequence analysis lent itself as a suitable method. Brzinsky-Fay et al. (2006: 435) note 
that in sequence analysis, “the positions in a sequence refer to the relative, not absolute, time 
point. Moreover, sequences are generally seen as an entity of their own and the interest is in the 
sequential character of all elements together”. In this method, sequences are conceptualized as 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Since this study is concerned with subpar performance sequences as the central unit of 
analysis, this perspective on the data appears appropriate. Sequence analysis will be used to 
identify subpar performance sequences and explore the nature of such sequences.  
 
Figure 5.1. Sample Sequence from Brzinsky-Fay et al., (2006: 425).  
 
5.8.2 Analytical Approach for “Identifying” 
 The dependent variable in this part of the analysis, regarding “Identifying”, was the 
response that was observed as a reaction to the foreign subsidiary’s subpar performance. Of 
particular interest at this point was thereby the first response (after the two initial years of subpar 
performance), since we assumed it to best reflect the process of identifying an appropriate 
response to a subpar performance situation at the subsidiary level. As a result, any subsequent 
responses were ignored for this analysis, essentially creating a cross-sectional subsample.  
Since the outcome variable in this study takes on discrete values, it is a nonlinear limited 
dependent variable for which conventional OLS regression is inappropriate (Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2009). This leads to the possibility of applying a multinomial logit model which allows 
for the assessment of the influence that independent variables have on the choice for a specific 
response relative to a base case (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010: 498; Berry, 2015). In this study, the 
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base case is selected to be subsidiaries that never experience a response for the duration of their 
subpar performance sequence. Thus, the coefficients indicate the probability of each response 
category to be selected over not responding at all. Comparisons regarding the impact of predictor 
variables across response categories can only be made with respect to the base category. This 
notion of relative interpretation of coefficients means that the signs and coefficients in 
multinomial logit models need to be assessed carefully - an aspect which has fallen short in much 
strategy research (see criticisms by Bowen & Wiersema, 2004; Wiersema & Bowen, 2009; 
Wulff, 2015). More analytical effort is required to derive absolute inferences (irrespective of the 
base category) of the impact a predictor variable has on the probability of a certain outcome.  
In this study, the best practice approach by Wulff (2015) is followed, which recommends 
adherence to two steps: 1) the reporting of the regression results for each outcome category 
relative to the base case and 2) the calculation and visualization of average marginal effects at 
representative values of the predictor variable to assess the significance of each predictor 
variable on outcome categories regardless of the base category. The latter step is especially 
important to assess whether the continuous variable is significant over the entire data range. 
Results from this analysis are reported in Chapter 6. 
 
5.8.3 Analytical Approach for “Responding” 
 Given that the outcome of interest constitutes the rate of two types of events (recovery or 
exit), a gap time competing-risk event history analysis was selected for testing the hypotheses. 
This choice was based on several considerations. First, we were interested in the duration from 
the start of the subpar performance sequence until a specific event (recovery or exit). Although 
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the outcome variable is categorical, logistic or multinomial logit regression are not appropriate 
because of the existence of right censoring (i.e. the end of the observation period) for some 
subsidiaries. Thus, although we expect all subpar performance sequences to end in either a 
recovery or exit, we cannot observe such an event for some subsidiaries and therefore cannot 
make any inferences about any events that may occur during unobserved times. Event history 
analysis techniques can account for this and thus provide unbiased estimates
7
 (Clark, Bradburn, 
Love & Altman, 2003). Conventional event history analysis is often termed survival analysis and 
finds much application in biostatistics, where the duration until death is estimated. The survival 
probability can then be estimated as “the probability of being alive at time tj, S(tj), is calculated 
from S(tj-1), the probability of being alive at tj-1, nj, the number of patients alive just before tj, and 
dj, the number of events at tj, by 
𝑆(𝑡𝑗) = 𝑆(𝑡𝑗−1)(1 −
𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
) 
where t0=0 and S(0)=1.” The value of S(t) is constant between times of events, and therefore the 
estimated probability is a step function that changes value only at the time of each event” (Clark 
et al., 2003: 233). From this, the hazard rate can be determined, which indicates the event rate at 
time t, conditional on the event not having occurred yet. Cox proportional hazard models are 
among the most common ways of applying survival analysis, whereby the hazard rate is 
estimated dependent on a set of covariates (Bradburn, Clark, Love, & Altman, 2003).  
                                                          
7
 Note the difference to the application of the multinomial logit regression in the “Identifying” section. In the 
“Identifying” section, the application of a multinomial logit regression was appropriate even though some 
subsidiaries experienced a non-response (which may appear like a case of right censoring) because the non-response 
was modeled as a specific outcome of interest. A nonresponse was thus inferred to be an outcome, rather than the 
end of the observation period as in event history analysis. 
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 Second, in applying an event history analysis approach, several aspects related to the 
structure of the data needed to be considered. While in conventional event history analyses 
subjects experience the onset of risk
8
 at a certain time point (e.g. end of schooling, birth) and the 
analysis time ends with an event (e.g. employment, death), the subsidiaries in this study could 
have several onsets of risk (every time a subpar performance sequence begins) and each analysis 
time could end with a different event (e.g. recovery, exit, or right censoring). Following Hsieh et 
al., (2015), this condition was accounted for by applying a gap time model, in which each subpar 
performance sequence was marked as a spell (see Table 5.3). Within each spell, the time between 
the beginning and the end of the spell was indicated by the gap time. This approach leads to the 
result that “the clock is reset to zero for a subject every time an event occurs” (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012: 859), by setting the onset of risk to the beginning of each subpar performance 
sequence. Thus, at the beginning of a subsidiary’s first subpar performance sequence, the 
subsidiary starts to become at risk for recovery or performance-related exit. Once an event 
occurs, the clock (i.e. the time of being at risk of recovery or performance-related exit) stops 
until the subsidiary experiences another subpar performance sequence, which is when it restarts 
from zero. This allows for each subpar performance sequence to have its own event-specific 
baseline hazard (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). To account for similarities between 
sequences within the same subsidiary, we clustered the standard errors by the unique subsidiary 
identifier.  
                                                          
8
 Note that the historical origins of event history analysis (otherwise known as survival analysis) cause it to come 
with terminology that carries a rather negative connotation. For instance, a subject may be indicated as “failing” 
whenever it exhibits an event of interest - regardless of whether such event is death, the acceptance of employment, 
or getting married. Similarly, “onset of risk” demarcates the start of the period during which a subject could 
potentially experience such an event, even if no one would conventionally speak of the “risk” of accepting 
employment or getting married. 
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Third, conventional survival analysis assumes that the event and censoring distribution 
are independent of each other. For instance, if a subsidiary is right-censored due to the end of the 
observation period, this fact is not going to affect the likelihood of the event (recovery or exit) to 
occur. However, if the subsidiary is right-censored due to it exiting, it cannot experience the 
recovery event any longer (Putter, Fiocco, & Geskus, 2007: 2394). These two aspects are thus 
not independent of each other and a competing-risk event history analysis (Fine & Gray, 1999) 
approach is employed. This methodology takes into account that a subsidiary may experience 
multiple outcomes, whereby “the occurrence of either removes the subject from the risk of the  
Table 5.3. Example of Subsidiary Histories to Illustrate the Structure of the Dataset. 
Subsi-
diary 
Begin time 
span 
End time 
span Event Spell 
Gap 
time 
Cova-
riates Remarks 
A 1990 1991 0 #1 1 X(t) Start of 1st subpar performance spell 
A 1991 1992 0 #1 2 X(t)  
A 
1992 1993 1 #1 3 X(t) 
Recovery at the end of the 3rd year 
of subpar performance 
A 
2001 2002 0 #2 1 X(t) 
Start of 2nd subpar performance 
spell 
A 2002 2003 0 #2 2 X(t)  
A 2003 2004 0 #2 3 X(t)  
A 2004 2005 0 #2 4 X(t)  
A 
2005 2006 1 #2 5 X(t) 
Exit at the end of the 5th year of 
subpar performance 
B 1998 1999 0 #1 1 X(t) Start of 1st subpar performance spell 
B 
1999 2000 1 #1 2 X(t) 
Recovery occurs at the end of the 
3rd year of subpar performance 
B 
2010 2011 0 #2 1 X(t) 
Start of 2nd subpar performance 
spell 
B 2011 2012 0 #2 2 X(t)  
B 2012 2013 0 #2 3 X(t) Right censoring 
 
other” (Cannella & Shen, 2001: 261). This does not imply that the events are mutually exclusive 
but that they are allowed to rely on asymmetric mechanisms and thus have their own subhazards, 
i.e. covariates may affect each outcome differently. For example, as the extant literature has 
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shown, the determinants of subsidiary exits may be different from the determinants of other 
outcomes, such as divestitures (Mata & Portugal, 2000). The same is assumed in this study, 
suggesting that the determinants of the rate of recovery may be different from the determinants 
of the rate of exit. Moreover, while conventional Cox proportional hazards regressions focus on 
the survivor function, indicating “the probability of surviving beyond a given time”, competing-
risks regressions center “on the cumulative incidence function, which indicates the probability of 
the event of interest happening before a given time.” (Stata Competing-risks regression, N/A).  
Thus, the choice for a gap time competing-risk event history analysis approach to testing 
the proposed hypotheses has three key advantages (e.g. over using a multinomial logit regression 
for this part of the analysis as well). First, the element of time is specifically modelled by way of 
incorporating durations. Time is a crucial factor in this part of the analysis since the duration 
between a response and an outcome allows for implications regarding the effectiveness of that 
response. Second, this approach is able to account for the fact that subsidiaries experience subpar 
performance sequences at different points in time and for different durations. Third, the 
competing-risk event history analysis approach allows for the simultaneous assessment of one 
event while controlling for the occurrence of the other. This leads to a more accurate adjustment 
of hazard functions than other methods (including sequential Cox proportional hazard 
regressions) would offer (Canella & Shen, 2001). Fourth, the method adjusts for right-censored 
cases that have a spell end in neither recovery nor exit (but the end of the observation period).  
An important assumption in event history analyses is the proportionality of hazards. This 
implies that “the hazard of the event in any group is a constant multiple of the hazard in any 
other” (Bradburn et al., 2003: 432). If the assumption holds, the hazard ratio (i.e. the event 
probability) remains the same for any two observations across time. Often, this assumption can 
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be violated, i.e. the hazard ratio can decrease or increase over time. An example for a hazard 
ratio that decreases over the analysis time would be a case where the rate of recovery is 
estimated (i.e. the outcome) and the concentration of a specific drug decreases in the blood 
stream over time (i.e. a time-variant predictor of recovery). An example for a hazard ratio that 
increases over the analysis time would be a case where the rate of survival is estimated (i.e. the 
outcome) and the patient’s age increases over time (i.e. a time-variant predictor of survival).  
 Without further specification, the inclusion of predictors that violate the proportional 
hazards assumption can produce incorrect results. There are several proportionality assumption 
tests available after running a conventional Cox proportional hazards model. For competing-risks 
analyses, however, there are much fewer tests available (as has been criticized repeatedly but no 
further tests have been added yet (status: Stata version 14)). One proposed approach is to interact 
each variable with the analysis time and specify those variables that are significant in Stata’s tvc 
option (Coviello, 2009; Clayton, 2013). The disadvantage of this approach is that graphs are not 
readily available when such variables are specified. Thus, we were forced to choose rigor over 
visualizations and therefore only able to produce graphs for the prediction of exits, after we had 
asserted that no such specification was necessary.  
 
5.8.4 Analytical Approach for “Synchronizing” 
 The analytical approach for the set of hypotheses in the “Synchronizing” section was 
slightly different than that for the preceding sections. The rationale behind this was to capture as 
much of a time-based effect as possible. In particular, we expanded the subpar performance 
sequences to also include the first two years in an effort to better map the effects of a “knee-jerk” 
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reaction (Hofer, 1980). For the first set of hypotheses which offer determinants of the time-to-
first response variable, we employed a linear OLS regression while clustering standard errors by 
the unique subsidiary identifier. For the second set of hypotheses, assessing curvilinear effects of 
the time-to-first-response variable (also by subgroups) on the probability of recovery (versus 
exit), we used a logit regression and analysed the marginal effects statistically and graphically. 
Again, we clustered the analysis by the unique subsidiary identifier, to adjust standard error for 
those cases where subsidiaries experienced more than one subpar performance sequence. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
Before reviewing the results for each part of the resource orchestration framework 
(“identifying”, “responding”, and “synchronizing”), it is worthwhile to generate a deeper 
understanding of the frequency and composition of the subpar performance sequences contained 
in our pre-analysis sample. To this end, we utilized a sequence analysis approach and review the 
results next. 
 
6.1 Sequence Analysis  
 Table 6.1 shows that about 60 percent of all response sequences in the sample experience 
subpar performance that lasts up to four years. About 90 percent of the subsidiaries experience a 
sequence that lasts up to seven years.  
Table 6.1. Maximum Length of Subpar Performance Sequences.  
Maximum 
length of 
sequences 
Number of 
sequences 
Number of  
subsidiaries 
Difference 
between 
sequences and 
subsidiaries 
Percentage of 
sequences in the 
sample 
Cumulative 
Percentage of 
sequences 
3 2,973 2,657 316 40.14 40.14 
4 1,769 1,643 126 23.89 64.03 
5 1,250 1,197 53 16.88 80.91 
6 595 585 10 8.03 88.94 
7 333 323 10 4.50 93.44 
8 181 181 0 2.44 95.88 
9 123 123 0 1.66 97.54 
10 73 73 0 0.99 98.53 
11 38 38 0 0.51 99.04 
12 26 26 0 0.35 99.39 
13 17 17 0 0.23 99.62 
14 15 15 0 0.20 99.82 
15 8 8 0 0.11 99.93 
16 4 4 0 0.05 99.99 
17 0 0 0 0.00 99.99 
18 1 1 0 0.01 100.00 
Totals 7,406 6,891 515 100.00 100.00 
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Table 6.1 also illustrates that a total of 7,406 subpar performance sequences were 
observed and some subsidiaries experienced more than one sequence (indicated by the difference 
between the number of observations (i.e. sequences) and the number of distinct subsidiaries). 
Additional analysis regarding the concentration of sequences revealed that the total amount of 
7,406 sequences can be categorized into 1,451 distinct sequence types. About 14.93 percent of 
all observed sequences are unique, with only one subsidiary each following that respective 
trajectory. The overarching measure of concentration of sequences is 19.59 percent, suggesting 
that there is a wide variety of different trajectories a subsidiary can experience in terms of the 
duration and the specific responses occurring during the sequence. 
 Regarding the occurrence of actions per subpar performance sequence, the following 
pattern emerges. 9 sequences contain seven different types of responses (including the non-
response), while the majority (>50 percent) only contain one to two different types of responses. 
Table 6.2 provides an overview of the frequencies of different responses observed in the sample.  
Table 6.2. Frequency of Different Response Types in the Sample.  
Number of different 
elements in sequence Number of observations 
Percentage of all 
observations in the 
sample 
Cumulative 
percentages 
1 5,299 29.47 29.47 
2 5,245 29.17 58.64 
3 4,011 22.31 80.94 
4 2,253 12.53 93.47 
5 981 5.46 98.93 
6 184 1.02 99.95 
7 9 0.05 100 
Total 17,982 100.00 100.00 
Note: Observations indicates subsidiary-year occurrences. 
 The frequency of each type of sequence and the responses (or non-responses) it contains 
can be especially informative. Sequence analysis reveals that most common type of sequence is 
that which contains no discernible response (see Table 6.3). Again, each sequence recorded in 
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the table is already preceded by two years of subpar performance during which time the 
responses are not considered (similar to the approach in Tangpong et al., 2015).  
Table 6.3. Frequency of the Types of Sequences (Without Specifications).  
Type of sequence 
Number of 
sequences 
NR 1,185 
oper. increase 513 
combination response 421 
NR  NR 402 
oper. decrease 359 
strat./oper. increase 258 
strat./oper. decrease 185 
NR  NR  NR 179 
NR  oper. increase 96 
oper. decrease  NR 80 
oper. increase  NR 78 
NR  oper. decrease  76 
oper. increase  oper. increase 75 
NR  combination response 65 
oper. decrease  oper. decrease  57 
combination response  combination response 53 
combination response  NR 52 
NR=no discernible response; the list was cut off at sequences with fewer than 50 observations. 
Considering that longer periods of subpar performance may hint at even more embedded 
structural challenges, we also listed the most common types of sequences when subpar 
performance lasted for at least five years. With such a qualification, the results are depicted in 
Table 6.4 (the list being cut off at sequences with at least 30 observations each). 
Again, Table 6.4 reveals that most sequences that last at least five years consist of a string 
of non-responses. At first glance, this may appear surprising because Pearce and Robbins (1993: 
615) noted that continuance (or non-action) rarely proves to be sufficient for turning around a 
subpar performance situation. Upon closer consideration, however, it might be exactly the 
prevalence of non-responses that may cause these sequences to become this prolonged in the first 
place. Moreover, it appears that most longer sequences contain operational increases or decreases 
as opposed to any strategic changes, perhaps hinting at the insufficiency of purely operational 
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responses in shortening a subpar performance sequence. This is mirrored in Hofer (1980: 30) 
who notes that many failed turnarounds may be due to management choosing an operational 
response when a strategic response was needed. 
Table 6.4. Frequency of the Types of Sequences (Length of Sequence>=5 Years).  
Type of sequence 
Number of 
sequences 
NR  NR  NR 179 
NR  NR  NR  NR 47 
NR  NR  oper. decrease  26 
NR  oper. increase  NR 25 
oper. decrease  NR  NR 24 
NR  NR  oper. increase  23 
oper. increase  NR  NR 23 
NR  oper. decrease  NR 18 
NR  NR  combination response 16 
NR  strat./oper. decrease  NR 15 
NR  NR  NR  NR  NR 15 
oper. increase  oper. increase  NR 15 
oper. decrease  NR  oper. decrease 15 
combination response  NR  NR 15 
NR  oper. increase  oper. decrease 14 
oper. increase  oper. increase  oper. increase 14 
NR=no discernible response 
Finally, differences in terms of sequence lengths were assessed regarding the respective 
subsidiary’s ownership mode, sector membership, and age. It appears that the means and 
standard deviations do not differ much between joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
Service subsidiaries experience somewhat longer subpar performance sequences than 
manufacturing subsidiaries. In terms of age, older subsidiaries tend to experience longer subpar 
performance sequences on average. Table 6.5 summarizes the results. 
In the next section, we present the results for the “identifying” part of the resource 
orchestration framework. 
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Table 6.5. Comparison across Subsidiaries (Based on Selected Characteristics).  
   
Years of subpar performance 
between 1990 and 2013  
  Observations Mean SD 
ownership mode 
Joint ventures (80-20) 6,619 3.87 2.65 
Wholly-owned subsidiaries 8,459 3.85 2.61 
sector 
membership 
Manufacturing 9,065 3.56 2.36 
Services  (wholesale, retail, other) 8,486 4.11 2.83 
categorical 
subsidiary age 
3-4 years 130 2.58 2.18 
5-9 years 2,899 2.98 2.08 
10-19 years 7,141 3.83 2.55 
20-29 years 4,038 4.12 2.78 
30-39 years 1,846 4.51 2.90 
40-49 years 523 4.20 2.81 
50+ years 123 3.37 2.01 
 
6.2 Results for the Set of Hypotheses around “Identifying” 
The concern of multicollinearity was alleviated by mean-centering all continuous 
independent variables. Pairwise correlations were assessed (see Table 6.6) and variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) calculated. The mean VIFs for the model always remained close to 1.00 (the exact 
score was 1.28) and the VIFs for the individual variables always remained below 1.7, which was 
well below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998) and even 
below the stricter threshold of 5 (Menard, 1995). Thus, multicollinearity did not pose a threat to 
the reliability of this study’s findings. 
By way of reporting the comparative results of the multinomial logit regression, Table 
6.7 illustrates the effect of each predictor variable (including control variables) on the probability 
of each response (as opposed to the base category). The results reported there allow for an 
assessment of whether a certain response is more probable than not responding at all (“no 
response” is the base category), given specific predicting determinants. However, following 
Wulff (2015), the hypotheses will be interpreted based on Table 6.8, which provides information 
on average marginal effects that follow from the multinomial regression, and require no 
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specification of a base category. Overall, the results for each response category are in the 
hypothesized directions.  
Table 6.6. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (“Identifying”).  
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Country-level 
determinants 
          
1 Population 
(million) 
290.00 444.00 1.00        
2 GDP growth 4.37 4.42 0.49* 1.00       
3 Geographic 
distance 
6,131.40 3,423,28 -0.27* -0.32* 1.00      
4 Cultural 
distance 
3.47 1.05 -0.15* 0.09* -0.36* 1.00     
 MNE-level 
determinants 
          
5 Network size 43.54 120.31 -0.05* -0.06* 0.04 -0.01 1.00    
 Subsidiary-level 
determinants 
          
6 Age 16.11 9.05 -0.25* -0.19* 0.20* -0.03 0.07* 1.00   
7 Number of 
employees 
270.89 583.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.08* 1.00  
8 Number of 
expatriates 
4.77 8.44 -0.04 -0.06* 0.07* -0.02 -0.02 0.10* 0.39* 1.00 
* p < 0.05; Factor variables are omitted from this table.  
  
6.2.1 Hypotheses 1a-1c (No Response) 
The first three hypotheses suggest that whether an MNE responds to subpar performance 
at the subsidiary level may depend on several country-level, MNE-level, and subsidiary-level 
determinants. First, Hypothesis 1a suggests that a non-response to subpar performance at a 
foreign subsidiary is more likely to occur with higher geographic distance between the 
headquarters and that foreign subsidiary. This hypothesis did not receive significant support in 
this analysis. Second, Hypothesis 1b indicates that a non-response to subpar performance at a 
foreign subsidiary is more likely to occur when the MNE as a whole is experiencing profit losses. 
This hypothesis is supported at p < 0.05. Third, Hypothesis 1c offers the notion that a non-
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response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to occur when there are 
fewer expatriates in the subsidiary. This hypothesis receives support, with p < 0.001.  
 
6.2.2 Hypotheses 2a-2c (Increases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment) 
The next set of hypotheses predicts the occurrence of increases in commitment, be it 
strategic, operational, or a combination thereof. First, Hypothesis 2a suggests that an increase in 
strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in 
a host country with higher GDP growth rates. This hypothesis did not receive significant support 
in this analysis. Second, Hypothesis 2b indicates that an increase in operational commitment is 
more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with 
higher GDP growth rates. This hypothesis is supported at p < 0.05. Third, Hypothesis 2c offers 
the notion that an increase in both strategic and operational commitment is more likely to occur 
when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth 
rates. This hypothesis did not receive significant support. Interestingly, however, a decrease in 
both strategic and operational commitment is significantly (p < 0.001) less likely to occur when 
the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth rates. 
 
6.2.3 Hypotheses 3a-3f (Decreases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment) 
 The next set of hypotheses predicts the occurrence of decreases in commitment, be it 
strategic, operational, or a combination thereof. First, Hypothesis 3a suggests that a decrease in 
strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary is not a 
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regional headquarters. This hypothesis received support at p < 0.001. Second, Hypothesis 3b 
proposes that a decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is not a regional headquarters. This hypothesis does not receive statistical 
support. Third, Hypothesis 3c suggests that a decrease in strategic commitment is more likely to 
occur when the subpar performing subsidiary does not fulfill an R&D purpose. This hypothesis 
received support at p < 0.001. Fourth, Hypothesis 3d suggests that a decrease in operational 
commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary does not fulfill an 
R&D purpose. This hypothesis received support at p < 0.001. Fifth, Hypothesis 3e indicates that 
a decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing 
subsidiary is older. This hypothesis was supported at p < 0.05. Sixth, Hypothesis 3f offers the 
proposition that a decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is larger (in terms of the number of employees). This hypothesis was not 
supported.  
 
6.2.4 Hypothesis 4 (Combination Response) 
 Hypothesis 4 states that a combination response is more likely to occur when the subpar 
performing subsidiary is a joint venture. This hypothesis received support, at p < 0.05. By way 
of conducting robustness checks, the average marginal effects were plotted for each continuous 
independent variable. As Wulff (2015: 6) notes, marginal effects indicate the “slope of the 
prediction function at a given value of the explanatory variable and thus inform us about the 
change in predicted probabilities due to a change in a particular 
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Table 6.7. Comparative Effects: Multinomial Logit Results with “No Response” as the Base Category (“Identifying”). 
 
Strat.  
increase Strat. decrease 
Operat.  
increase 
Operat. 
decrease Mixed increase 
Mixed 
decrease 
Combination 
response 
Country-level 
determinants 
       
Population (billion) -2.550 (0.935)** -0.660 (0.662) -0.770 (0.217)*** -0.114 (0.226) -0.525 (0.253)** -0.422 (0.252)* -0.375 (0.223)* 
GDP growth 0.111 (0.112) 0.042 (0.055) 0.035 (0.025) -0.049 (0.023)** 0.003 (0.028) -0.066 (0.024)** -0.003 (0.024) 
Geographic distance 
(thousand) 
0.047 (0.140) 0.099 (0.055)* 0.004 (0.028) 0.019 (0.029) -0.023 (0.034) -0.028 (0.032) 0.065 (0.029)** 
Cultural distance -0.787 (0.489) 0.037 (0.239) 0.058 (0.086) 0.080 (0.096) 0.025 (0.097) -0.129 (0.113) 0.190 (0.093)** 
MNE-level determinants        
Network size -0.012 (0.010) -0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Positive profits 
Negative profits 
(reference) 
0.109 (0.940) 
(reference) 
-0.571 (0.449) 
(reference) 
-0.208 (0.164) 
(reference) 
-0.481 (0.175)** 
(reference) 
-0.416 (0.189)** 
(reference) 
-0.317 (0.182)* 
(reference) 
-0.205 (0.166) 
Subsidiary-level 
determinants 
       
No regional HQ 
Regional HQ 
(reference) 
-13.661 
(1.545)*** 
(reference) 
-14.900 
(0.579)*** 
(reference) 
-0.473 (0.703)  
(reference) 
0.577 (0.569) 
(reference) 
0.864 (0.594) 
(reference) 
0.367 (0.599) 
(reference) 
0.535 (0.580) 
No R&D purpose 
R&D purpose 
(reference) 
-13.309 
(1.502)*** 
(reference) 
-16.035 
(0.890)*** 
(reference) 
-16.096 
(0.716)*** 
(reference) 
-16.141 
(0.800)*** 
(reference) 
-16.761 
(0.956)*** 
(reference) 
-1.255 (0.1765) 
(reference) 
-0.036 (0.835) 
Joint venture 
WOS 
(reference) 
-16.014 (0.870) 
*** 
(reference) 
-0.433 (0.413) 
(reference) 
0.038 (0.173) 
(reference) 
0.075 (0.180) 
(reference) 
0.227 (0.193)  
(reference) 
-0.088 (0.196) 
(reference) 
-0.331 (0.173)* 
Same industry 
Different industry 
(reference) 
-0.142 (0.845) 
(reference) 
0.928 (0.412)** 
(reference) 
0.081 (0.176) 
(reference) 
-0.031 (0.185) 
(reference) 
0.233 (0.198) 
(reference) 
0.389 (0.196)** 
(reference) 
0.070 (0.174) 
Age 0.056 (0.043) 0.016 (0.019) -0.014 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010) -0.009 (0.011) -0.005 (0.010) -0.018 (0.009)* 
Number of employees -0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Number of expatriates 0.219 (0.097)** 0.140 (0.048)** 0.076 (0.038)** 0.030 (0.047) 0.190 (0.036)*** 0.225 (0.036) 0.176 (0.035)*** 
Constant -4.224 (1.175)*** -2.681 (0.552)*** 0.278 (0.175) 0.227 (0.187) -0.329 (0.194)* -0.302 (0.188) 0.465 (0.167)** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors are in parentheses. Results of complete mlogit model. Betas are reported. Number of observations: 1,735.  
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Table 6.8. Absolute Effects: Marginal Effects from the Multinomial Logit Regression (“Identifying”). 
 
No 
response 
Strat.  
increase 
Strat. 
decrease 
Operat.  
increase 
Operat. 
decrease 
Mixed 
increase 
Mixed 
decrease 
Combination 
response 
Country-level 
determinants 
        
Population (billion) 0.061 (0.023)** -0.007 (0.004)* -0.004 (0.009) 
-0.074 
(0.026)** 
0.042 (0.024)* -0.016 (0.022) -0.004 (0.023) 0.003 (0.027) 
GDP growth 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.008 (0.003)** 
-0.007 
(0.002)** 
0.002 (0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.002)*** 
0.001 (0.003) 
Geographic 
distance (thousand) 
-0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)* 0.010 (0.003)**  
Cultural distance -0.008 (0.010) -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009) -0.002 (0.007) 
-0.023 
(0.010)** 
0.028 (0.010)** 
MNE-level 
determinants 
         
Network size 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Positive profits 
Negative profits 
(reference) 
0.042 (0.018)** 
(reference) 
0.001 (0.003) 
(reference)  
-0.004 (0.006) 
(reference) 
0.009 (0.019) 
(reference)  
-0.035 
(0.017)** 
(reference)  
-0.018 (0.016) 
(reference)  
-0.006 (0.016) 
(reference) 
0.011 (0.019) 
Subsidiary-level 
determinants 
        
No regional HQ 
Regional HQ 
(reference)  
-0.044 (0.053) 
(reference)  
-0.004 
(0.001)** 
(reference)  
-0.015 
(0.003)*** 
(reference)  
-0.106 
(0.044)** 
(reference)  
0.047 (0.061) 
(reference)  
0.080 (0.053) 
(reference)  
0.000 (0.043) 
(reference)  
0.042 (0.062) 
No R&D purpose 
R&D purpose 
(reference) 
0.247 (0.185) 
(reference)  
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
(reference)  
-0.014 
(0.003)*** 
(reference)  
-0.191 
(0.009)*** 
(reference)  
-0.165 
(0.009)*** 
(reference)  
-0.123 
(0.008)*** 
(reference)  
-0.034 (0.139) 
(reference) 
0.284 (0.172)* 
Joint venture 
WOS 
(reference) 
0.007 (0.018) 
(reference)  
-0.012 (0.007)* 
(reference)  
-0.005 (0.006) 
(reference) 
0.016 (0.019) 
(reference) 
0.019 (0.018) 
(reference) 
0.033 (0.016)** 
(reference)  
-0.003 (0.017) 
(reference)  
-0.055 
(0.020)** 
Same industry 
Different industry 
(reference)  
-0.017 (0.019) 
(reference)  
-0.001 (0.003) 
(reference) 
0.011 (0.005)** 
(reference)  
-0.006 (0.020) 
(reference)  
-0.023 (0.018) 
(reference) 
0.013 (0.016) 
(reference) 
0.034 (0.017)** 
(reference)  
-0.011 (0.020) 
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)** 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001)** 
Number of 
employees 
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)* 0.000 (0.000) 
Number of 
expatriates 
-0.017 
(0.004)*** 
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.006 (0.004) 
-0.012 
(0.005)** 
0.009 
(0.002)*** 
0.014 
(0.002)*** 
0.012 
(0.002)*** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001; Coefficients are the derivative of f at x (dy/dx). Betas are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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predictor.” Assessing marginal effects is thus a key tool for assessing whether the effect of a 
continuous predictor is significant over the entire data range of that variable. Specifically, this 
can be achieved by deriving a graphical representation of these marginal effects and assessing 
whether the 95 percent confidence interval crosses the zero line. As Wulff (2015: 14) further 
notes, “The fact that marginal effects are second-order relationships makes them harder to 
interpret than predicted probability curves [, i.e. conventional graphical representations of 
regression results]. But what we lose in intuition we gain in information [, allowing us to assess 
the] significance of the relationship between a predictor and the choice outcomes” more 
precisely. The results are displayed in Figures 6.1 to 6.5 below, where the solid lines indicate the 
marginal effect of the predictor on the respective outcome category and the two dotted lines 
indicate the confidence interval. Note that the y-axis scale is automatically derived by the 
analysis. 
 Geographic distance was not significant over the entire data range as a predictor of the 
likelihood of a non-response (Figure 6.1). Further, the effect of the number of expatriates on the 
likelihood of a non-response was negatively significant most strongly when the number of 
expatriates is between 0 and 10 expatriates (Figure 6.2). Next, as the collection of graphs in 
Figure 6.3 show, the impact of GDP growth on the likelihood of a strategic increase as a first 
response is not significant across the entire data range. For the operational increases, GDP 
growth is a significant predictor, however, not at negative levels of GDP growth. In contrast, 
GDP growth is a significant indicator for mixed increases in commitment when GDP growth is 
at the lower end of its data range. Furthermore, subsidiary age loses some of its significance 
levels at higher subsidiary ages (Figure 6.4). Finally, for the number of subsidiaries, the 
confidence interval crosses zero across the entire data range (Figure 6.5). 
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Figure 6.1. Average Marginal Effects of Geographic Distance (“Identifying”).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Average Marginal Effects of the Number of Expatriates (“Identifying”).  
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Figure 6.3. Average Marginal Effects of GDP Growth (“Identifying”). 
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Figure 6.4. Average Marginal Effects of Subsidiary Age (“Identifying”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Average Marginal Effects of the Number of Employees (“Identifying”). 
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6.3 Results for the Set of Hypotheses around “Responding” 
 To address possible multicollinearity, the mean VIFs were assessed for each model. They 
always remained close to 1.00 and the VIFs for the individual variables always remained below 
1.2. Further, Table 6.9 illustrates the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Thus, 
multicollinearity did not pose a threat to the reliability of this study’s findings. 
 
Table 6.9. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (“Responding”).  
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
 Country-level determinants        
1 GDP growth 4.05 3.87 1.00     
2 Cultural distance 3.44 1.10 0.12* 1.00    
 MNE-level determinants        
3 Network size 71.75 167.57 -0.04* -0.01 1.00   
 Subsidiary-level 
determinants 
       
4 Number of employees 288.27 969.60 0.05* 0.02 0.03 1.00  
5 Number of expatriates 4.13 6.63 -0.04* 0.01 -0.05* 0.27* 1.00 
* p < 0.05; Factor variables are omitted from this table.  
 
6.3.1 Hypotheses 5a-5b (No Response versus Any Response) 
 Hypotheses 5a and 5b explore the notion of performing any action versus refraining from 
action. Specifically, Hypothesis 5a states that compared to not responding, any response to 
subsidiary-level subpar performance increases recovery prospects, while Hypothesis 5b suggests 
that compared to not responding, any response to subsidiary-level subpar performance increases 
survival prospects. As Table 6.10 shows, responding in any form at all does not exert an impact 
on the rate of recovery per se, perhaps due to the aggregated nature of the variable in this model. 
Responding in any form appears to be marginally beneficial for survival prospects, such that the 
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rate of exit is reduced by about 27 percent
9
 (p < 0.1). This suggests that any action is potentially 
better than none, at least in the longer run. Figure 6.6 illustrates this finding graphically
10
. 
Table 6.10. Results for Hypotheses 5a-5b (“Responding”: No Response versus Any Response). 
Variables Rate of Recovery Rate of Exit 
Response variable   
No response 
Any response 
(reference) 
0.037 (0.059) 
(reference) 
-0.310 (0.181)* 
Control variables   
Population (billion) -0.086 (0.078) 0.451 (0.242)* 
GDP growth 0.037 (0.009)*** 0.014 (0.026) 
Geographic distance (thousand) -0.009 (0.009) 0.055 (0.030)* 
Cultural distance† -0.109 (0.040)** 0.085 (0.089) 
MNE network size 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)** 
Positive profits 
Negative profits 
(reference) 
-0.299 (0.057)*** 
(reference) 
-0.049 (0.184) 
No regional HQ  
Regional HQ 
(reference) 
-0.262 (0.188) 
(reference) 
-1.155 (1.023) 
Joint venture (20-80) 
Wholly-owned subsidiary 
(reference) 
0.023 (0.057) 
(reference) 
0.014 (0.201) 
Same industry 
Different industry 
(reference) 
-0.103 (0.058)* 
(reference) 
0.021 (0.202) 
Number of subsidiary employees 
(thousand) 
-0.069 (0.047) -0.304 (0.287) 
Number of expatriates† 0.001 (0.004) -0.098 (0.045)** 
N of observations 4,771 4,771 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1; variables marked with an † were identified as time-variant variables for the 
prediction of recovery. No such specification appeared necessary for the prediction of exit. 
  
                                                          
9
 These effect size percentages were derived from hazard ratios. In the tables, coefficients are reported instead of 
hazard ratios. 
10
 Note that the graphs are depicted in the stepwise fashion that is typical for event history analyses (because the 
state is assumed to be constant between two time points). While the graphs can be smoothed using a kernel option 
after conventional Cox proportional hazard functions, this is not possible after a competing-risk event history 
analysis (Stata stcurve, N/A: 1). 
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Figure 6.6. Results for Hypothesis 5b (“Responding”: No Response versus Any Response). 
 
Note: Outcome=exit, only illustrative graphs and the comparison group are shown.  
Subpar performance sequence is measured in years. 
 
6.3.2 Hypotheses 6a-6d (No Response versus Specific Types of Responses) 
 The next set of hypotheses is concerned with the specific combinations of strategic and 
operational (or combined) increases or decreases (or combined) in commitment. Overall, the 
findings confirm that the determinants of recovery are different from the determinants of exit. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 6a states that compared to not responding, increases in commitment 
affect the rate of recovery such that strategic increases worsen the rate of recovery while 
operational increases improve the rate of recovery. The findings summarized in Table 6.11. 
illustrate that Hypothesis 6a is not supported for strategic increases but fully supported for 
operational increases (p < 0.05), such that the foreign subsidiary has a faster recovery rate of 
about 22 percent when such a response is used. This effect becomes even stronger when a 
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combination of strategic and operational responses is used, whereby the rate of recovery is 
improved by about 46 percent (p < 0.001). 
 Next, Hypothesis 6b suggests that compared to not responding, decreases in commitment 
affect the rate of recovery such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of 
recovery, however strategic decreases more so than operational decreases. As reported in Table 
6.11., this hypothesis is partially supported such that strategic decreases are not significant but 
operational (p < 0.05) decreases in commitment worsen the rate of recovery by about 17 percent. 
A combination of strategic and operational decreases in commitment also reduces the rate of 
recovery (p < 0.05), by about 26 percent.  
 Further, Hypothesis 6c offers the proposition that compared to not responding, increases in 
commitment improve survival prospects, such that both strategic and operational increases in 
commitment improve survival prospects, however strategic increases more so than operational 
increases. This hypothesis is supported for strategic increases, where the rate of exit falls to 
almost zero percent (p < 0.001). For operational increases, this hypothesis does not generate 
statistical significance (p = 0.148), although the coefficient points in the suggested direction. For 
combinations of strategic and operational increases, the effect is significant at p < 0.05, such that 
survival prospects are improved by about 68 percent. 
 Finally, Hypothesis 6d states that compared to not responding, decreases in commitment 
affect the rate of recovery such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of 
recovery, however strategic decreases more so than operational decreases. This hypothesis did 
not receive statistical significance, although the coefficient for strategic decrease points in the 
proposed direction.  
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 Figure 6.7 illustrates the significant graphs and the reference category (no response) for 
the prediction of exit rates. 
Table 6.11. Results for Hypotheses 6a-6d (“Responding”: No Response versus Specific Types of 
Responses). 
Variables Rate of Recovery Rate of Exit 
Response variable   
No response 
Strategic increase 
Strategic decrease 
Operational increase 
Operational decrease 
Mixed increase 
Mixed decrease 
Combination response 
(reference) 
-0.945 (0.980) 
-0.578 (0.359) 
0.199 (0.080)** 
-0.187 (0.093)** 
0.376 (0.086)*** 
-0.307 (0.107)** 
0.078 (0.083) 
(reference) 
-13.250 (0.384)*** 
0.634 (0.588) 
-0.409 (0.283) 
-0.083 (0.252) 
-1.130 (0.515)** 
0.210 (0.302) 
-0.732 (0.329)** 
Control variables   
Population (billion) -0.070 (0.077) 0.441 (0.242)* 
GDP growth 0.033 (0.009)*** 0.018 (0.026) 
Geographic distance (thousand) -0.008 (0.009) 0.053 (0.030)* 
Cultural distance† -0.112 (0.040)** 0.083 (0.089) 
MNE network size 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)** 
Positive profits 
Negative profits -0.300 (0.057)*** -0.058 (0.183) 
No regional HQ  
Regional HQ -0.215 (0.184) -1.198 (1.026) 
Joint venture (20-80) 
Wholly-owned subsidiary 0.023 (0.057) -0.003 (0.197) 
Same sector 
Different sector -0.100 (0.057)* 0.011 (0.203) 
Number of subsidiary employees 
(thousand) -0.081 (0.048)* -0.281 (0.285) 
Number of expatriates† 0.002 (0.004) -0.105 (0.048)** 
N of observations 4,771 4,771 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1; variables marked with an † were identified as time-variant variables. 
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Figure 6.7. Results for Hypotheses 6a-6d (“Responding”: No Response versus Specific Types of 
Responses). 
 
Note: Outcome=exit, only illustrative graphs and the comparison group are shown.  
Subpar performance sequence is measured in years. 
  
6.4 Results for the Set of Hypotheses around “Synchronizing” 
  Multicollinearity was judged to not pose a threat, since the mean VIFs for models 
remained close to 1.00 and for individual variables below 1.6. Table 6.12 illustrates the 
descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. The analysis regarding time-related aspects of the 
subpar performance phenomenon was split into two main subsections. First, the determinants of 
the time-to-first-response were assessed.  
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Table 6.12. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (“Synchronizing”) 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Country-level 
determinants 
         
1 Population 
(million) 
342.00 476.00 1.00       
2 GDP growth 4.58 4.13 0.58* 1.00      
3 Geographic 
distance 
6,150.14 3,382.30 -0.35* -0.41* 1.00     
4 Cultural 
distance 
3.42 1.03 -0.13* 0.13* -0.34* 1.00    
 MNE-level 
determinants 
         
5 Network size 67.40 160.36 -0.05* -0.06* 0.10* -0.05* 1.00   
 Subsidiary-level 
determinants 
         
6 Number of 
employees 
324.58 1,371.97 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 1.00  
7 Number of 
expatriates 
4.86 7.92 -0.04* -0.06* 0.11* -0.03* -0.02 0.22* 1.00 
 
6.4.1 Hypothesis 7 (Determinants of the Timing to the First Response) 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that Compared to having no such communication enhancing 
mechanisms, subsidiaries that have mechanisms which facilitates more frequent communication 
with headquarters exhibit a shorter time to the first response. This hypothesis is supported for 
R&D subsidiaries (p < 0.005) and a Japanese GM manager (p < 0.05) in Model 2a. After 
excluding the countries China, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan (see Model 2b), R&D 
subsidiaries were significant at (p < 0.001) and Japanese GM managers were marginally 
significant at (p < 0.1). Table 6.13 summarizes the results. 
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Table 6.13. Results for Hypothesis 8 (“Synchronizing”: Determinants of the Timing of the First 
Response). 
 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b 
Control variables    
GDP growth 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 
Geographic distance (thousand) -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 
Cultural distance -0.007 (0.007) -0.007 (0.007) -0.008 (0.008) 
Network size (thousand) 0.106 (0.108) 0.102 (0.108) 0.152 (0.128) 
Positive MNE profits 
Negative MNE profits 
(reference) 
0.031 (0.017)* 
(reference) 
0.029 (0.017)* 
(reference) 
0.036 (0.019)* 
Same industry 
Different industry 
(reference) 
0.033 (0.017) 
(reference) 
0.035 (0.017)** 
(reference) 
0.024 (0.020) 
Number of subsidiary employees 
(thousand) 
-0.029 (0.012)*** -0.023 (0.012)* -0.054 (0.012)*** 
    
 
Communication channels 
   
No regional headquarters 
Regional headquarters 
 
(reference) 
0.003 (0.061) 
(reference) 
0.003 (0.056) 
No R&D role 
R&D role 
 
(reference) 
-0.179 (0.055)** 
(reference) 
-0.212 (0.057)*** 
Number of expatriates  -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 
Non-Japanese GM 
Japanese GM 
 
(reference) 
-0.040 (0.020)** 
(reference) 
-0.035 (0.021)* 
Constant 1.218 (0.014)*** 1.252 (0.022)*** 1.256 (0.023)*** 
Observations 4,730 4,730 3,331 
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1; Note: Model 2b contains a sample without China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Korea. 
 
6.4.2 Hypotheses 8a-8b (Shape of the Relationship with Recovery versus Exit) 
Second, the effects of the time-to-first-response on the probability of recovery (versus 
exit) were derived. Table 6.15 summarizes the model-building approach, where Model 1 
contains control variables only, Model 2 adds the time-to-first-response predictor, Model 3 
incorporates the squared term of the time-to-response variable and Model 4 adds the types of 
responses. Hypothesis 8a suggests that the effect of the time-to-first-response on the likelihood of 
recovery (as opposed to exit) takes an inverted U-shape, such that the likelihood of recovery is 
highest at medium levels of the time-to-first-response. This hypothesis is supported in Model 3, 
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with p < 0.05 and the negative sign of the squared term of the time-to-response variable 
suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship as hypothesized. Figure 6.8 underscores this 
finding visually. 
Figure 6.8. Results for Hypothesis 8a (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship between the 
Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus Exit, by Response Types). 
 
Note: Time to first response is measured in years. 
 
Hypothesis 8b suggests that the effect of the inverted U-shape relationship between the 
timing of the first response and the probability of a recovery (versus exit) is more pronounced for 
decreases in commitment than for increases in commitment. This hypothesis is supported in 
Model 4 for increases and decreases in commitment. Both exhibit a significance level of p < 
0.001. As Figure 6.9 illustrates, the line for “Increases in commitment” is indeed higher and less 
pronounced than the line for “Decreases in commitment”. We interpret this finding as an 
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indication that the timing of a decrease in commitment is more salient and potentially harmful to 
the likelihood of recovery than the timing of an increase in commitment. The implications of this 
finding will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Figure 6.9. Results for Hypothesis 8b (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship between the 
Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus Exit, by Response Types).   
 
Note: Time to first response is measured in years. 
 
6.4.3 Hypothesis 9 (Effect of the Timing of a GM Replacement) 
 Finally, Hypothesis 9 suggests that an earlier GM replacement during periods of subpar 
performance leads to better rates of recovery and improved rates of exit than a later GM 
replacement. As illustrated in Table 6.15, this hypothesis was supported at (p < 0.05). When
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Table 6.15. Results for Hypotheses 8a-8b (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship with Recovery versus Exit). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control variables     
Population (billion) 0.029 (0.115) 0.003 (0.012) 0.003 (0.012) 0.012 (0.012) 
GDP growth -0.019 (0.013) -0.021 (0.013) -0.021 (0.013) -0.035 (0.014)** 
Geographic distance (thousand) -0.075 (0.014)*** -0.076 (0.014)*** -0.076 (0.014)*** -0.074 (0.014)*** 
Cultural distance -0.003 (0.044) -0.001 (0.044) -0.001 (0.044) 0.018 (0.044) 
Network size -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** 
No regional HQ 
Regional HQ 
(reference) 
0.554 (0.336)* 
(reference) 
0.549 (0.337) 
(reference) 
0.556 (0.337)* 
(reference) 
0.530 (0.342) 
Same industry 
Different industry 
(reference) 
-0.130 (0.085) 
(reference) 
-0.132 (0.085) 
(reference) 
-0.133 (0.085) 
(reference) 
-0.152 (0.085)* 
Subsidiary age 0.008 (0.005)* 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.010 (0.005)** 
Number of subsidiary employees 
(thousand) 
0.245 (0.116)** 0.266 (0.121)** 0.267 (0.121)** 0.326 (0.140)** 
Number of subsidiary expatriates 0.014 (0.010) 0.017 (0.011) 0.017 (0.011) 0.022 (0.013)* 
 
Independent variables 
    
Time-to-first-response  0.325 (0.080)*** 0.575 (0.163)*** 0.591 (0.169)*** 
Time-to-first-response (squared)   -0.061 (0.030)** -0.067 (0.032)** 
Increases in commitment 
Decreases in commitment 
Combination response 
   
(reference) 
-1.102 (0.098)*** 
-0.473 (0.113)*** 
Constant 2.174 (0.063)*** 1.756 (0.118)*** 1.558 (0.168)*** 2.153 (0.187)*** 
Observations 6,645 6,645 6,645 6,645 
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1
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visualizing the relationship, an interesting shape is revealed (see Figure 6.10): if the GM is 
replaced rather early, the likelihood of recovery (versus exit) is higher than if the GM was not 
replaced. However, if the GM is replaced later than in year two, the effect becomes reversed and 
a GM replacement may be harmful to recovery prospects.  
Table 6.15. Results for Hypothesis 9 (“Synchronizing”: Effect of the Timing of a GM 
Replacement). 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Control variables   
Population (billion) -0.002 (0.016) 0.001 (0.016)** 
GDP growth -0.011 (0.018) -0.014 (0.019) 
Geographic distance (thousand) -0.061 (0.019)** -0.062 (0.019)** 
Cultural distance 0.015 (0.060) 0.019 (0.060) 
Network size -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Positive MNE profits 
Negative MNE profits 
-0.322 (0.108)** -0.318 (0.108)** 
Same industry 
Different industry 
-0.160 (0.118) -0.166 (0.118) 
Joint venture 
Wholly-owned subsidiary 
0.068 (0.114) 0.079 (0.114) 
Number of subsidiary employees 
(thousand) 
0.116 (0.134) 0.134 (0.145) 
Number of subsidiary expatriates 0.042 (0.021)** 0.046 (0.022)** 
 
Independent variables 
  
Time-to-first-response  0.477 (0.118)*** 
No GM replacement 
GM replacement 
 0.691 (0.341)** 
Time-to-first-response x GM 
replacement 
 -0.489 (0.245)** 
Constant 2.423 (0.112) 1.810 (0.187)*** 
Observations 3,978 3,978 
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Figure 6.10. Results for Hypothesis 10 (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship between the 
Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus Exit, by GM Replacement 
Status).  
 
Note: Time to first response is measured in years. 
 
6.5 Robustness Checks 
 In general, method-specific robustness checks were incorporated directly into each 
respective subsection. This includes e.g. the visualization of average marginal effects for the 
“Identifying” section and the exclusion of five countries in Model 2b in the “Synchronizing” 
section. Using different measurements of subpar performance, however, is an overarching 
robustness check which assesses our findings with different measures of performance sequences. 
Unless otherwise stated, hypotheses are supported in the same way as in the main analysis. 
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As noted earlier, we used a decline in sales measure of performance to construct subpar 
performance sequences. In order to test for other operationalizations of subpar performance, we 
first used labor productivity as an alternative measure of subpar performance. The findings 
regarding the “Identifying” dimension remained largely robust. The only exceptions were with 
regards to Hypothesis 1b (the impact of MNE-level subpar performance on the occurrence of a 
non-response) which became insignificant, Hypothesis 2b/2c (the impact of GDP growth on the 
likelihood of an operational/mixed increase in commitment) which switched significance such 
that the increase in operational commitment lost significance but mixed increase in commitment 
gained significance. This may be due to a stronger effect being picked up in the mixed category 
which contains strategic and operational responses. Hypothesis 3a (the impact of a regional 
headquarters on the occurrence of a decrease in strategic commitment) became insignificant, and 
Hypothesis 4 (the likelihood of a joint venture receiving a combination response) which became 
insignificant. 
 The findings regarding the “Responding” dimension remained largely robust as well. The 
effect presented in Hypothesis 5b became stronger, at p < 0.05. Hypothesis 6a is now not 
significant while Hypothesis 6c now does received significance at p < 0.05, suggesting that 
operational decreases worsen the rate of exit. Moreover, we did find some marginal support now 
for Hypothesis 6d, whereby strategic decreases in commitment worsen the rate of exit (p < 0.1). 
The findings regarding the “Synchronizing” dimension also remained largely intact. For 
Hypothesis 7, the significance levels dropped into the marginal area (p < 0.1). Regarding 
Hypothesis 9 (assessing the effect of the timing of a GM replacement), the findings were non-
significant. 
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 Second, we used the first operationalization of the perceptual measurement of subpar 
financial performance (with loss and break-even in one category) as a robustness check. 
Regarding the “Identifying” dimension, Hypotheses 1a-1c were not supported. However, similar 
to what was proposed in Hypothesis 1a, higher cultural distance significantly led to a higher 
likelihood of receiving no response. The effect of GDP growth was supported for strategic / 
operational increases in commitment. The effects of subsidiary roles were supported for R&D 
subsidiaries. The number of employees was now a significant predictor of operational decreases, 
supporting Hypothesis 3f. The role of a joint venture on receiving a combination response was 
not supported. 
 Regarding the “Responding” dimension, responding in any way is found to reduce the 
rate of recovery but to have no effect on the rate of exit. The effect of a strategic increase alone 
on the rate of exit was not supported; however, mixed increases in commitment reduced the rate 
of exit significantly. Within the “Synchronizing” dimension, the communication enhancing 
mechanisms were marginally supported for Japanese GMs in Model 2a. Hypotheses 8a-8b were 
not significant. Hypothesis 9 was supported. 
 Third, we used the second operationalization of the perceptual measurement of subpar 
financial performance (with gain and break-even in one category) as a robustness check. 
Regarding the “Identifying” dimension, Hypothesis 1a (assessing the effect of geographic 
distance on the likelihood of a non-response) was now significant at p < 0.05. Hypotheses 1b-1c 
were not supported, as in the previous robustness check. Hypothesis 3c was also supported, the 
rest of the hypotheses in this section were not.  Regarding the “Responding” dimension, any 
response (Hypothesis 5a) had a significant beneficial effect on the rate of recovery. Other 
hypotheses received support. 
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 Finally, within the “Synchronizing” dimension, the effect of a Japanese GM was not 
significant. The timing of a response (Hypothesis 8a) was a significant predictor of the 
probability of a recovery versus exit. However, the shape was no longer curvilinear but 
negatively linear. Hypotheses 8b-9 were not significant although the shape of the relationship for 
Hypothesis 9 was similar to the ones from the main analysis. 
 In sum, many hypotheses are also supported and sometimes even strengthened when 
using other measures of performance. The largest deviation seems to occur with the second 
operationalization of the perceptual measure of subpar financial performance. This may be due to 
the much smaller sample size that results from that operationalization. Future research could map 
this measure of performance onto truly subjective measures of performance, such as managerial 
satisfaction, and assess whether it is more highly correlated with those than accounting-based 
measures of performance. If that is the case, the perceptual measure of performance may indeed 
capture more than financial performance and may thus warrant further exploration. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Discussion of Key Findings 
 The objective of this thesis was to examine the phenomenon of subpar performance in 
foreign subsidiaries from a holistic perspective that encompasses 1) consideration of the 
antecedents of the choice of responses (or non-responses), 2) assessment of the impact of such 
responses on the rate of recovery and survival, and 3) exploration of the effects of time by way 
of investigating the determinants and outcomes of the timing of the first response. We combined 
these three dimensions into a theoretical framework that was guided by a resource orchestration 
perspective, distinguishing between dimensions of “Identifying”, “Responding”, and 
“Synchronizing”. Given that we are not aware of any study that has examined said phenomenon 
from three such angles, with a variety of different response types, and in an international context, 
there are several contributions to research and practice of this work.  
The main research questions guiding the analyses in this thesis were: When a foreign 
subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what determines which specific type of 
response is chosen (if any at all)? Which type of response (if any) is most conducive to 
increasing recovery and survival prospects? What factors determine the timing of a response 
and what role does the timing of responses play in the effectiveness of the chosen response in 
increasing recovery and survival prospects? After the analysis, we find answers to all of these 
questions, at least in the context of our dataset and sample.  
 The four perhaps most substantive contributions are first, that this thesis allows us to get 
a glimpse into the frequency and nature of the phenomenon. One interesting insight this study 
brought to light, for instance, is that non-response to subpar performance is surprisingly 
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common. We supplied frequencies of sequence occurrences and brought forward some potential 
explanations for this observation and found some support for the importance of communication 
frequency enhancing mechanisms of subsidiaries in grasping headquarter attention and initiating 
a response.  Second, we aimed to expand both the organizational decline/turnaround literature 
and the international divestment literature by specifically mapping the phenomenon of declining 
organizations to an international, subsidiary-level context. As our analyses revealed, the 
phenomenon is not a rare one, making it imperative for research to offer some evidence-based 
guidelines for managers to navigate turnaround challenges. Third, this study contributes to the 
nascent research on time-related aspects of turnaround responses. As our analysis revealed, 
however, the timing of a response may be important for its effectiveness. Tangpong et al. (2015) 
is one of the very first studies to explicitly model time and our study builds on this by responding 
to their call for exploring the antecedents of response timing more, along with discovering a 
curvilinear relationship between the timing of responses and the probability of recovery (versus 
exit). Fourth, the framework we provide offers a guideline for structuring the investigation of the 
subpar performance phenomenon at the foreign subsidiary-level. As many turnaround scholars 
have lamented, a unifying theory of turnaround is lacking and new approaches such as the one 
offered may be instrumental in advancing future research. In the following section, these 
contributions will be discussed in more detail per analysis type.  
 
7.1.1 Regarding the Sequence Analysis 
 The sequence analysis revealed that there are hundreds of subsidiaries that experience 
subpar performance sequences for 10 years or more. Some subsidiaries experience more than one 
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such sequence. This suggests that the subpar performance phenomenon at the level of foreign 
subsidiaries is a rather prevalent phenomenon which befalls many foreign subsidiaries. It is thus 
rather surprising that not more studies exist which specifically examine subpar performance and 
appropriate responses (apart from only divestments) at the level of foreign subsidiaries. Given 
that these subsidiaries may play an important role in the MNE’s overall performance, offer 
employment opportunities to individuals at the foreign location, and provide an empirical context 
for exploring the boundaries of current decline/turnaround and international divestment studies, 
the study of this phenomenon seems to hold merit for practitioners, policy makers, and scholars 
alike. The goal should be to generate a deeper understanding of the factors and mechanisms at 
play in this context, in order to eventually offer guidelines to managers as to how the likelihood 
of recovery can be enhanced. 
Furthermore, many organizational decline/turnaround scholars agree that when decline 
occurs, a first response should occur in the form of retrenchment (Tangpong et al., 2015; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994). However, the findings from our sequence 
analysis reveal that the most common sequences are those where the subsidiary does not 
experience any response at all, especially if the subpar performance lasts for at least five years. 
We found this to be a rather intriguing finding, since early turnaround scholars such as Schendel 
et al. (1976) noted that responses are generally necessary to break the inertia of decline. Our 
results may potentially be interpreted in support of Weitzel and Jonsson’s (1989: 97) stage-
model of organizational decline, which consists of the following stages: blinded, inaction, faulty 
action, crisis, and dissolution. At the beginning of the decline, firms may be blinded, such that 
they lack the appropriate monitoring systems to detect the decline in a timely fashion. This 
aspect may be especially salient in the relationship between an MNE headquarters and its foreign 
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subsidiary, where communication channels may be insufficiently developed or prone to language 
barriers, time zone differentials, and a general lack of attention due to its geographic and cultural 
distance.  
Over time, the MNE headquarters will notice the decline but often, firms will remain 
stuck in the inaction stage. This stage can last several years, especially if the decline is not in the 
form of a plummeting of performance but at a slower rate of decline. Weitzel and Jonsson (1989: 
100) offer two main reasons for inaction despite clear signs of decline. First, the decline may be 
abrupt and thus costly to turn around. Leaders at the headquarters may be hesitant to undertake 
any bold move necessary to initiate turnaround. Second, the decline may be perceived as 
temporary and leaders may assume a “wait and see” approach, hoping that performance will 
regress to the mean eventually. The result are “responses to declining performance [which 
include] denial, avoidance, resistance, or procrastination” (p. 100). Generally, such a delay of 
action is not conducive to turnaround success and instead increases stress on the organization and 
the decision-maker. The result of inaction that lasts too long may thus be a vicious cycle 
(Tangpong et al., 2015; Lindsley et al., 1995), which can quickly lead the organization to the 
subsequent stages of faulty action and crisis. At these stages, it is much more difficult for an 
organization to be turned around. If all attempts fail, the dissolution stage becomes inevitable.  
Another, perhaps related, aspect the sequence analysis revealed is that the most frequent 
sequences (apart from non-responses) contained operational responses, rather than strategic 
responses. This mirrors Hofer’s (1980) observation that even if a strategic response might have 
been the more fitting response, most organizations use operational responses instead. Several 
reasons may account for this: 1) strategic responses usually take a long-term perspective. Any 
effects from it may take longer to pay off, forcing the subsidiary to be able to weather the 
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continued short-term decline; and 2) strategic moves such as market repositioning may not 
always be available, given the current competitive landscape. Despite these considerations, 
however, Hofer (1980: 30) notes that “even if both of these observations are true, it still appears 
that management is systematically overlooking or excessively discounting the benefits of 
strategic turnarounds in many situations.” 
In sum, the sequence analysis approach allowed us to gather a picture of the subpar 
performance sequence picture in foreign subsidiaries and assess how similar it is to what we 
already know about organizations in decline more generally. It seems that while there are 
important factors at the international level, key notions such as the stages of decline and 
predispositions to certain response types may also be applicable to the foreign subsidiary level. 
In order to explore the determinants of responses in more depth, we conceptualized an 
“Identifying” dimension in our overarching resource orchestration framework. The findings and 
contributions from this section are discussed next. 
 
7.1.2 Regarding the “Identifying” Dimension 
The first dimension in the resource orchestration framework was designed to assess the 
determinants of responses to subpar performance, guided by the question: When a foreign 
subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what determines which specific type of 
response is chosen (if any at all)? The ABV provided a useful framework to organize the 
determinants of headquarters-level responses to subpar performance at the subsidiary level, 
especially with regards to non-responses. In general, this study thus contributes to the literature 
by exploring the effect of determinants that are particularly salient in an international context, 
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such as specific roles of subsidiaries within the MNE network, GDP growth rates of the host 
country, and the number of expatriates. Moreover, this study offers a finer-grained categorization 
of responses than the dichotomous responses that have been prevalent in the turnaround literature 
(strategic vs. operational, retrenchment vs. non-retrenchment, strong retrenchment vs. weak 
retrenchment).  
We find that inaction as a “response” to subpar performance at the subsidiary level is 
more likely to occur when the MNE as a whole is declining. Following the logic offered by the 
ABV, this suggests that the leaders at the headquarters are likely preoccupied with turning the 
entire organization around, rather than focusing their attention responding to subpar performance 
at the individual subsidiary. We are not aware of any study in the decline/turnaround realm that 
has considered the notion that there may be different performance levels within an MNE. This is 
likely due to the preoccupation with the corporate-level or business-level of analysis in the 
decline/turnaround literature. Thus, we contribute by suggesting that responses to subpar 
performance at a subsidiary may depend on factors at the corporate-level or business-level of the 
MNE network.   
In contrast, we find that inaction is less likely if the subsidiary has more expatriates. 
These individuals may act as directors of headquarter attention and can provide important 
information and assessment to the decision-makers at the corporate-level or business-level. 
Likewise, expatriates can act as advocates for the subsidiary and channel/translate headquarters 
directives to the subsidiary-level. As a result, inaction as described by Weitzel and Jonsson 
(1989) is less likely to occur.  
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We did not find significance for an effect of distance on the likelihood of a response. 
Perhaps geographic distance per se is not a hindrance to a response, given modern 
telecommunications and travel technology. Future research could assess this aspect further, e.g. 
by exploring different notions of distance such as travel time (Boeh & Beamish, 2011). 
Regarding increases in commitment, we find that the country-level determinant of GDP 
growth rates does indeed impact which response is chosen. Our results are in line with Berry 
(2013) who found that subsidiaries are less likely to be divested if they are located in a host 
country with high growth rates. We extend Berry’s (2013) finding by differentiating between 
more types of responses than just divestment. Indeed, our results show that the likely response 
when GDP growth is high is to increase operational commitment, while decreases in 
commitment are unlikely to occur in that context. This finding may suggest that decision-makers 
see potential in the market and associate the poor performance of the foreign subsidiary with it 
not having enough resources to match that potential. As a result, they increase resource 
commitment to that subsidiary. While we were able to support this logic for operational 
responses, we did not find significance for strategic increases in commitment. This may be due 
to the smaller number of observations in that category. Future research could explore this aspect 
further by focusing specifically on strategic responses and gathering a larger sample specifically 
for this category.  
 Next, regarding decreases in commitment, we find that if a subsidiary holds a specific 
role in the MNE’s network, it is less likely to be subjected to decreases in commitment. This is in 
line with Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) work on subsidiary weight and voice, whereby a 
subsidiary can influence certain outcomes based on its importance in the network. Moreover, 
decreases in operational commitment were predicted by the age of the subsidiary. Age may serve 
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as a proxy for the existence of slack and a higher risk of inefficiencies. Thus, our finding is in 
line with the retrenchment stream of the literature (Pearce & Robbins, 1994; Schmitt & Raisch, 
2013). This stream suggests that organizations can be turned around by jettisoning superfluous 
resources. We did not, however, find support for the existence of slack in terms of the size of the 
workforce as a determinant of retrenchment. Future research could explore further whether and 
how the type of the source of slack (age versus size of the workforce) may affect the 
retrenchment decision. 
Finally, we developed a hypothesis regarding the choice for a combination response, 
despite Hofer’s (1980) warning that these may be too managerially complex and confusing to 
truly facilitate turnaround. In the international context, one determinant of a combination of 
responses may, however, be the case where more than one headquarters determines a response. 
This is the case in joint ventures, where both the foreign and the local partner may initiate 
responses. Indeed, we found support for this notion. This aspect thus adds to the organizational 
decline/turnaround literature by differentiating between the impact of different organizational 
forms at the subsidiary level. It may also contribute to the literature on international joint 
ventures, such that these organizations may be more prone to combination responses. Given the 
risk associated with these types of responses, future research is warranted to explore whether the 
combination response is the result (or trigger) of conflict between joint venture partners or 
whether it represents a concerted (and effective) effort to turn the subsidiary around. 
In sum, the findings from the “Identifying” dimension of the resource orchestration 
framework highlighted that the determinants differ for each type of response. Further, several 
factors that are relevant in an international context (and have been relatively neglected in single-
country decline/turnaround studies) impact the choice of response significantly as well. 
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Therefore, this study offers an expansion of concepts from the decline/turnaround literature to 
the international context. Next, we discuss the second dimension in the resource orchestration 
framework, “Responding”, where the efficacy of each response is assessed.  
 
7.1.3 Regarding the “Responding” Dimension 
The second dimension in the resource orchestration framework considers the question: 
Which type of response (if any) is most conducive to increasing recovery and survival prospects? 
We first assess the impact of responding versus not responding at all and find that at least for 
survival prospects, responding appears to be beneficial. Broken down by response type, we find 
that increases in operational commitment tend to improve the rate of recovery, while decreases in 
operational commitment tend to worsen it.  
This suggests that prescriptions for the corporate-level or business-level may not hold for 
the subsidiary-level, at least without further specification. Retrenchments at the subsidiary-level, 
in particular, may have an adverse effect since the gains from efficiency may be offset by 
negative rippling effects resulting from the perceived decrease in headquarter commitment. This 
adds to the discourse between the two camps within the organizational decline/turnaround 
literature, suggesting that 1) retrenchment is a necessary first response (Pearce & Robbins, 1994) 
and 2) that retrenchment may be a reflection of further decline and thus not welcomed (Barker & 
Mone, 1994). We offer a broader perspective by moving away from a focus on decreases in 
commitment and emphasizing the importance of increasing investments into the foreign 
subsidiary. 
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 In general, it appears that the determinants for the rate of recovery are different from the 
determinants of the rate of exit. This may suggest that MNE headquarters need to consider which 
outcome they desire more: short-term financial recuperation or longer-perspective ensuring of 
survival. Future research could investigate the specific characteristics of the subsidiary further 
which would cause an MNE to aim for short-term or long-term recuperation.  
 
7.1.4 Regarding the “Synchronizing” Dimension 
 Following Tangpong et al., (2015), we emphasized the importance of the timing of the 
first response and explored its effect on the probability of recovery (versus exit). Specifically, we 
asked What factors determine the timing of a response and what role does the timing of 
responses play in the effectiveness of the chosen response in increasing recovery and survival 
prospects? 
Our findings suggest that some subsidiaries may receive earlier headquarter attention 
which may aid them in their recovery, since it can decrease the risk of being stuck in inaction. 
The factors that may lead to more headquarter attention can be summarized as communication 
channels which enhance the frequency of communication between the headquarters and its 
subsidiary. We find that especially when the subsidiary has an R&D focus, it receives earlier 
headquarter attention. Also, if the GM was Japanese, the response was more likely to be 
administered earlier rather than later. This may be due to fewer cultural and language barriers 
between the Japanese headquarters and the subsidiary, and thus a more trusting flow of 
information. We are not aware of any studies that have examined the determinants for the timing 
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of a response and indeed, Tangpong et al. (2015) call for exploring this aspect further. Our study 
contributes an initial look at what may impact the timing of a response. 
To better assess the notion of the timing of a response, we then explored the impact of the 
timing on the probability of recovery versus exit. We combined arguments about time 
compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) with arguments about the detrimental effects 
of inaction (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989) and hypothesize an inverted U-shape in the relationship 
between the timing of  a response and the probability of recovery versus exit. We did indeed find 
support for this hypothesis, suggesting that very early responses to subpar performance (i.e. in 
the first two years of subpar performance) may be counterproductive. This qualifies and extends 
Weitzel and Jonsson’s (1989) recommendation to respond as early as possible. Indeed, extensive 
due diligence may be required before an appropriate response can be administered. Further, this 
finding may be interpreted in support of cutting the first two years of subpar performance 
sequences from analyses, since they may contain “knee-jerk” reactions which are not good 
indicators of the effectiveness of a thoroughly orchestrated response.  
We then qualified this finding of a curvilinear relationship by introducing the moderating 
effect of response type and GM replacement. Regarding response types, we found that different 
responses are time-sensitive to differing degrees. In particular, while increases in commitment 
may be more beneficial to the likelihood of recovery than decreases in commitment, we also find 
that the timing of a decrease in commitment response matters more than it does for an increase in 
commitment. If, as our findings suggest, a retrenchment was conducted very early on or very 
late, the outcome may indeed be counterproductive to recovery rates. Thus, including the aspect 
of the timing of a response may be an important contingency factor that can advance the debate 
on whether retrenchment is a necessary aspect to successful turnarounds or not. We also advance 
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Tangpong et al.’s finding that earlier retrenchment actions appear to be better than later ones by 
considering the entire sequence range for this analysis and thus exposing a curvilinear effect. 
Regarding the replacement of the top leadership during subpar performance, we build on 
contingency arguments put forward in the extant literature. We particularly build on Chen and 
Hambrick (2012) who note that GM replacements per se do not hold much value for the 
subsidiary’s turnaround but that certain contingency factors (fit or misfit in their study) may 
explain when GM replacements are a valuable approach. We extend their perspective by offering 
the timing of GM replacement as a contingency factor. Our findings suggest that only when the 
GM replacement was done very early did it have a productive effect; beyond that, GM 
replacements were counterproductive to recovery rates. We also suspect, however, that the 
replacement of a GM at the subsidiary level will be less impactful than the replacement of a CEO 
at the corporate level, as the decline/turnaround literature suggests. This may potentially be due 
to the fact that a replacement of the GM at a foreign subsidiary has a different (less visible) effect 
than replacing the corporate-level CEO in the declining firm’s headquarters. Future research 
could explore this notion further. 
 The construct of time is multidimensional and in our study, we assessed the aspect of a 
timing of the first response on the probability of recovery versus exit. It would be interesting to 
explore other dimensions of time in future research, such as the specific ordering of responses. 
For instance, is a retrenchment followed by a strategic response most effective (Schmitt & 
Raisch, 2013) or should this be reversed or simultaneous? What contingencies affect the 
effectiveness of the ordering of events? Although Schendel & Patton (1976) called for research 
on the ordering of responses, not much progress has been made in this regard.  
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 In sum, the findings from this thesis may expand current knowledge about organizational 
decline/turnaround in the international context in several directions. Furthermore, we offer a 
theoretical framework which could act as guidance when examining the subpar performance 
phenomenon in an international context.  
 In particular, using a resource orchestration perspective, we devised three dimensions 
“identifying”, “responding”, and “synchronizing” through which mechanisms could be 
categorized. This approach allows us to view the phenomenon less from a phenomenon-driven 
perspective as much of the existing literature has done (Trahms et al., 2013) and more from a 
theory-driven perspective. Moreover, we moved the concept of time into the foreground. Most 
extant research has treated time as a latent construct but responses to subpar performance are 
time-critical - thus, temporal concepts such as timing, duration, ordering, and synchronization 
should be explicitly modeled (Tangpong et al., 2015). It would be interesting to see future 
research follow resource orchestration from its initiation to its completion. Although some 
studies on resource orchestration exist (e.g. Chadwick et al., 2015), a qualitative study following 
the process of resource orchestration in the case of addressing subpar performance sequences at 
foreign subsidiaries would be enlightening.  
The findings from this thesis thus contribute most strongly to two main literatures within 
this realm: 1) regarding the organizational decline/turnaround literature, this thesis expands the 
field of vision from a domestic, corporate-level or business-level perspective to an international, 
headquarters-subsidiary perspective. While some notions of that literature hold (e.g. the 
importance of retrenchment when slack is present), other constructs were not even considered in 
that literature yet (e.g. regional headquarter role, MNE network, cultural distance). Moreover, 
this expansion allows for a different take on devising a theoretical framework to guide the 
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analysis. 2) Regarding the international divestiture literature, this thesis offers a more 
comprehensive analysis of a subsection of the literature, which considers subpar performance as 
one predictor of divestitures. By focusing only on those subsidiaries that are performing poorly, 
divestitures can be seen as one type of response and the perspective opens up for other types of 
responses. 
Other literatures may be tangential to this thesis as well. For instance, the literature on 
organizational resilience touches upon exploring what makes some firms weather a crisis and 
others to fold under pressure. Perhaps the model devised in this thesis allows for a more 
international perspective of influencing factors and mechanisms that are at play in such 
situations. 
 
7.2 Managerial Implications 
While this thesis by no means claims any normative power, it does reveal an important 
aspect that is relevant to MNE-level managers. When a subsidiary experiences subpar 
performance, whether and how a response follows depends in part on how attention is allocated 
throughout the organization. How misaligned attention structures can be is illustrated by 
anecdotal evidence by Beamish (2008: 100) from a training module with 40 executives from a 
Fortune 500 bank. The executives were asked to indicate the number of alliances and joint 
ventures within the bank’s network - the best estimate was off by about 77 percent of the actual 
number. The reason for this gross underestimation could be that beyond about a dozen 
subsidiaries, it is difficult to know and keep track of the subsidiary network as a whole. As a 
result of larger networks, each individual unit may receive less headquarter attention and thus be 
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less likely to experience a response to subpar performance. Thus, if the goal is to aim for a 
response when a foreign subsidiary experiences subpar performance, improving the allocation of 
attention within the MNE network may be desirable.  
Further, our analysis revealed that MNEs can counteract some attention-related aspects 
inherent in a foreign subsidiary by assigning strategic roles to subsidiaries or placing importance 
on the selection of the GM. These are but two options for enhancing communication frequency 
and thus increase attention to the subsidiary. However, to reduce the out-of-sight-out-of-mind 
phenomenon, managers can also allocate sufficient resources to personal visits to headquarters. 
Especially then the subsidiary is many flight hours away from the headquarters, making travel 
time-consuming (Boeh & Beamish, 2011) or in a country that is associated with travel-related 
hassles (Schotter & Beamish, 2013), the trip is likely going to be worth it in the longer run. 
When communication channels are well established, future responses to challenging situations 
such as subpar performance are likely going to be easier and faster. 
The arguments brought forward in the thesis, particularly in the “Identifying” section, 
reinforce the view that managerial attention is a scarce and valuable resource. The allocation of 
said attention is an important matter since it may be translated into monetary losses when an 
ailing subsidiary is overlooked because it is further away or otherwise distant from the 
headquarters. Thus, managers should monitor and evaluate not only where their individual 
attention is directed but also how attention is embedded in organizational structures. For 
instance, is the organization too entrepreneurially-oriented that the risk management department 
is easily outvoted? Is the management team so opportunity-driven that longer-term perspectives 
may be neglected?  
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Further, the findings in the “Synchronizing” section underscore the importance of rigor 
when conducting responses to subpar performance. It appears that very early responses to subpar 
performance may, on average, not be conducive to enhancing the subsidiary’s likelihood of 
recovery. A careful information gathering process may take time but prove to be more effective 
in the longer run. Perhaps because retrenchment has become known as a go-to response to subpar 
performance, firms may administer that response right away without anticipating the negative 
effects this may have on morale and productivity. Thus, the findings from this thesis may offer 
some caution with regards to resorting to retrenchments as the very first response. GM 
replacements however, are likely to be more effective if done right after decline is detected. The 
reason for this could be that the outgoing GM may have contributed to the decline, e.g. by 
inaction, and a new GM may boost morale, bring in fresh ideas, break up political groups within 
the organization, and thus facilitate the subsidiary’s recovery. Decision-makers should thus 
consider the timing and the type of the response in unison when considering how to best address 
subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary.    
Finally, as the decline/turnaround literature has repeatedly emphasized and this thesis has 
again confirmed: identifying the accurate causes of decline is a very complex and challenging 
endeavor with much uncertainty. Usually, decline occurs as a result of a combination of non-time 
variant and time-variant factors that are very difficult to discern. Since managers are required to 
make decisions quickly, as stakeholder pressure increases, psychological stress can increase 
considerably. Indeed, Whetten (1980: 583) notes that “One of the most pronounced effects of 
decline is that it increases stress”. Under very high degrees of stress, decision-makers may 
become paralyzed in their decision-making or jump to inaccurate, “knee-jerk” reactions, leading 
to faulty action (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). It may be useful to proactively counteract negative 
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stress from building up, since it is likely going to lead to adverse outcomes such as faulty 
actions. Both the manager as an individual and the organization as a structural background 
should account for such challenges before a decline occurs. 
 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Several limitations of the analyses presented in this thesis lend themselves to future 
research directions. First, the study on “Identifying” has the potential of being expanded in 
several directions, starting from its current limitations. The selection of response categories 
resulted from a careful consideration of the tension between offering a sufficient amount of detail 
and the requirement to create categories with at least 30 observations each (Roth & Morrison, 
1990). Future research could build on this study by going into more detail about each specific 
type of response.  
Second, although the Toyo Keizai dataset offers a rich amount of information, some 
forms of responding may not have been captured. For instance, responses to subpar performance 
such as hiring a consulting company, intensifying advertisement efforts at the subsidiary-level, 
process-reorganizations, product-line adjustments, or utilization of credit options are not 
information that is offered in the TK dataset. This notion is true for all parts of the analysis that 
involved a response variable measure. Future research could go into more detail regarding types 
of responses by exploring this research question with a qualitative study design. However, some 
confidence regarding the usefulness of the chosen responses is derived from their similarity to 
Barker and Duhaime’s (1997) list of actions that were verified through a mail questionnaire sent 
to CEOs of 208 U.S. manufacturing firms.  
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Third, the common denominator in this study is the fact that each subsidiary in the 
sample is at least in part owned by a Japanese parent firm. This has the advantage of creating a 
more homogenous sample and thus eliminating one source of variability while maintaining a 
large sample size. At the same time, however, this aspect may affect the results if Japanese 
parent firms have idiosyncratic ways of responding to subpar performance at the subsidiary level. 
For instance, Japanese MNEs have traditionally relied more on expatriates as a means to control 
foreign subsidiaries than MNEs from other home countries (Gong, 2003; Peterson, Napier & 
Shim, 1996). Another aspect may be the notion that Japanese managers and expatriates are likely 
to be influenced by the cultural values of their home countries, at least to a certain extent. For 
instance, as Hofstede et al. (2010) identified, the dimension of long-term orientation is much 
higher in Japanese cultures (a score of 88/100) than in the U.S. culture (a score of 26/100). This 
could potentially influence the types of responses administered and whether any detectable 
response occurs at all. Therefore, the findings from this study are most directly generalizable to 
subsidiaries within Japanese MNE contexts, although we suspect that many findings will also 
apply to foreign subsidiaries from other contexts. Future research could extend this study by 
expanding the sample to subsidiaries with other combinations of host country MNE parent firms. 
Fourth, this thesis controlled for sector membership (particularly the similarity between 
the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary) is controlled for. There may, however, be 
differences between subsidiaries from the manufacturing sector and those from the service 
sector. For instance, since the value generated in service industries is predominantly derived 
from the interaction between a customer and an employee, a service-sector organization 
experiencing subpar performance may rely less on reductions in the number of employees than a 
manufacturing-sector organization. Future studies could explore this aspect in more depth. 
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Fifth, the “identifying” analyses focused on first responses (after at least two years of 
subpar performance) while ignoring subsequent responses. Future studies could consider those 
subsequent responses and their determinants in more depth. Moreover, Chung & Beamish (2010) 
may be a fitting reference here, who examined the impact of a first and all subsequent change in 
ownership. A study similar to theirs could be informative to the context of first and subsequent 
responses to subpar performance as well.   
Sixth, the study on “responding” is also not without limitations. As Mata and Portugal 
(2000) note, exit of a subsidiary from the dataset does not necessarily mean that it was closed or 
went bankrupt. Instead, it is possible that the equity held by the Japanese parent firm(s) was sold 
to another company, including the local partner, or the subsidiary as a whole was fully acquired 
by another company. As it is the case with many large secondary data sources, it is not possible 
to discern which fate befell the subsidiary. As Benito (2005) and Berry (2013) note, divestments 
can occur as a result of a number of causes. What can be reasonably implied, however, is that the 
Japanese parent firm likely did not envision further investment into the subsidiary anymore, 
suggesting that the perceived value of the subsidiary has declined. As such, exit is an important 
indicator of the subsidiary’s status within the MNE. Future studies could aim to refine this 
approach by gathering data which specifically differentiates between exits due to closure, 
bankruptcy, and other reasons. Furthermore, the longer the duration of the subpar performance 
sequence, the fewer observations are available each year. Mata and Portugal (2000) encountered 
the same concern and suggest that while analysing the full length of available subpar 
performance sequences is informative, the findings towards the right tail of that duration should 
be interpreted with caution.  
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  Seventh, in this thesis, we assess the “Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing” 
parts of the model separately, while aiming for as much rigor in the choice and execution of each 
of the methodological approaches as possible. Future research could combine these parts (or 
aspects of these parts) into one model, to carry the effect of a specific determinant of a response 
all the way through to the eventual outcome, while accounting for temporal aspects. We believe 
that such an approach could be possible with a structural equation modeling technique (SEM). 
However, in order to not lose rigor within each subpart of such a model, much computational 
power and a very large dataset are likely going to be necessary. Perhaps the SEM technique itself 
will have to be more advanced before it can be used to adequately investigate such a model 
which combines a multinomial logit regression with a competing-risk gap time event history 
analysis, and a moderation effect. Nonetheless, a combined approach would likely generate new 
insights about the overarching impact of determinants and may thus be an important endeavor for 
future research. 
Eighth, in an ideal world (and what is often approximated in laboratory settings), the 
assignment of treatment (i.e. action) will be conducted in a random manner, to ensure that any 
differences between groups are truly attributable to the effects of the treatment. Such a 
randomized experimental design is the optimal approach for making causal inferences. With 
real-world, observational data (as predominant in most social sciences settings), however, such a 
randomization is often not possible: we cannot create a randomized sample by forcing some 
subsidiaries to change their ownership and others to refrain from doing so. Although we 
followed some of Antonakis et al.’s (2010) best practice steps for managing endogeneity, e.g.  
including control variables to reduce the risk for omitted variable bias, future studies could refine 
the analyses with regards to addressing endogeneity. As such, this limitation connects to the 
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preceding one, whereby SEM may be the most fitting approach to include instrumental variables 
or endogenous treatment designs (which have only been started to be published in Stata) into the 
analyses. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 The model offered presented in this study provides a mapping of the mechanisms that are 
at work when subpar performance occurs at a foreign subsidiary. A theoretical framework 
devised from resource orchestration, consisting of the sub-processes of “identifying”, 
“responding” and “synchronizing” was developed. We hope that this work will spark more 
studies into the analysis of the subpar performance phenomenon in an international context, 
thereby fostering a deeper exploration of the next chapter in the decades-old decline/turnaround 
literature.  
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